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Abstract 
 
This thesis generates a greater understanding of the George W. Bush administration’s 
Freedom Agenda for the Middle East and North Africa.  It is motivated by two central 
research questions: How and why was the Freedom Agenda developed? And, how was 
the Freedom Agenda constituted?  To address these questions, a constructivist 
institutionalist methodology is developed.  The value of this undertaking, is that it 
theorises the relationship between the events of September 11, 2001, and the rise of the 
Freedom Agenda.  Consequently, this research focuses on the narrative constructed in the 
aftermath of the “crisis”, and how this laid discursive tracks for the evolution of the 
Freedom Agenda.  Furthermore, it is demonstrated that the Bush administration 
appropriated and articulated multiple discourses into a distinctive ideological-discursive 
formation, which in turn, sedimented particular definitions of concepts such as 
‘democracy’ and ‘freedom’.  This created a new policy paradigm, which failed to address 
the ‘conflict of interests’ problem central to US-Middle East relations.  As a result, the 
Freedom Agenda demonstrated a commitment to regional stability and the gradual reform 
of ally regimes, whilst seeking to challenge regimes hostile to the US.  It was a policy 
caught between promoting democracy and domination. 
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Introduction 
This thesis seeks to generate a greater understanding of the George W. Bush 
administration’s (2001 to 2009) Freedom Agenda for the Broader Middle East.  As such, 
this thesis is motivated by two central research questions: 
 
• How and why was the Freedom Agenda developed?  
• How was the Freedom Agenda constituted and why was it done in this way? 
 
To answer these research questions this thesis is methodologically driven but empirically 
rich.  It combines theoretical innovation, which builds on the ‘constructivist turn’ in the 
social sciences, with empirical research.  By undertaking this task, this thesis adds value 
to the current literature on both a theoretical and empirical level.  Moreover, whilst the 
approach adopted is interdisciplinary in scope, it seeks to be firmly based within, and 
contribute to, the Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) subfield of International Relations 
literature.   
 
The particular focus of this thesis is United States foreign and security policy in the 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) in the aftermath of September 11, 2001.  More 
specifically, it seeks to return to first order questions concerning the Bush 
administration’s prioritisation of democracy promotion to the level of grand strategy in 
US-MENA relations.  Such questions are imperative to answer, firstly because of a 
serious gap in the current literature, and secondly because of the highly ideological 
manner in which the Bush administration articulated particular discourses to legitimise its 
Freedom Agenda policy.  Accordingly, the findings of this thesis are important on 
multiple levels.  Firstly, they provide a deeper understanding of the Bush administration’s 
policy towards the MENA, explicating the level of continuity and change that the 
Freedom Agenda presents within a long durée.  Secondly, they problematise and critique 
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the policy by illustrating how essentially contested concepts such as ‘freedom’, and 
‘democracy’ were sedimented into a particular ideological-discursive formation,  
consequently, constructing and propagating particular power relations and rule structures.  
Third, they illustrate problems with democracy promotion both philosophically and at the 
level of praxis, therefore signalling wider problems with such an approach being adopted 
by future administrations. 
 
To answer the set research questions this thesis is broken down into four distinct sections.  
Section one begins by defining the policies and agencies that constitute the Freedom 
Agenda.  The aim of this section is to demonstrate that the Freedom Agenda is composed 
of much wider policy actions than just the Iraq war in 2003.  Notably, democracy 
promotion for the MENA has been pursued through the Middle East Partnership 
Initiative (MEPI), the Middle East Free Trade Area (MEFTA), the Broader Middle East 
and North Africa Initiative (BMENA) and culminated in the ADVANCE Democracy Act 
of 2007 and National Security Presidential Directive-58 (NSPD).  These policies 
constitute the institutional and legislative structure buttressing the Bush administration’s 
liberal grand strategy, which sought to transform the MENA region into pro-Western 
democratic states. The institutionalisation of the Freedom Agenda has however created 
serious tensions in US-MENA relations.  By advocating democratic reform, a ‘conflict of 
interests’ was created that challenged decades of US foreign policy in the region.  
 
Since the end of the Second World War successive administrations have propagated the 
notion that American national interests in the region were satisfied by preventing the spread 
of communism, securing the free flow of oil and protecting the security and integrity of 
Israel’s borders.  By advocating the democratisation of the region, however, the Bush 
administration was seen by many to challenge this status quo.  Instead the Bush 
administration argued that American national interests lay in promoting democracy, as this 
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would be a method of eradicating terrorism, promoting regional stability, creating regional 
economic growth and ending tyranny.  This created a ‘conflict of interests’ problematic, 
that the Bush administration attempted to navigate and resolve throughout its time in 
office.   
 
By constructing the Freedom Agenda, the Bush administration invited a considerable 
amount of discord concerning US-MENA relations.  A series of critiques emerged that 
challenged the Freedom Agenda by arguing that it would empower Islamist movements, 
cause regional instability, was based on a misunderstanding of movements such as Al 
Qaeda, and ultimately that the Freedom Agenda would harm indigenous groups 
promoting democratic reform.  Conversely, a wide ranging consensus emerged to support 
the Freedom Agenda and argue that promoting democracy in the region was a necessity 
and the only method of combating the form of terrorism that demonstrated itself on 
September 11, 2001.  Section one will review this literature, and demonstrate that the 
debate has often been overly concerned with strategic questions, rather than exploring 
what exactly the Bush administration believed the Freedom Agenda was supposed to be 
promoting.  This leaves a gap in the literature, as there is a failure to address first order 
questions.  To redress this issue it is argued that a hermeneutic analysis is needed, before 
critiques of praxis.  It is only by doing this that it is possible to reactivate the sedimentary 
logics that underpinned the Freedom Agenda. 
 
To add this hermeneutic dimension and create a greater understanding of the Freedom 
Agenda it is necessary to elucidate the methodology that underpins this research.  This 
methodology must be capable of theoretically and historically (re)-constructing the 
context from which the Freedom Agenda developed and therefore be sensitive to 
institutional changes.  Moreover, it must include the ability to analyse both the 
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underpinning philosophy of the Freedom Agenda and the manner in which this was 
turned into praxis.  Consequently, section two of this research develops a methodological 
framework to analyse the Freedom Agenda at a meta-theoretical level.  As such, it begins 
by critiquing ‘mainstream constructivist’ literature in International Relations theory, but 
puts forward ‘constructivist institutionalism’ as a modified alternative.  It is argued that 
such a methodology is theoretically robust, and better equipped to answer the questions 
guiding this research.   
 
The constructivist institutionalist methodology is able to guide this research because it 
builds on an insight made by Michael Barnett (1999), who argues that, traditional 
constructivist literature in International Relations has failed to incorporate a core insight 
of institutionalism, namely that actors strategise in institutional settings.  Conversely, 
institutionalism fails to incorporate a core insight of constructivism, namely that actors 
are embedded in and circumscribed by a normative structure that demarcate the limits of 
legitimate and possible policy options.  With this guiding mantra in place, it is argued 
that the constructivist institutionalist methodology is able to surmount this problem by 
explicitly developing a stance on ontological and epistemological debates; namely, the 
role of structure and agency, and ideas and material in political action.  By virtue of 
engaging with these debates, it is argued that political time can be understood as a 
process of punctuated evolution, where “normal” policy-making is disrupted by crises 
and consequently evolves along an alternative path.  Whilst this describes the shape of 
political time, it is argued that how crises are narrated provides the content of political 
change.  Consequently, it is necessary to elucidate the ideological-discursive formation 
and rule structures that underpin post-crisis narration to understanding policy 
development and institutional evolution. 
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Deploying the constructivist institutionalist methodology in this research has a direct 
impact on the methods used for data analysis.  Consequently, section two of this research 
will outline how a process-tracing narrative discourse analysis was utilised in an analysis 
of various ‘texts’ produced by the Bush administration. This technical section outlines 
how the computer software NVivo 8 was used to store and conduct an analysis of 
speeches, interviews, radio addresses, reports to congress, and official documents.  The 
time span of these texts was from September 23, 1999, to January 19, 2009.  These texts 
were analysed manually and supplemented with computer assisted searches until a level 
of discursive saturation was reached. 
 
Section three of this research will detail the findings of the process-tracing narrative 
discourse analysis established as a result of the constructivist institutionalist 
methodology.  In particular, this section specifically addresses the question of how and 
why the Freedom agenda developed in response to September 11, 2001.  It begins by 
detailing the post-Cold War context in which the 2000 presidential campaign was 
contested.  It argues that whilst the presidential campaign between Al Gore and George 
W. Bush was unexceptional, the importance of the campaign for the Freedom Agenda 
was that candidate Bush set out a distinctive ideological-discursive formation.  Notably, 
Bush’s vision for US foreign policy, under the banner of a ‘Distinctly American 
Internationalism’ combined US primacy with hegemonic stability theory as a proposed 
means of preventing American decline.  Furthermore, this was articulated with an 
understanding of how ‘freedom’ could be promoted through neoliberal methods, based on 
a particular understanding of modernisation thesis, to create a utopian organisation of 
democratic, prosperous, peaceful, secure interdependent states.  Notably, this guiding 
philosophy was not applied to US-MENA relations prior to September 11, 2001.  
However, the importance of this ideological-discursive formation was that it provided the 
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foundations for the initial response to September 11, 2001, and evolved throughout the 
end of 2001 to early 2009, culminating in the Freedom Agenda being institutionalised.   
 
Indeed, if the events of September 11, 2001 are understood as a crisis requiring a decisive 
intervention, it is possible to understand them as constituting a moment of punctuation in 
US-MENA relations.  Accordingly, it is possible to understand the events themselves as 
critical to the structuring of political time, in that they introduced an uncertainty condition 
that strategically selective actors in the state bureaucracy sought to overcome.  Initially, 
this was done by narrating the events as a tragedy.  However, the Bush administration 
radically began to assimilate the events into a large historical understanding, constructing 
them as part of a moral play that required a ‘war on terrorism’.  By seamlessly 
transforming this moral play into a moral crusade, the Bush administration foregrounded 
moral realism and American exceptionalism in an attempt to legitimise its response.  As 
this ideological-discursive formation grasped multiple concepts together, the Bush 
administration provided a distinctive understanding of terms such as ‘freedom’, 
‘democracy’, ‘peace’ and ‘security’, which were then institutionalised into the Freedom 
Agenda.   
 
Given this researches focus on post-crisis institutional development, it is argued that the 
rise of the Freedom Agenda can only be understood by focusing on the “official” 
narrative presented by the administration after September 11, 2001.  It is this narrative 
that laid the discursive tracks that gave rise to the notion that America must defeat ‘evil’ 
and ‘advance freedom’.  This shaped the content of change in the post-crisis context, and 
opened up a political space for contestation within the administration over what exactly 
had gone wrong and what should be done.  Undeniably, before the Freedom Agenda 
came to fruition, multiple cumulative steps were taken that influenced its construction.  
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The war in Afghanistan began to shape what was deemed politically feasible and 
desirable, and with what was perceived as a swift victory, a new hubris was born that 
substantiated claims that the US could project its overwhelming military power in Iraq 
and socially engineer a democratic state in the Middle East.  Consequently, from 
November 2001 through to the invasion in March 2003, individuals within the Bush 
administration began to view an invasion of Iraq as a means of creating a ‘domino effect’ 
throughout the MENA region.  To supplement this vision and push the creation of 
democratic states in the region the Bush administration constructed the Freedom Agenda, 
legitimised by appeals to democratic peace theory and the universal appeal of freedom.  
This was presented by the Bush administration as a new overarching rationale to US 
foreign policy, which had been missing since the end of the Cold War.  Moreover, it was 
presented as part of an ideological struggle in which a ‘foreign policy based on liberty’ 
and a ‘hopeful ideology called freedom’ could defeat extremists and their ‘hateful 
ideology’. 
 
Whilst section three details the rise of the Freedom Agenda, and the evolutionary logics 
embedded within the post-crisis narration, section four addresses how the Freedom 
Agenda was constituted and why it was done in this way.  It argues that, in spite of the 
Bush administration’s bold assertions that democracy promotion was in the national 
interest, the Freedom Agenda can be described as a policy of conservative radicalism.  
The approach is radical to the extent that it insists on political democracy, yet 
conservative in its desire to safeguard the socio-economic privileges and power of the 
established order to secure regional stability.  Such a strategy was caught between 
democracy promotion and free trade as the positive route to liberty, and domination to the 
extent that negative liberty was undermined in favour of stability.  As the Bush 
administration oscillated between emphasising both of these elements it enabled a double 
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standard in the Freedom Agenda to emerge.  This was characterised by a slow gradualist 
policy guided by an understanding of freedom in economic terms for regional allies.  
However, for regimes that challenged American policy in the region, a strategy of regime 
change was pursued.  This approach highlights the central contradictions in the Bush 
stratagem, which ultimately led to a retreat from the agenda from 2006 onwards.  The 
Bush administration was ultimately unable to convert vision into action, because the zeal 
in which the strategy had been constructed contained ideological blind-spots.  Due to the 
shallow understanding of freedom, based on neoliberalism and modernisation thesis 
being a dominant part of the Bush administration’s ideological-discursive formation, it 
became evident that the administration was promoting a policy of low-intensity 
democracy in an inhospitable strategically selective context. 
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Section One: 
Defining the Freedom Agenda and Reviewing the 
Literature 
 
Sixty years of Western nations excusing and accommodating the lack of freedom in the 
Middle East did nothing to make us safe ... As long as the Middle East remains a place 
where freedom does not flourish, it will remain a place of stagnation, resentment, and 
violence ready for export.  And with the spread of weapons that can bring catastrophic 
harm to our country and to our friends, it would be reckless to accept the status quo. 
 
George W. Bush (2003_11_06) 
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1. What is the Freedom Agenda? 
 
The ambition of promoting democracy in the Middle East is not new to the American 
people or their foreign policy.  Since the early nineteenth century American missionaries 
have sought to take American values and plant them in the region.  Inspired by the 
Second Great Awakenings of the nineteenth century and a desire for adventure in a new 
frontier, missionaries went to the Middle East to set up schools, clinics, churches and 
colonies, all with the aim of ‘letting in the light’ and spreading the ‘American Eagle of 
freedom’ (Oren 2007: 210-27; Mead 2001: 158-62; Hahn 2005: 2).  Moreover, after the 
First World War, whilst Britain and France were fighting over “the great loot of the 
war”1, it was President Wilson who was arguing for ‘self-determination’ and 
‘autonomous development’ for all ‘nationalities … under Turkish Rule’2 (Oren 2007: 
377).  Similarly, subsequent American Presidents have claimed that they support 
democratic governance for the Middle East.  Thus, at the birth of the Eisenhower 
Doctrine the President argued that, 
The Middle East has abruptly reached a new and critical stage in its long and 
important history. In past decades many of the countries in that area were not 
fully self-governing … But since the First World War there has been a steady 
evolution toward self-government and independence. This development the 
United States has welcomed and has encouraged. Our country supports without 
reservation the full sovereignty and independence of each and every nation of the 
Middle East (Eisenhower 1957). 
 
Contrastingly, in the same period, the political rhetoric did not match policy, with 
American idealist notions of self-determination and anti-colonialism giving way to 
conservative/imperial counterrevolutionary policies (Hahn 2005: 35-46; Yaqub 2004: 87-
121; Gaddis 1997: 172-6).  Thus, as Steve Smith has noted, ‘the debate about US 
democracy promotion seems to assume that the US has had a clear long-standing 
                                              
1 A term used by William L. Westermann to describe the Interwar Middle East (cited in Oren 2007: 380). 
2 Of particular importance is Point Twelve of the Fourteen Points Plan presented to Congress in January 
1918.   
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commitment to such a policy, I see the record as far more complex’3 (2002: 65).  What 
can however be asserted is that throughout the twentieth century, as the United States 
increasingly became involved in Middle Eastern affairs, and concerned over the region’s 
geo-political orientation, the notion of promoting democracy in the Middle East was 
always at least a stated goal of US foreign policy.   
 
Yet, it was under the George W. Bush administration, and in the aftermath of the 
September 11, 2001 attacks, that promoting democracy in the Middle East was elevated 
and believed to be central to American national security interests.  Thus, as Jessica 
Mathews notes, 
Of all the tectonic shifts in US foreign policy emerging from the aftermath of 
9/11, none is more potentially transformative than the widespread conviction in 
the US policy community that America must reverse its long time support for 
friendly tyrants in the Middle East and push hard for a democratic transformation 
of that troubled region (2005: vii). 
 
At a surface level President Bush provided a succinct answer to explain why this shift 
was necessary, 
Sixty years of Western nations excusing and accommodating the lack of freedom 
in the Middle East did nothing to make us safe ... As long as the Middle East 
remains a place where freedom does not flourish, it will remain a place of 
stagnation, resentment, and violence ready for export. And with the spread of 
weapons that can bring catastrophic harm to our country and to our friends, it 
would be reckless to accept the status quo (Bush 2003_11_06). 
 
Accordingly the intention behind of the Freedom Agenda was to use the full spectrum of 
means available to the United States for the ‘advancement of human freedom and human 
dignity through effective democracy’ (NSCT 2006: 9).  The objectives of which were to: 
• Eradicate terrorism 
• Promote regional stability 
• Promote regional economic growth 
• End tyranny and create peace (see NSCT 2006) 
                                              
3 For a lineal account of US democracy promotion see Tony Smith (1994) America’s Mission: The United 
States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century. 
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Undoubtedly, these objectives were dominated by liberal ideals, and the Freedom Agenda 
was the quintessential expression of a liberal grand strategy.  No bolder statement of such 
an approach could have been put forward than that asserted in the 2006 National Security 
Strategy (NSS): 
It is the policy of the United States to seek and support democratic movements 
and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending 
tyranny in our world.  In the world today, the fundamental character of regimes 
matters as much as the distribution of power among them.  The goal of our 
statecraft is to help create a world of democratic, well-governed states that can 
meet the needs of their citizens and conduct themselves responsibly in the 
international system.  This is the best way to provide enduring security for the 
American people (NSC 2006: 1). 
 
The “liberal grand strategy” label is often used  to describe administrations characterised 
by their emphasis on the domestic character of other states as vitally important for the 
attainment of American security and material interests (see Ikenberry 2000: 103).  The 
logical corollary of this notion is that promoting both American self-interest and values 
may actually assist one another.  For national security liberals, it is believed that there is a 
symbiotic relationship between enhanced American global influence and the promotion 
of “peace, prosperity and freedom” (see Smith 2000b).  Accordingly, as President Bush 
maintained, 
Our greatest strength is that we serve the cause of liberty. We support the advance 
of freedom in the Middle East, because it is our founding principle, and because it 
is in our national interest (Bush 2003_05_09). 
 
Notably the Bush administration was not the first to assert this symbiotic synergy of 
principles and interests.  It is important to note that the genealogical origins of this 
approach date back as far as the eighteenth and nineteenth century.  As such 
contemporary liberal prescriptions of the national interest have long roots growing out of 
the “progressive” philosophy of the European enlightenment, the creation of the United 
States and American’s Wilsonian tradition (see Wittkopf et al. 2002: 245-50; Mead 2001: 
132-173; McCormick 1992).  Then as now, liberal prescriptions of the national interest 
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concern the pursuit of peace and the elimination of war through cosmopolitan values such 
as democratic government4 and free trade (see Burchill 2005: 104-151). 
 
The novelty of the Freedom Agenda is the manner in which the Bush administration 
sought to spread democracy through coercive regime change, and to institutionalise a 
Forward Strategy of Freedom in the Middle East (FSFME).  Whilst the former was most 
obviously expressed in the form of the 2003 Iraq war, the latter culminated in the Bush 
administration reinforcing and expanding the American ‘democracy bureaucracy’.  
Whilst a considerable amount of literature has focused on democracy promotion and the 
Iraq war, very little has acknowledged the formal institutionalisation process of the 
agenda and institutional changes that have taken place within the ‘democracy 
bureaucracy’.  Thus, it is important to note that the Freedom Agenda consists of both 
“stick and carrot” methods5.  Moreover, these “carrots” have largely, but not exclusively, 
taken the form of the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), the Middle East Free 
Trade Agreement (MEFTA), and the Broader Middle East North Africa initiative 
(BMENA).  Each will be outlined in turn, followed by an explication of the legislative 
embodiment of the Freedom Agenda in the 2007 ADVANCE Democracy Act (ADA) and 
National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) - 58. 
 
The Middle East Partnership Initiative 
 
The most dominant, but certainly not the only, institutional changes made by the Bush 
administration took place within the US Department of State (DOS), specifically in the 
                                              
4 It should be noted that liberalism’s first prescription was for ‘liberty’ and not democracy until the mid-
nineteenth century, when the fear of ‘mob rule’ gave way to the belief that authority is legitimate only with 
the consent of the governed (see Smith 1994: 15) 
5 This distinction is often referred to as “hard” and “soft” power approaches (see McInerney 2008).  
However this term has been deliberately avoided because of the manner in which Joseph Nye defines soft 
power as ‘the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments… aris[ing] 
from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals, and policies’ (2004b: x).  Freedom Agenda 
programmes do not meet these criteria. 
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Bureau of Near East Affairs (NEA).  Crucially Elizabeth Cheney6 pushed for institutional 
reform and was the “brainchild” of the US flagship democracy assistance programme 
entitled the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) (Wittes 2008c).  This programme 
was officially launched on December 12 2002 by Secretary of State Colin Powell, who 
argued that,  
It is time to lay a firm foundation of hope. I am announcing today an initiative 
that places the United States firmly on the side of change, of reform, and of a 
modern future for the Middle East … Through the U.S.-Middle East Partnership 
Initiative, we are adding hope to the U.S.-Middle East agenda. We are pledging 
our energy, our abilities, and our idealism to bring hope to all of God's children 
who call the Middle East home (Powell 2002_12_12). 
 
The intention behind the MEPI programme was to ‘broaden’ the US approach to Middle 
East reform by focusing on factors highlighted in the 2002 UN Arab Human 
Development Report.  This report outlined a ‘freedom deficit’ in the MENA, and argued 
that a strategy needed to be in place to deliver ‘freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom from 
want’, in conjunction with educational improvements and women’s empowerment to the 
people in the region (AHDR 2002).  Significantly, this report was constructed by Arab 
scholars from the region, and MEPI was portrayed as building on regional desires (see 
Bush 2003_05_09; Powell 2002_12_12).  Consequently, MEPI was divided into four 
pillars; Political, Economic, Education, and Women’s issues (See Table 1). 
 
These four pillars were specifically designed to generate short-term grants, lasting for 
two years or less, which focused on addressing specific challenges to democratisation in 
the region.  Accordingly, they sought to overcome problems that stymied longer term 
development projects ran by the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID) (see McInerney 2008: 11; Wittes 2008b: 89).  To meet this goal, MEPI officials 
                                              
6 The daughter of former Vice President Richard Cheney and in 2002 the Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
State for Near Eastern Affairs. 
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often worked with Arab governments, especially in the first two years, to invest funds in 
programmes geared toward ‘strengthening Arab civil society, encouraging micro-
enterprise, expanding political participation, and promoting women’s rights’ (Sharp 
2005b: 2).  In practice, this translated into a plethora of programmes in each pillar, which 
were undertaken simultaneously and justified by their ability to complement and facilitate 
progress in each other (See Table 2).   
 
To fund these programmes in Fiscal Year [FY] 2002 and FY2003, MEPI originally relied 
on emergency supplemental appropriations from Congress, which combined into a total 
of $119 million (see Sharp 2005b: 4).  However, from FY2004 to FY2008 MEPI received 
funding from Economic Support Funds (ESF) in the annual rounds of Congressional 
Foreign Operations Appropriations legislation.  This peaked at a single year high of 
$114.2 million in FY2006, but from FY2002 to FY2008 cumulatively totalled $497.7 
million (See Table 3). 
 
Although these figures demonstrate the impact that the MEPI has had on financial 
commitments to MENA reform, the MEPI’s importance can also be discerned by the 
manner in which it impacted the US ‘democracy bureaucracy’ itself.  Significantly, as 
part of the Bush administration’s commitment to the MEPI strategy, the MEPI became 
the ‘central hub’ for interagency discussions under the Freedom Agenda.  Consequently, 
the MEPI was able to produce a joint review between the Department of State and 
USAID, in which USAID programmes in the MENA region were scrutinised to ensure 
compliance with the MEPI goals and objectives (See Epstein, Serafino, and Miko 2007: 
1-3; Sharp 2005b: 3; Wittes 2008b: 89).  The results of this review were published in a 
Joint Strategic Plan (JSP) for Fiscal Years 2007-2012, by the DOS and USAID, in which 
a strategy of ‘Transformation Diplomacy’ was proposed.  The influence of MEPI was 
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certainly prominent in the joint mission statement asserted by Secretary of State 
Condoleezza Rice: 
The joint mission of the Department of State and USAID is to “Advance freedom 
for the benefit of the American people and the international community by helping 
to build and sustain a more democratic, secure, and prosperous world composed 
of well-governed states that respond to the needs of their people, reduce 
widespread poverty, and act responsibly within the international system.” It is a 
vision rooted in partnership, not paternalism--in doing things with other people, 
not for them (italics in original, JSP 2006: 4).   
 
The Middle East Free Trade Area 
 
On May 9, 2003 the Bush administration proposed that a US - Middle East Free Trade 
Area (MEFTA) be established by 2013.  President Bush argued that: 
The combined GDP [Gross Domestic Product] of all Arab countries is smaller 
than that of Spain. Their peoples have less access to the Internet than the people 
of Sub-Sahara Africa. The Arab world has a great cultural tradition, but is largely 
missing out on the economic progress of our time. Across the globe, free markets 
and trade have helped defeat poverty, and taught men and women the habits of 
liberty. So, I propose the establishment of a U.S. - Middle East free trade area 
within a decade, to bring the Middle East into an expanding circle of opportunity, 
to provide hope for the people who live in that region … By replacing corruption 
and self-dealing, with free markets and fair laws, the people of the Middle East 
will grow in prosperity and freedom (Bush 2003_05_09). 
 
MEFTA was perceived as an end goal of a series of cumulative measures targeted at 
twenty countries in the MENA7.  On June 23, 2003, at the World Economic Forum held 
in Jordan, U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) Robert B. Zoellick outlined a six step 
process for MENA countries to create MEFTA: 
 
1. Joining the World Trade Organisation (WTO). 
2. Participating in the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) programme to 
increase US trade linkages with the MENA. 
3. Negotiating and entering into new trade and investment framework agreements 
(TIFAs). 
4. Negotiating formal bilateral investment treaties (BITs) with interested countries. 
5. Negotiating comprehensive free trade agreements (FTAs) with the US, this would 
be combined into a sub-regional and ultimately a single MEFTA. 
                                              
7 These countries included Algeria, Bahrain, Cyprus, Egypt, the Gaza Strip/ West Bank, Iran, Iraq, Israel, 
Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, the United Arab 
Emirates, and Yemen (see Bolle 2006). 
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6. Participating in trade capacity building, by allowing the US to provide financial 
and technical assistance to realise the creation of open markets.   
 
(See Zoellick 2003_06_23; Bolle 2006: 7-9; Lawrence 2006b: 1-2). 
 
Eligibility for entering into this six step process required minimal concessions from 
MENA countries.  The opportunity of joining MEFTA was left open to countries that met 
the following criteria: 
 
 “Peaceful” and sought to increase trade relations with the US. 
 Prepared to participate in economic reform and liberalisation. 
 Not participating in primary, secondary, or tertiary boycotts of Israel.  
(Bolle 2006: 9).    
 
Whilst the US already had FTAs established with Israel and Jordan before September 11, 
2001, it subsequently concluded FTA agreements with Morocco, Bahrain, the West Bank 
and Gaza and Oman.  Moreover by the end of President Bush’s tenure in office the US 
had 15 TIFAs and 6 BITs in place with MEFTA eligible countries, and was assisting 
Arab governments that had not joined the World Trade Organisation (WTO) to reach this 
goal (See Table 4).   
 
The motivation behind MEFTA is not primarily economic.  Rather it was seen as a 
method of winning ‘hearts and minds’ by creating greater prosperity and peace through 
trade, whilst laying the foundations for liberal reform in the region.  It therefore 
attempted to boost US trade with the 20 MEFTA countries, which accounts for less than 
4% of US exports and less than 5% of US imports.  The dominant US imports from the 
region are oil, gas and textiles.  Of all the yearly consumed oil and gas in the US, 10% is 
imported from the MENA, which consequently totals 53% of all imports from the region.  
The next largest import is textiles, which totals 15% of all imports from the MEFTA 
countries.  Conversely, US exports to MEFTA countries are heavily concentrated on 
 - 26 -
machinery and transportation equipment, which respectively account for 24% and 21% of 
total exports to the region (Bolle 2006: 4-7; see Lawrence 2006b: 95-106).   
 
In addition to envisaged economic benefits, MEFTA sought to work with MEPI to use 
FTAs as a democratising tool, by promoting structural, economic and governance 
reforms.  Accordingly, trade promotion and trade-related technical assistance 
programmes were established, focusing on teaching better methods of making 
government regulation transparent, promoting the rule of contract law, and protecting 
intellectual property (see Wittes 2008b: 85-92). 
 
The Broader Middle East North Africa Initiative 
 
The US launched the Broader Middle East and North Africa initiative during its 2004 G8 
presidency, intending to add a multilateral dimension to the forward strategy of freedom.  
The initiative was the product of a working paper which suggested that the G8 create a 
Greater Middle East Initiative8 (GMEI), which agreed upon a set of common reform 
priorities towards the MENA.  This attempted to replicate many of MEPI’s ambitions and 
tried to create a multilateral goal of ‘promoting democracy and good governance, 
building a knowledge society, and expanding economic opportunities’ for the MENA.  
As a result, the BMENA initiative was marketed as a ‘partnership’ between the G8, the 
US, and European nations, with the governments, business and civil society of the 
MENA region.  Through what was described as ‘genuine co-operation’, BMENA 
officials asserted that the initiative would ‘strengthen freedom, democracy and prosperity 
for all’ in the region (see G8-BMENA 2006; DOS 2004). 
 
The central initaitve that emerged from the June 2004 Sea Island summit was the Forum 
                                              
8 The GMEI was the original name given to BMENA.  The name was changed due to objections that came 
from MENA governments.   
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for the Future.  This was intended to be an annual meeting in which governments, 
business and civil society groups from the G8 and MENA would meet and discuss reform 
measures.  The first of these meetings took place in December 2004 in Morocco, the 
second in November 2005 in Bahrain, the third in December 2006 in Jordan, and the 
fourth in 2008 in the United Arab Emirates.  Although there was intended to be a forum 
in Yemen in 2007 this was not held because of US efforts to rejuvenate Israeli-Palestinian 
peace talks at the Annapolis Conference in Maryland (Wittes 2008b: 96).   
 
In addition to the Forum for the Future, the BMENA initiative was comprised of several 
small multinational and national projects.  Out of the subsequent Forums for the Future 
four main ‘working groups’ were established: 
 
 ‘Tax Administration and Policy’; led by Egypt 
 ‘Financial Systems’ combining Banking System, Financial Sector Reform and 
Regulation, Financial Services, and Capital Market Development; led by Bahrain 
 ‘Microfinance’; led by Jordan 
 ‘Financing Poverty Alleviation’; led by Yemen. (see G8-BMENA 2006) 
 
In addition to these developments and private enterprise endeavours, the BMENA 
initiative attempted to promote literacy by creating ‘The Literacy Hub’.  This was 
designed to provide policymakers and programme developers in the BMENA region with 
an extensive database of exemplary practices and programmes in literacy (see 
LiteracyHub 2008).   
 
A further multilateral dynamic that the BMENA initiative launched was the Foundation 
for the Future. Announced in November 2005, the foundation was intended to pool and 
distribute international funds to nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) in the region.  
As Condoleezza Rice announced at the 2005 Forum for the Future: 
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The Foundation will provide grants to help civil society strengthen the rule of law, 
to protect basic civil liberties, and ensure greater opportunity for health and 
education. But most importantly, the Foundation is a sign that citizens have to be 
trusted who are working for democratic reform in particular countries, and cities, 
and villages to use their grant money for the greatest good that they see fit (Rice 
2005_12_12). 
 
The largest donations to this fund have come from the US, which in FY2006 dedicated 
$35 Million of MEPIs funding to the foundation, but other donors included Denmark, the 
European Commission, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Jordan, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, 
and the United Kingdom (FFF 2008; Wittes 2008b: 97).  In total the fund raised 
approximately $60 million, and by the year end of 2008 the foundation had a net total of 
$26 million in available assets for future projects (FFF 2009: 43-54; DOS 2009; Sharp 
2005a). 
 
The ADVANCE Democracy Act of 2007 and the National Security Presidential 
Directive-58 
 
At a bureaucratic level the Freedom Agenda has led to the creation of new institutions and 
policies, predominantly in the form of the MEPI, the MEFTA and the BMENA initiative.  
Yet there is also an additional legislative layer in which the Freedom Agenda has 
manifested itself and been formally institutionalised.  Notably this has been done through 
the ADVANCE Democracy Act of 20079 (ADA).  This act has largely been ignored or 
erroneously represented within current literature on the Freedom Agenda.  In James 
Traub’s book The Freedom Agenda, published in September 2008, it was even asserted that 
the bill ‘never became law’ (2008: 227).  However, on August 3, 2007, as part of H.R.1. 
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, ADA was ratified10. 
 
                                              
9 This acronym stands for Advance Democratic Values, Address Nondemocratic Countries, and Enhance 
Democracy Act. 
10 See H.R.1 Public Law 110-53, 22 USC 8201n; Title XXI, Sections 2101-62, as passed by the 110th 
Congress. 
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The significance of ADA is multifaceted.  The bill was originally proposed in 2005, 
sponsored by Representative Tom Lantos (D-CA) and Representative Frank Wolf (R-
VA) in the House, and Senator John McCain (R-AZ) and Senator Joe Lieberman (D-CT) 
in the Senate.  Notably this legislation was inspired by and attributed to Mark Palmer’s 
book Breaking the Real Axis of Evil: How to Oust the World’s Last Dictators by 2025 
(see Lantos 2005; Palmer 2003).  Accordingly, ADA asserts that:  
It is the policy of the United States to promote freedom and democracy in foreign 
countries as a fundamental component of United States foreign policy, along with 
other key foreign policy goals11 (ADA  2007: 22 USC 8202). 
 
The importance of this is that ‘the act for the first time declares with the force of law that 
supporting democracy and human rights abroad shall be a fundamental component of 
U.S. foreign policy’ (Mann 2007).   
 
To reflect this objective the ADA legislated changes throughout the US foreign policy 
bureaucracy.  The first of these was the creation of the a Democracy Liaison Office (DLO), 
with new officers to serve under the supervision of the Assistant Secretary of State.  The 
ADA did not prescribe the exact institutional location that these officers would be 
situated.  However, the legislation did account for the possibility of posting Democracy 
Liaison Officers to regional diplomacy offices, multilateral organisations, and US 
combatant commands (ADA  2007: 22 USC 8211). 
 
Additionally, the ADA formally instructed Chiefs of Mission in nondemocratic and 
democratic transition countries to:  
 
Develop, as part of annual program planning, a strategy to promote democratic 
principles, practices, and values in each such foreign country and to provide 
support, as appropriate, to nongovernmental organizations, individuals, and 
                                              
11 The line “along with other key foreign policy goals” was not in the 2005 version of the bill submitted to 
the House and Senate.   
 - 30 -
movements in each such country that are committed to democratic principles, 
practices, and values12 (ADA  2007: 22 USC 8211). 
 
These instructions were accompanied by orders to publicly condemn violations of 
internationally recognised human rights, to visit local landmarks associated with non-
violent protest, and to meet with government leaders to discuss human rights and 
democratisation. 
 
The ADA also required: 
 The creation of a Democracy Fellowship Program to allow DOS officers to work 
with relevant congressional committees, NGOs and multilateral organisations.  
The aim of this was to ‘enable officers of the Department [DOS] to gain an 
additional perspective on democracy promotion in foreign countries’  (ADA  2007: 
22 USC 8212). 
 Enhanced training for Foreign Service Officers on protecting human rights and 
supporting democratisation. 
 Making support for democracy and human rights a criterion for awards, 
performance pay, and promotions within the DOS. 
 Establishing an Office for Multilateral Democracy Promotion. 
 The change of title for the annual report on Supporting Human Rights and 
Democracy: The U.S. Record, to the Annual Report on Advancing Freedom and 
Democracy. 
 The payment of $14 million from the US to the United Nation’s Democracy Fund. 
 
In addition to these official requirements, the ADA also presented a ‘sense of Congress’: 
 Urging the Community of Democracies to establish a headquarters and formalise 
its organisation. 
 Urging USAID and the Secretary of State to develop guidelines to direct and 
coordinate U.S. democracy promotion efforts. 
 Commended the Secretary of State for creating an Advisory Committee on 
Democracy Promotion13 (ACDP), and asserted that this committee ‘should play a 
                                              
12 Definitions of nondemocratic and democratic transition countries are provided in the legislation. 
13 The first meeting of the Advisory Committee on Democracy was held on 6th November 2006. 
Administration officials that attended were: Condoleezza Rice, Randall L. Tobias (USAID), Paula J. 
Dobriansky (Under Secretary of State for Democracy and Global Affairs), Barry F. Lowenkron (DRL), 
Stephen Krasner (Director of Policy Planning).  The ACDP members include:  Anne-Marie Slaughter, chair 
(Princeton University), Lorne Craner (International Republican Institute), Chester Crocker (Georgetown 
University), Bernard DeLury (formerly of Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service), Aaron Friedberg 
(Princeton University), Carl Gershman (National Endowment for Democracy), Mary Ann Glendon 
(Harvard Law School),  Donald Horowitz (Duke University), Clifford May (Foundation for the Defense of 
Democracies), Michael Novak (American Enterprise Institute), Mark Palmer (Council for a Community of 
Democracies and Freedom House), Richard Soudriette (International Foundation for Election Systems), 
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significant role in the Department’s [DOS] transformational diplomacy’ (ADA  
2007: 22 USC 8231). 
 
Combined, the steps outlined by the ADA represent a significant attempt to reform the 
US foreign policy bureaucracy, and heighten considerations of democracy promotion in 
policy-making.  Consequently, the ADA represents an important legal basis for US 
foreign policy to commit to democracy promotion and build upon the FSFME policy set 
out by President Bush. 
 
In addition to the ADA, the Bush administration codified the policies and practices of the 
Freedom Agenda on the July 17 2008 in National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 
58.  Although the exact wording of this document is unknown, the Bush administration 
elected to partially declassify NSPD-58 on October 9, 2008.  Entitled Institutionalising 
the Freedom Agenda, NSPD-58 states that,  
It is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic 
movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of 
ending tyranny in the world. This policy goal was established and elaborated in 
the 2006 National Security Strategy of the United States of America, which 
declares the promotion of freedom, justice, human dignity, and effective 
democratic institutions to be central goals of our national security (DOS 2008). 
 
Moreover, building on the ADA’s legislative provisions, NSPD-58 calls for: 
 Cabinet and sub-Cabinet officials meeting with foreign leaders to communicate 
consistently the US priority on democracy promotion. 
 The Secretary of State, in coordination with other departments and agencies, to 
establish stronger cooperation with other democratic countries; to promote 
fundamental freedoms, develop, adopt, and pursue strategies to advance common 
interests through new and existing bilateral and multilateral mechanisms, and 
provide political, economic, security, and other support to fellow and new 
democracies (DOS 2008). 
 
 
                                                                                                                                      
Vin Weber (National Endowment for Democracy), Jennifer Windsor (Freedom House), Richard 
Williamson (Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw), and Kenneth Wollack (National Democratic Institute) (see 
DOS 2006a; Rice 2006_11_06; Milbank 2007). 
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Summary of the Freedom Agenda 
Although the desire to spread democracy is not a new phenomena in US foreign policy, 
the Freedom Agenda represented a new approach to US-MENA relations with democracy 
promotion as a core objective.  It asserted a “forward leaning” approach to reforming the 
nature of MENA states politically, socially and economically.  Indeed, as shown above, 
the Freedom Agenda demonstrated concrete attempts to divert and utilise American 
resources, capabilities and foreign and security policy instruments towards promoting 
democracy and reforming the MENA.  At a military and nation-building level, the policy 
had the goal of establishing a free and democratic Afghanistan and Iraq.  However, the 
policy also sought to combine foreign policy tools such as the presidential pulpit and 
diplomatic pressure, with new institutions in the form of MEPI, MEFTA and the 
BMENA initiative.  Furthermore, through the legislative process the Bush administration 
was able to create a legal basis for a liberal grand strategy.  In effect, the promotion of 
democracy in the MENA was represented as fundamental to American national security 
and in the nation’s interest.  As a direct consequence of this, institutional changes 
followed that significantly impacted the DOS and USAID in particular but also impacted 
the US foreign policy bureaucracy more widely.  Accordingly, the Freedom Agenda merits 
further analysis because it provides an institutional legacy for the Obama administration, 
which took office in January 2009. 
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2. The ‘Conflict of Interests’ Problematic, and a History of 
Promoting the Status Quo 
 
The decision to advocate freedom and democracy in the MENA challenged decades of US 
foreign policy.  That President Bush challenged the historical conduct of past policy was in 
and of itself a rare admission of failure, which reflected a serious conceptual change 
concerning US-MENA relations.  Notably, President G. W. Bush accepted a consistent 
pattern in US foreign and security policy towards the region: 
In the name of stability and anti-communism, the United States regularly and 
overtly backed dictators, and monarchs, providing diplomatic, military, and 
economic assistance to bolster these autocrats against enemies both foreign and 
domestic (Wittes 2008b: 16).   
 
To point out the obvious implications of the President’s admission, since the steady 
growth of American involvement in the MENA from 1945, the US has tried to control 
events in the region.  To this extent, it is widely acknowledged that the US has slowly 
taken over Britain’s historical ‘oversight role’ and ‘security management services’ of the 
region  (Boot 2004: 47; Murden 2002: 43).  That this role began during the Second World 
War is not a coincidence.  Not only did it coincide with the decline of the British and 
French imperial regime’s ‘moments’ in the Middle East14, but also with the rise of the US 
as a global superpower and the onset of the Cold War. 
 
Long-Term Interests: Stability for Oil, Bases and Israel 
It was during World War II itself that the geopolitical orientation of the MENA was for 
the first time seen as vital to US interests; through both the need to maintain a supply 
corridor to the Soviet Union through Iran, and as a staging ground to invade Italy from 
North Africa. Yet, it was in the war’s aftermath and the accompanying new international 
                                              
14 Although Britain and France retained influence in the region into the 1960s and the 1970s, their place as 
the hegemonic external powers was gradually being eroded by the US (Halliday 2005: 95). 
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order, that subsequent US administrations increasingly began to define US interests as 
intrinsically linked to the fate of the MENA region.  As Alan R. Taylor notes,  
The overriding concern of American foreign policy in the immediate postwar 
period was finding an effective way to check Soviet expansion throughout the 
world.  When applied to the Middle East, this meant using all means available to 
prevent the Russians from filling the power vacuum being created by the incipient 
withdrawal of the old colonial powers (1991: 49). 
 
In the post-war milieu, containment became the dominant US strategic doctrine, which 
consequently impacted upon US-MENA relations.  The first sign of this creeping 
insurrection occurred over the issue of post-war Soviet retention of troops in Northern 
Iran15  (see Truman 1956: 98; 100-1).  This subsequently expanded into concerns over 
the Turko-Iranian border, Turkish sovereignty and ultimately the geopolitical orientation 
of the entire Middle East.  Reacting to the July 1946 note from Moscow to Turkey, 
proposing a new Turkish-Russian defence structure to control the Dardanelles, President 
Truman argued: 
The Russians, in addition to their efforts to outflank Turkey through Iran, were 
beginning to exert pressure on Turkey for territorial concessions…This was 
indeed an open bid to obtain control of Turkey … To allow Russia to set up bases 
in the Dardanelles or to bring troops into Turkey, ostensibly for the defense of the 
straits, would, in the natural course of events, result in Greece and the whole Near 
and Middle East falling under Soviet control (1956: 102). 
 
In response to these events a “patience and firmness” strategy was adopted, which 
ultimately transformed itself in the Truman doctrine (Gaddis 1982: 22-3).  This 
established for the first time, and albeit focused on the ‘northern tier’, a situation in which 
the US would actively endeavour to strengthen its own position in the MENA16 whilst 
containing Soviet advances.  Towards this aim, the US increasingly asserted the need for 
                                              
15 This broke an agreement made at the London conference of Ministers in September 1945.  It had been 
agreed that Soviet troop withdrawal  would be completed no later than 2nd March 1946 (Truman 1956: 98). 
16 This was originally done in partnership with Britain until the 1950s.  Spurred by the failure to establish 
either the Middle East Command or the Middle East Defence Organisation US officials increasingly 
questioned the ability of Britain to protect Western interests in the region (see Hahn 2005: 15).  The 1956 
Suez Crisis exacerbated this, leading to the US taking a ‘leadership’ role and becoming the primary 
‘western’ power in the region. 
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stability and the maintenance of the established political order in the region throughout 
the Cold War.  The regional status quo was favoured to the extent that it was perceived to 
benefit US interests, even if this meant challenging the internal dynamics emerging from 
the region.  This was certainly the case with the 1953 CIA engineered coup of 
Mohammed Mossadegh and the reinstatement of Mohammad Reza Shah in Iran (see 
Kinzer 2003; Pollack 2004: 40-80).  In a similar vein, the Eisenhower doctrine led to the 
interventions in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq through the 1957-8 period, with the aim 
of maintaining the regional status quo and winning American influence in the region.  
This status quo policy was pursued by successive administrations throughout the Cold 
War; culminating in President Carter advising the Shah of Iran to use force to crush the 
1979 Islamic revolution to maintain ‘an island of stability’, and President Reagan 
asserting that ‘I will not permit [Saudi Arabia] to be an Iran’ after US trained Saudi 
Arabian SANG forces crushed an anti-regime uprising in 1981 (see Hahn 2005: 42-43, 
70-85; Zunes 2003: 15; Freedman 2008: 63-149).  Accordingly, to fortify this 
counterrevolutionary policy in the early stages of the Cold War, the US demonstrated 
willingness to condone and participate in both coercion and subversion.   
 
In addition to directly violent methods of securing stability and the maintenance of the 
established political order, the US also sought to pursue a status quo policy through 
foreign and military assistance.  The genealogical origins of this, in US-MENA relations, 
lay with the precedent set by the Truman doctrine’s aid packages to Greece and Turkey.  
With this as a model, President Eisenhower declared his own doctrine to a joint session of 
Congress on January 5, 1957.  Approved in March the same year, Congress authorised 
the Eisenhower administration to use force if necessary to protect American interests in 
the Middle East.  However, this was coupled with $200 million in economic aid to 
support any nation in the Middle East ‘requesting assistance against armed aggression 
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from any country controlled by international communism’.  This was substantially less 
than the $400 million originally intended by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, who 
retained the idea that economic aid would be used ‘as a means of building our position in 
the Middle East’17 (Little 2004: 132-7; Yaqub 2004; Heiss 2006).  Commenting at the 
time, Milton Friedman observed: 
The President is empowered to make payments to certain countries, particularly in 
the Middle East, the purpose of which is to induce the recipient countries to 
support particular policies that are thought to be in our interest - these are, in 
essence, straight military or political subsides (Friedman 1958 [1995]: 3). 
 
As a method of securing stability and influence, economic and military aid to the MENA 
has waxed and waned but continues to the present day.  From 1950 to 1970 both 
economic and military aid to the region totalled a sum of $7,845 million18.  This figure 
takes into account the 80% drop in foreign assistance between 1965 and 1970, which was 
the result of the June 1967 War and the impact of the war in Vietnam.  Yet these sums are 
meagre in comparison to the dramatic rise in foreign assistance that accompanied the 
1970s, and would continue into the 2000s.  From 1971 to 2001 economic and military aid 
to the region totalled a sum of $144,969 million19, representing over a 1800% increase 
(see Sharp 2006b).   
 
During the Cold War foreign assistance packages to the MENA were portrayed as 
necessary for containing communism.  The assumption was that patronage could be 
bought and foreign aid used as a bargaining chip to stop key strategic countries like 
Egypt, Jordan, Iran and Syria falling under Soviet influence.  In effect, it provided a less 
direct means of confronting the Soviet Union than military intervention, which would 
                                              
17 For a systematic analysis of how economic aid was conceptualised from 1947 through to the 1970s see 
Robert A. Packenham (1973) Liberal America and the Third World: Political Development Ideas in 
Foreign Aid and Social Science. 
18 This figure is in current year millions and combines loans and grants given to ‘Near East’ countries.   
19 Ibid. 
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have increased the risk of escalating the Cold War (see Banfield 1963).  An added virtue 
of the foreign assistance method was that it was perceived as a development policy that 
would strengthen the Western block.  Indeed a predominant assumption in America at the 
time was that ‘communism flows from poverty’ (Packenham 1973: 52).  As a logical 
corollary of this, economic aid was portrayed as a method of combating communism by 
helping raise the living standards in less developed areas and making communism less 
attractive.  In turn, raising living standards would also bolster the Western powers, by 
laying the foundations of ‘world prosperity, political freedom, and international 
cooperation’ (Packenham 1973: 50-51).  That foreign assistance to the MENA continued 
in the post-Cold War era, is testimony to the fact that it also sought to guarantee 
perceived US interests in the region that continue.   
 
Despite the US having no other superpower challenging their hegemonic power over the 
region in the post-Cold War era, reasons for America to intervene in the region remain.  
Accordingly there are a set of interests that the US consistently maintains, which could be 
jeopardised by regional instability.  Notably geography has played a distinctive role.  The 
reason for this was recongnised as early as 1945 by the State Department, that described 
the Middle East as ‘a stupendous source of strategic power, and one of the greatest 
material prizes in world history’ (in Zunes 2003: 2).  This was a far cry from earlier 
assertions by the State Department in 1923 that the region ‘is of little commercial 
importance’ (Oren 2007: 407).  The fundamental distinction between these two quotes 
relates to the role of oil in the region and the manner in which it began transforming the 
world in the early twentieth century.  Accelerated industrialisation combined with an 
increasing demand on oil dependent consumer goods, such as automobiles and 
electronification of households in the United States, played an unprecedented role.  
Moreover, what became apparent from both World Wars was that oil was playing a 
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decisive factor in providing “longlegs” to military personal and faster vehicles,  
consequently, providing a strategic advantage in warfare.  To quote the young Winston 
Churchill’s enduring principle, which referred to the use of oil instead of coal on British 
warships; ‘Mastery itself is the prize’ (Yergin 1993). 
 
Notably, by 1947 oil producing MENA states provided half of the oil consumed by the 
US armed forces, which led to the CIA deeming Middle Eastern oil ‘essential to the 
security of the United States’ (in Hahn 2005: 7).  Yet, oil from the region was playing a 
much more important strategic role by fuelling the revitalisation of Western European 
economies.  As one US government report commented at the time ‘without petroleum the 
Marshall plan could not have functioned’ (Yergin 1991: 424).  This was due to the fact 
that in the post-war era a fundamental transition in Europe took place, in which coal-
based economies transitioned to importing oil20.  This helped produce a symbiotic 
confluence of events in which European needs and the development of Middle Eastern oil 
combined.  Thus, by 1955 approximately 90 percent of oil consumed in Western Europe 
came from the Middle East (Hahn 2005: 7; see Kapstein 1990; Yergin 1991: 425).  From 
the American perspective, Middle Eastern oil was now fundamental to the material 
balance of the world, and in its efforts to create an integrated transatlantic market system.   
 
The twenty-first century still bears the marks of the post-war decision to move from coal 
power to oil.  As Kenneth Pollack has argued: 
The reason the United States has a legitimate and critical interest in seeing that 
Persian Gulf oil continues to flow copiously and relatively cheaply is simply that 
the global economy built over the last 50 years rests on a foundation of 
inexpensive, plentiful oil, and if that foundation were removed, the global 
                                              
20 In 1955 coal provided 75 percent of total energy use in Western Europe, and petroleum just 23 percent.  
By 1972, coal’s share had shrunk to 22 percent, while oil’s had risen to 60 percent.  This was almost a 
complete reversal (Yergin 1991: 545). 
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economy would collapse (2003: 3). 
 
Furthermore, in today’s highly technological hydrocarbon society the demand for oil is 
increasing, and the Middle East contains around 66 per cent of the world’s known oil 
reserves (Milton-Edwards 2006: 73).  Of particular concern to the United States is that in 
the intermediate future ‘oil supply is expected to continue to concentrate in the Persian 
Gulf, which holds the world’s largest geologically attractive reserves’ (CFR 2006: 22).  
The cause of America’s concern is that the highly industrial US economy is becoming 
more dependent on oil for growth.   The United States, with only 4.3 percent of the 
world’s population, uses 25 percent of the world’s oil, and significantly 60 percent of this 
need is dependent on import and expected to rise in the coming decades (CFR 2006: 22).  
Yet, as consumption is increasing, America’s domestic production is decreasing.  
Consequently, making the US significantly dependent on foreign oil from places such as 
Saudi Arabia, which provides 20 per cent of America’s crude oil imports (Milton-
Edwards 2006: 239).  As Beverley Milton-Edwards argues: 
The maintenance and future growth of the American economy owes much to the 
import of oil from the Middle East.  In this way unimpeded access to that resource 
is vital to national interest.  If there were any doubt that this were not the case, the 
Arab oil embargo during the 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict, although it occurred more 
than thirty years ago, remains fresh in the collective consciousness of American 
policy-makers (2006: 239). 
 
In addition to American demand for oil, however, the region’s resources are also 
increasingly being claimed by expanding global economic powers such as India and 
China.  Indeed, the Chinese government is pursuing a strategy of “locking up” particular 
supplies for the Chinese market, and is aligning its relationships with Saudi Arabia and 
Iran in order to secure these exclusive oil supplies.  This is a direct challenge to American 
hegemony in the region and is impacting Middle Eastern politics more widely (see Pace 
2008: 162-3; Salameh 2003; Jaffe and Lewis 2002; Xu 2000; Rubin 1999: 49-50).  The 
effect of this is that US influence in the region is diminishing; which has caused foreign 
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policy analysts such as Henry Kissinger to predict potential international conflicts over 
hydrocarbon resources to occur in the future (see Leverett and Bader 2005: 187; 
Ikenberry 2008).  This demonstrates that concerns over the material balance of the world 
and the geopolitical orientation of the Middle East are as strong in the twenty-first 
century as they were in the Cold War era.  With oil being linked to the “American way of 
life”, economic growth and strategic military power, the consequences of instability or a 
loss of regional hegemony are intricately linked to American’s global position. 
 
The geographical location of the Middle East also plays a distinctive role in wider 
military-strategic concerns of the US.  Previous to the development of intercontinental 
ballistic missiles in the 1960s, the US enjoyed a significant strategic advantage over the 
USSR by having allies that bordered the Soviet Union.  This gave the US the potential 
power to invade its rival from Turkey or Iran, whilst the Soviets had no comparable 
access to the United States (Sluglett 2005: 43).  More widely, throughout the Cold War, 
military bases were seen as a strategic advantage essential to winning a direct conflict 
with the Soviet Union.  Not only would they have provided the ability to launch aerial 
offensives, but they also allowed the build up of troops for a ground invasion and the 
positioning of intelligence gathering personnel and equipment for covert operations (see 
Cohen 1997: 1-94).   
 
Significantly, although the threat of war with the Soviet Union passed, the Middle East 
remains an important strategic location for American defence interests.  Military bases in 
the region could provide a method of projecting American military might in future 
conflicts with rising powers.  With bases in the Middle East, the US would be able to 
strike China from the west, as well as from eastern bases in the Pacific.  Whilst this 
represents an ‘external’ dynamic to the projection of US military power from the region, 
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there are also ‘internal’ and ‘inter-regional’ strategic concerns.  With potential political 
unrest in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries21, the dilemma represented by 
Iran’s nuclear weapons programme, and the instability in Iraq there is a perceived need to 
maintain a military presence in the region (see Pollack 2003, 2004; Sick et al. 2008; 
Cordesman 2008).  Furthermore, the MENA has been considered part of an ‘arc of 
instability’ and a ‘breeding ground for threats’ to US interests (NMS 2004: 5).  In the 
2005 National Defense Strategy (NDS), the US declared the objective of securing 
‘strategic access’ and retaining ‘global freedom of action’.  The logic underlying this is 
simple, ‘the United States cannot influence that which it cannot reach’ (NDS 2005: 6; 
also see Posch 2006).  The overall result of this is, as the highly influential Council on 
Foreign Relations has concluded: 
Even if the Persian Gulf did not have the bulk of the world’s readily available oil 
reserves, there would be reasons to maintain a substantial military capability in 
the region … At least for the next two decades … the United States should expect 
and support a strong military posture that permits suitably rapid deployment to the 
region, if required (CFR 2006: 29-30). 
 
In addition to the region’s oil supply and military strategic concerns, the US has also held 
a historical interest in maintaining the security of Israel.  At times the US-Israeli ‘special 
relationship’ has conflicted with the goal of securing the region’s oil, by antagonising the 
populations of other regional allies.  However, the extent of the relationship is visible in 
the vast quantity of foreign assistance that Israel has received.  Notably since France 
withdrew its assistance to Israel, in protest of the pre-emptive launch of the June 1967 
War, the US has stepped into a patron role (Sharp 2006b: 5; Mearsheimer and Walt 2007: 
53; Bowen 2005: 55).  From 1971 to 2008, the US has given foreign assistance to Israel 
at an average rate of $2 billion per year22, making it the ‘largest annual recipient of US 
aid and the largest recipient of cumulative US assistance since World War II’ (Mark 
                                              
21 GCC countries include Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE.  
22 Assistance from the US has consisted of two thirds military assistance to one third economic aid.   
 
 - 42 -
2006: 2-21; Sharp 2006b: 5).  Martin Indyk has described the relationship as an 
‘asymetric relationship in which we [the US] are “big brother”, the superpower, and they 
[Israel] are the small regional power’ (1998: 81). 
   
A clear turning point in the US-Israeli relationship, and in the US-Egyptian relationship, 
was the signing of the Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty in 1979.  This was the result of secret 
negotiations and the signing of the Camp David Accords, which ushered in the current 
era of financial support for stability between Israel and its Arab neighbours (Milton-
Edwards 2006: 247).  As a consequence, Israel became the highest recipient of US aid 
and Egypt the second highest recipient.  Combined, these two countries currently receive 
almost 93 percent of all annual funding to the region (Sharp 2006b: 7).  Since this period 
the US has remained “engaged” in the peace process as a “peace broker”, but remained 
committed to strengthening Israel.   
 
The sum of these concerns, securing the free flow of oil, maintaining a military presence 
and securing the integrity of regional allies such as Israel, has contributed to what Tamara 
Coffman Wittes has termed the ‘conflict-of–interests’ problem at the heart of US-MENA 
relations (2008: 18).  On one-hand, the Bush administration asserted the need for regional 
reform through democratisation, and, on the other, more traditional interests existed.  
Conspicuously, although the Freedom Agenda was portrayed as ‘challenging’ past policy, 
these long term historical interests remained, providing the strategically selective context 
in which the Freedom Agenda had to navigate.  The effect of this has been to create a 
rigorous debate concerning the merits of promoting democracy, versus maintaining the 
established stability approach to US-MENA relations.   
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3. The Democracy Consensus and its Discontents 
 
On September 18, 2007 Intelligence Squared US, a debating forum initiated by The 
Rosenkranz Foundation and sponsored by media partners such as Newsweek and NPR, 
held an Oxford style debate in New York City23.  The motion being put forward was that 
“Spreading democracy in the Middle East is a bad idea”.  This event is notable because of 
the highly esteemed panel members arguing both for, and against, the motion.  Arguing 
for the motion was Flynt Leverett24, Dimitri Simes25 and Shibley Telhami26.  Arguing 
against the motion, and therefore in favour of promoting democracy in the Middle East, 
was Elizabeth Cheney27, Danielle Pletka28 and Natan Sharansky29.  Of particular interest 
is the fact that Flynt Leverett and Elizabeth Cheney were on opposing sides.  This not 
only demonstrated the tensions that existed within the Bush administration, but also 
reservations about the Freedom Agenda more widely.   
 
Flynt Leverett had served as Senior Director for Middle East Affairs at the National 
Security Council (2002-03) and as a Middle East expert on the Secretary of State’s Policy 
                                              
23 An Oxford style debate consists of one motion, one moderator, two to three advocates for the motion, 
two to three against. 
24 From March 2002 to March 2003, Flynt Leverett served as the senior director for Middle East affairs on 
the National Security Council (NSC). Prior to serving on the NSC, he was a counter-terrorism expert on the 
State Department’s Policy Planning Staff, and before that he served as a CIA senior analyst for eight years. 
25 Dimitri Simes is president of The Nixon Center and publisher of the foreign policy journal The National 
Interest.   He also served as an informal policy adviser to Richard Nixon, who appointed him to lead the 
center. 
26 Shibley Telhami is the Anwar Sadat Professor for Peace and Development at the University of Maryland, 
 and a nonresident senior fellow of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution. 
27 Elizabeth Cheney has formally served as Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of State for 
Assistance to the former Soviet Union, and as a USAID officer in U.S. embassies in Budapest and Warsaw. 
In 2002, Cheney was appointed to the position of Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern 
Affairs, and given control of MEPI.  After two years of service, Cheney left her first State Department post 
in 2003 to serve in her father Richard Cheney’s re-election campaign.  In February 2005, she returned to 
the US State Department and was appointed the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State For Near 
Eastern Affairs and Coordinator for BMENA initiatives. 
28 Danielle Pletka is vice president for foreign and defense policy studies at the American Enterprise 
Institute (AEI).  Pletka is also involved in various other projects such as the Committee on the Present 
Danger.  Formerly, she was a senior professional staff member for Near East and South Asia with the U.S. 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations from 1992 to 2002. 
29 Natan Sharansky is a former Soviet dissident, human rights activist, Israeli politician and author. 
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Planning Staff (2001-02).  He asserted that:  
In arguing that spreading democracy in the Middle East is a bad idea, my 
colleagues and I want to look at tonight’s resolution through the prism of 
American national interests. Of course US interests in the Middle East are 
complex and multifaceted, but I’m gonna boil down our most important interests 
in this critical region to three things. First, the free flow of oil from the Persian 
Gulf, second, the security and welfare of the state of Israel, and third, keeping the 
Middle East from providing a platform for further mass-casualty terrorist attacks 
of the sort that we suffered on 9-11 … I believe that promoting democracy in the 
Middle East is not just not helpful for these interests, it is downright harmful to 
them (IQ2 2007). 
 
This was a clear juxtaposition to Elizabeth Cheney, who argued that: 
 
The truth is that spreading democracy in the Middle East is not a bad idea nor is it 
a failed idea. Nor is it an idea that would have been good except that George W. 
Bush adopted it.  It is, by any objective measure, a good idea, the right idea and a 
necessary policy choice for America today … For too many years America 
perpetuated this status quo. We supported those authoritarian regimes; we ignored 
the aspirations of their people. This policy, essentially the one that our opponents 
would have us return to tonight, brought only a false sense of security and 
stability (IQ2 2007). 
 
Throughout the debate, contentions over perceived US interests were drawn out.  For 
those that thought democracy promotion was a bad idea, the Freedom Agenda was 
defined as a ‘dangerous’ approach to international affairs.  There have been many critics 
of the Freedom Agenda and the idea of promoting democracy in the Middle East.  For 
those that thought promoting democracy was a good idea, it was not only seen as a 
method of combating terrorism, but portrayed as the only policy option left for the US to 
adopt.   
 
The Freedom Agenda’s Critics 
Debating the merits of democracy promotion is often abstract and fraught with perils.  
Furthermore, the debate about democracy promotion is often structured in such a way as 
to make criticism particularly difficult; if it is “freedom” and “democracy” that are being 
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exported, rather than allowing rule by tyrannical despots, then like apple pie and 
parenthood, how can anyone be against it?  This observation is important because it 
serves as a precautionary note; to take arguments against democracy promotion seriously, 
and not to succumb to the straw man fallacy.  This fallacy has been highly present in 
current literature on the Freedom Agenda, and also been a rhetorical tactic deployed by 
the Bush administration to defend the Freedom Agenda. 
 
Outright opposition to the Freedom Agenda has come from a wide and varied range of 
proponents.  However, many of the arguments presented overlap and can be broken down 
into a series of four core objections to democracy promotion in the Middle East: 
 
1. The “Islamist dilemma”. 
2. Promoting democracy in the Middle East may cause regional instability. 
3. Promoting democracy does not weaken terrorist organisations like Al Qaeda, 
because they rely on ideological appeal and are not a product of political or 
economic marginalisation.  They do not rely on a lack of democracy or poverty to 
recruit future terrorists. 
4. The US is a discredited actor and by promoting democracy may harm indigenous 
groups promoting democratic reform. 
 
The “Islamist dilemma” has been a dominant argument summoned in order to reject 
promoting democracy in the MENA.  At its core lies an empirical observation; 
throughout the MENA, Islamists have established themselves as major political players 
and currently represent the only viable opposition forces to existing undemocratic 
regimes (see Sharp 2006a).  Consequently, as many have argued, ‘should free and fair 
elections be held in the Middle East tomorrow, it would be likely that radical religious 
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forces [sic] would win a sweeping victory in many countries’ (Neep 2004: 82; Byman 
2007: 143-4).  This is seen as problematic because it could result in the “one person, one 
vote, one time” scenario, in addition to helping the formation of “Islamic” states.  The 
creation of such states raises the spectre of the Iranian revolution in 1979 and the 
prospect of hostility towards American interests.  It is still common place to ask the 
questions ‘will country X be another Iran?  Is so-and-so another Ayatollah Khomeini?’ 
(Esposito and Voll 1996: 150).  Accordingly, as many critics of the Freedom Agenda 
have illustrated:  
The problem with promoting democracy in the Arab world is not that Arabs do 
not like democracy; it is that Washington probably would not like the 
governments Arab democracy would produce … Assuming that democratic Arab 
governments would better represent the opinions of their people than do the 
current Arab regimes, democratisation of the Arab world should produce more 
anti-U.S. foreign policies (Gause III 2005). 
 
Proponents of this argument often cite the events of 1989-91 and its aftermath in Algeria, 
as evidence for their position.   In response to outside pressure and the desire for internal 
stability the single ruling party in Algeria, the Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN), 
began making attempts at pluralism in 1989.  Through constitutional changes the FLN 
monopoly on the state apparatus was to be ended and a competitive multiparty system 
established.  However, as a direct result the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) swept to 
victory in municipal and later parliamentary elections. Resultantly, an Islamic movement 
had come to power ‘not through bullets but through ballots, not by violent revolution but 
by working within the system’ (Esposito and Voll 1996: 150; 150-72; Burgat 2003: 102-
21).  In January 1992, the military decided that the Algerian people had ‘voted unwisely’ 
and that the FIS had ‘hijacked democracy’.  This led to military intervention, that 
amounted to a de facto coup, and a civil conflict that reversed the political openings made 
throughout 1989 to 1991 (see Quandt 2003; Willis 1999).   
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For many proponents, the Islamist dilemma argument was vindicated throughout the 
2005-6 period.  Chiefly, this was caused by the electoral victory of Harakat al-
Muqawama al-Islamiya (Hamas)30 in the 2006 Palestinian parliamentary elections.  This 
represented a pattern of Islamic groups, hostile to Washington and Israel, winning 
significant gains through elections in the ‘Arab Spring’ period, which included the 
Muslim brotherhood in Egypt, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Shiites backed by militias in 
Iraq (Weisman 2006a).  This was coupled with the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war in Lebanon 
and increasing civil violence in Iraq despite hopes that the elections would calm the 
insurgency (Kurth 2006).  These events allowed some proponents of the Islamist 
dilemma argument to draw a further historical analogy with Hitler’s rise to power 
through democratic elections.  Thus, as Dimitri Simes has argued, 
I will not hesitate to say that there are some things that are more important than 
democracy.  If … in the 1930s, we knew what Hitler would do to the Jews and to 
the others, would we allow him to come to power democratically? … I completely 
agree with the Israelis now when they would not want to recognise democratically 
elected Hamas (IQ2 2007). 
 
In addition to the Islamist dilemma argument being propagated by some of the US 
foreign policy commentariat, it has also been voiced within the MENA region.  Within 
the region itself autocrats have regularly depicted Islamists as the only viable alternative 
to their own autocratic rule.  This has served their interests by generating support for 
autocratic rule from Western governments and by striking a “stability bargain” with 
sections of their own societies, which see Islamists as a threat (Feldman 2004: 19-25; 
Deeb 2008).  Accordingly, as Noah Feldman has noted: 
 
The optimal strategy for the autocrats is therefore to eliminate secular democratic 
dissent, keeping just enough Islamist opposition alive to make Islamism the only 
alternative without enabling it to become strong enough to overthrow the 
government (2004: 23). 
 
A second dominant argument summoned in order to reject promoting democracy in the 
                                              
30This Arabic acronym translates as “Islamic Resistance Movement”. 
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MENA, has been the assertion that promoting democracy may cause greater regional 
instability and conflict.  This argument has been widely asserted and strongly influenced 
by Mansfield and Snyder’s book Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies go to 
War (see Epstein, Serafino, and Miko 2007: 8; Smith 2007: 159-61; Traub 2008: 7; Kaye 
et al. 2008: 25; Owen 2005).  The thrust of the argument directly challenges the manner 
in which democratic peace theory has been portrayed by the Bush administration.  Whilst 
Mansfield and Snyder acknowledge that ‘no mature democracies have ever fought a war 
against each other’, they argue that ‘in the short run … the beginning stages of transitions 
to democracy often give rise to war rather than peace’ (2005: 1-2).  Moreover, in 
agreement with Fareed Zakaria’s (2004) analysis in The Future of Freedom and Samuel 
Huntington’s (1968) Political Order in Changing Societies, Mansfield and Snyder argue 
that ‘rising political participation leads to conflict and instability in states with weak 
political institutions’ (2005: 13).  However, this assertion is explicated, and provides an 
insight for understanding instability and conflict “within” states and “between” states.   
 
For those that opposed the war in Iraq, the implications of this study directly challenge 
the Bush administration.  Thus, Tony Smith has pointed out, 
If Mansfield and Snyder are correct, their findings deliver a body blow to the 
facile assumption of the Bush Doctrine that terrorism is more likely to come 
under control in the Middle East as a result of the conquest of Iraq followed by its 
democratisation. Indeed, exactly the opposite seems likely (2007: 159). 
 
Moreover, when Mansfield and Snyder’s findings are applied to the MENA, and vis-à-vis 
the Freedom Agenda, they argue that ‘democratising the Arab states is a major political 
gamble in the war on terror’ (2005: 278).  The reasoning behind this is worth quoting at 
length, 
Although democratisation in the Islamic world might contribute to peace in the 
very long run, Islamic public opinion in the short run is, in most places, hostile to 
the United States, reluctant to condemn terrorism and supportive of forceful 
measures to achieve favourable results in Palestine, Kashmir and other disputed 
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areas.  Although much of the belligerence of the Islamic publics fueled by 
resentment of the U.S.-backed authoritarian regimes under which many of them 
live, simply renouncing these authoritarians and pressing for a quick democratic 
opening is unlikely to lead to peaceful democratic consolidations.  On the 
contrary, unleashing Islamic mass opinion through sudden democratisation could 
only raise the likelihood of war.  All the risk factors are there: the media and civil 
society groups are inflammatory, as old elites and rising oppositions try to claim 
the mantle of Islamic or nationalist militancy.  The rule of law is weak, and 
existing corrupt bureaucracies cannot serve a democratic administration properly.  
The boundaries of states are mismatched with those of nations, making any push 
for national self-determination fraught with peril (2005: 13).   
 
For those that oppose the Freedom Agenda the notion that emerging democracies in the 
Middle East may in fact have a destabilising effect on the region is highly problematic.  
Such instability challenges other US interests and makes securing those interests 
problematic31. 
 
The third argument put forward to reject the Freedom Agenda has been the assertion that 
promoting democracy and/or reducing poverty do not weaken terrorist organisations like 
Al Qaeda.  They rely on ideological appeal, and therefore a “drain the swamp” approach 
fails to provide an effective counter-terrorism strategy.  Notably, this challenges the core 
assumption of the Freedom Agenda; that political and economic marginalisation cause 
the sort of terrorism witnessed on September 11, 2001.  The most prominent proponent 
arguing against this premise is Gregory F. Gause III.  His Foreign Affairs article Can 
Democracy Stop Terrorism? sparked considerable debate about the Freedom Agenda.  
The central questions and conclusions presented in this article were: 
 
Is it true that the more democratic a country becomes, the less likely it is to 
produce terrorists and terrorist groups? In other words, is the security rationale for 
promoting democracy in the Arab world based on a sound premise? 
Unfortunately, the answer appears to be no … [Al Qaeda] are fighting to impose 
their vision of an Islamic state. Nor is there any evidence that democracy in the 
Arab world would "drain the swamp", eliminating soft support for terrorist 
organisations among the Arab public and reducing the number of potential 
recruits for them (2005: 62). 
                                              
31 It should be noted that Mansfield and Snyder themselves do not oppose democracy promotion, but rather 
favour a cautious approach and ‘democratization from above’ (2005: 14; 283). 
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 The implication of Gause’s argument is that an absence of democracy is not an 
underlying “causal factor” leading to the sort of terrorist threat presented on September 
11, 2001 (also see Dalacoura 2006).  Moreover, as Douglas Borer and Michael Freeman 
argue, Al Qaeda’s goals are to stop the perceived foreign occupation of Islamic lands and 
to establish Sharia law as a guiding principle of an Islamic caliphate.  Democracy 
promotion is unlikely to satisfy these grievances and may in fact create the perception 
that Islamic identity and culture are threatened (Borer and Freeman 2007; Freeman 2008; 
Kaye et al. 2008: 21).  Further still, Scott Atran argues that, 
Those who believe suicide terrorism can be explained by a single political root 
cause, such as the presence of foreign military forces or the absence of 
democracy, ignore psychological motivations (2006: 144). 
 
Significantly, empirical evidence appears to raise serious questions concerning the 
“democracy deficit - terrorism” and “poverty - terrorism” link.  It has been widely 
demonstrated that the MENA does not have a monopoly on terrorism, and that factors 
other than a “democratic deficit” and “poverty” play a role (see Hobson 2005: 43; 
Dalacoura 2006).  As Flynt Leverett has argued,  
From Osama bin Laden on down, that claim that jihadist terrorists are products of 
economic and political marginalisation is simply false. The 9-11 hijackers were 
truly trust-fund terrorists, from economically and politically advantaged 
backgrounds (IQ2 2007). 
 
Moreover, the phenomena of “home grown” terrorists in democratic states, such as three 
of the individuals that carried out the July 7 2005 bombings in London, raises further 
questions about the “democracy deficit - terrorism” and “poverty - terrorism” link 
presented by the Bush administration. 
 
The impact of questioning the “democracy deficit - terrorism” link has been pronounced.  
It has led long term proponents of democracy promotion, Francis Fukuyama and Michael 
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McFaul, to assert that, 
The deep sources of terrorism are much more complex than just the Middle East’s 
democratic deficit.  One can argue in fact that the modernisation process produces 
terrorism and that more democracy is likely to exacerbate the terrorism problem, 
at least in the short run (2007: 30). 
 
This built on Francis Fukuyama’s earlier assertion that attacked the Bush administration 
and the Freedom Agenda directly, 
The problem of jihadist terrorism will not be solved by bringing modernisation 
and democracy to the Middle East.  The Bush administration’s view that terrorism 
is driven by a lack of democracy overlooks the fact that so many terrorists were 
radicalised in democratic European countries.  It is highly naïve to think that 
radical Islamists hate the West because of ignorance of what the West is (2006b: 
12). 
 
Notably however, this has not stopped these authors asserting that democracy promotion 
is a moral good in and of itself, and therefore that the US should enhance the role of 
democracy promotion in its foreign policy (Fukuyama and McFaul 2007: 34-44). 
 
The fourth argument put forward to reject the Freedom Agenda has been the assertion 
that the US is a discredited actor.  For some, this has been caused by US actions over the 
last few decades, in which it has ‘allied itself with autocratic regimes and has supported 
Israel against the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people’ (Dalacoura 2005: 973).  
Further still, some have argued that the invasion of Iraq has discredited US democracy 
promotion efforts.  As Shibley Telhami has argued,  
In essence, we have given democracy a bad name. It is hard for people in the 
region, including people who badly and desperately are looking for democracy 
and freedom, to think of democracy and freedom the American way without 
thinking about the horrors of Iraq. We have paid a price by diverting attention 
from the important issue of human rights, which we often confuse with spreading 
democratic systems. That issue which we should trump and advocate has paid a 
price as a consequence of this policy (IQ2 2007). 
 
Notably, because the Iraq war was constructed by the Bush administration as a method 
for promoting democracy in the MENA region, many critics of the Freedom Agenda have 
argued that US democracy promotion is in disrepute.  For example, Strobe Talbott has 
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argued that “democracy” has become ‘a controversial if not dirty word’ caused by 
‘George W. Bush’s invocation of that goal in Iraq and in the Greater Middle East’ (2008: 
xi-x).  This setback to democracy promotion as a cornerstone of American foreign policy 
has been exacerbated by events in Abu Ghraib prison.  Indeed, upon capturing Saddam 
Hussein, President Bush declared that ‘this event brings further assurance that the torture 
chambers and the secret police are gone forever’ (2003_12_14).  Yet months earlier the 
US had taken over Abu Ghraib prison, which for over 40 years had been a notorious 
centre for torture under the Ba’ath Party regime in Iraq.  Under the prison’s new title, 
Baghdad Central Confinement Facility torture did not stop (see Williams 2006: 7-49).  
Throughout 2003-4, American military personnel engaged in practices such as, stripping 
prisoners naked, binding them, sexually abusing them, beating them, menacing and 
attacking them with dogs, and killing them (see Eisenman 2007: 7).     
 
The visual documentation of these events has been widely broadcast throughout the 
world, and for many has severely damaged America’s “soft power” (see Nye 2004a; 
Gardels 2005).  Similarly, the use of extraordinary rendition and the role of detention 
facilities in Guantanamo Bay and beyond, have raised serious credibility questions about 
the Freedom Agenda (Hassan 2008a; Neep 2004: 79-80).  Thus, as Thomas Carothers 
(2006) has argued:  
Even as the president has repeatedly asserted his commitment to a “Freedom 
Agenda,” he has struck blow after self-inflicted blow against America's 
democratic principles and standards: through the torture of prisoners and 
detainees at U.S.-run facilities in Iraq and Afghanistan; the holding of hundreds of 
persons in legal limbo at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba; the rendition of foreign 
detainees … to foreign countries known to practice torture; the establishment of a 
network of covert U.S.-run prisons overseas; eavesdropping without court 
warrants within the United States; and the astonishing resistance by the White 
House last year [2005] to a legislative ban on cruel, inhumane, and degrading 
treatment of any person in U.S. custody anywhere. Taken together, these actions 
have inflicted incalculable harm to the United States' image in the world … the 
damage has made it all too easy for foreign autocrats to resist U.S. democracy 
promotion by providing them with an easy riposte: "How can a country that 
tortures people abroad and abuses rights at home tell other countries how to 
 - 53 -
behave?".   
 
The effects of such behaviour raise suspicion about US motives, which combined with 
the MENA region’s colonial legacy, have had a significant impact on the Freedom 
Agenda; leading many indigenous groups to distance themselves from Washington and 
from the democracy assistance offered (Dalacoura 2005: 969; Kubba 2008).   
 
The Freedom Agenda Consensus and Necessity 
In spite of the Freedom Agenda’s critics there is still considerable support within the US 
for promoting democracy in the MENA.  For many commentators the notion that the US 
should democratise the MENA, coercively if necessary, has been attributed to the 
neoconservative movement.  Since September 11, 2001, it has been widely asserted that a 
‘neoconservative revolution’ or ‘neoconservative coup’ took place within the Bush 
administration (Lind 2003: 10; Hudson 2005: 298-301).  Accordingly, President Bush 
was described as the ‘callow instrument of the neoconservative ideologues’ (Epstein 
2003: 13).  For some, this “coup” was simply self-evident, leading to claims such as, 
Unless you lived at the bottom of a well, you’ve probably noticed that 9/11 and 
Iraq have had a transforming effect on the American Right.  The short formulation 
is that so-called neoconservatism has triumphed (Rauch 2003: 1607). 
 
This is an assessment shared by both critics and advocates of neoconservatism.  Richard 
Perle has argued that the Bush administration followed a neoconservative agenda on 
‘issue after issue’, whilst William Kristol argued that President Bush’s foreign policy was 
‘basically a neocon foreign policy’ (in Hurst 2005: 75-6; also see Fukuyama 2006a).  
Moreover, by accepting the premise that the Bush foreign policy was equivocal to 
neoconservativism, some academics have even resorted to critiquing the Bush era vis-à-
vis critiquing the neoconservative ideology (see Reus-Smit 2004; Hudson 2005).   
 
That many neoconservatives have advocated democracy promotion in the MENA is 
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unquestionable.  Equally, that many neoconservatives advocated the removal of the 
Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq is unquestionable.  Assertions of these positions are 
readily available within past editions of the neoconservative magazine The Weekly 
Standard and past papers produced by the American Enterprise Institute.  Relatedly, upon 
hearing President Bush’s second inaugural address, which placed democracy promotion 
centre stage, Robert Kagan asserted that, ‘This is real neoconservatism … It would be 
hard to express it more clearly’ (in Mcmanus 2005).  Moreover, throughout the 1990s, 
many neoconservatives openly disagreed with the Clinton administration’s policy toward 
Iraq and the MENA more broadly.  Paul Wolfowitz has long opposed American policy in 
the region adopted after the 1991 Gulf war, claiming that, ‘containment is not a static 
policy: the political dynamics of the Middle East will tend to weaken sanctions over time’ 
(Wolfowitz 1997: 111).  By December 1997, this culminated in the conclusion, 
Overthrow Him … Military force is not enough … it must be part of an overall 
political strategy that sets as its goal not merely the containment of Saddam but 
the liberation of Iraq from his tyranny (Khalilzad and Wolfowitz 1997: 14). 
 
Similarly, the desire to overthrow Saddam Hussein was recorded as a wider 
neoconservative commitment in 1998, under the auspice of The Project for a New 
American Century letter to President Clinton, which argued that it was a “necessity” to 
deal with Iraq32 (PNAC 1998; see Plesch 2005; Mann 2004). 
 
Simply put, the reason for many neoconservatives to advocate democracy promotion as a 
strategy towards the MENA is ideological.  It derives from the belief that the internal 
                                              
32 Notably the signatories of this letter included: Elliott Abrams, Richard L. Armitage, William J. Bennett, 
Jeffrey Bergner, John Bolton, Paula Dobriansky, Francis Fukuyama, Robert Kagan, Zalmay Khalilzad, 
William Kristol, Richard Perle, Peter W. Rodman, Donald Rumsfeld, William Schneider, Jr., Vin Weber, 
Paul Wolfowitz, R. James Woolsey and Robert B. Zoellick. Many of theses individuals later became key 
members of the Bush administration, but not all are neo-conservatives.   
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constitution of a state, and the nature of a regime, matters in international affairs.  
Consequently, 
there is an imperative to liberate people from tyranny and promote democracy 
around the world by reaching inside states and shaping their basic institutions.  
This stands in sharp contrast to realist foreign policy, which tends to respect 
sovereignty and be indifferent to the internal character of other states (Fukuyama 
2007: 114). 
 
This belief is supplemented by the notion that values such as “freedom, democracy and 
free enterprise” are not culturally specific.  Accordingly, they are prescribed a “universal” 
appeal, in which all cultures desire them.  As a logical corollary of this premise, these 
values can be applied to all cultures.  Democracy constitutes the default condition all 
societies would adopt, if and only if tyrannical rule was removed (Reus-Smit 2004: 47; 
Fukuyama 2007: 114-54; Mead 2005: 117).  These premises were certainly embedded 
within the Bush administration’s discourse.  However, the notion that the Freedom 
Agenda was the result of a “neoconservative coup” is deeply problematic; both 
theoretically and empirically.  
 
On a theoretical level, the “neoconservative coup” thesis is problematic because it asserts 
an overtly intentionalist argument.  This is done by removing agents from wider cultural 
and bureaucratic structures.  As Tony Smith has argued: 
If the neoconservatives did indeed pour a poison of unlimited expectations into 
the president’s ear, along with those of Vice President Cheney and Secretary of 
Defense Rumsfeld, these men were more than ready to heed the tempters’ 
message … The neoconservative appeal could not have been as great as it was 
without finding resonance in older and varied sources of American culture and 
belief (2007: 43-4). 
 
Furthermore, as David Hastings Dunn has argued,  
To assume that the President, or even his cabinet, could launch America on a 
military campaign [Iraq] of this scale without having the backing of Congress and 
the Washington political class more broadly, shows a poor understanding of 
American politics (2003: 281). 
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The “neoconservative coup” thesis writes out responsibility, and indeed culpability, 
attributable to a wider group of political actors.  This is the case for the Iraq war and the 
Freedom Agenda more broadly.   Accordingly, it is essential to note that there was a 
broad bipartisan consensus in Washington to invade Iraq in 2003, which was 
demonstrated by the overwhelming congressional approval for the war33.  As 
commentators pointed out at the time,  
Not since Congress passed the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin resolution, which helped 
Lyndon B. Johnson to rapidly expand the Vietnam War, has a President won such 
broad authority to prosecute an undefined military operation and possible war 
(Reid 2002: 20). 
 
Similarly, calls for promoting democracy in the Middle East have come from actors that 
are not affiliated with the neoconservative movement.  As Gregory F. Gause III has 
illustrated,  
Bush's belief in the link between terrorism and a lack of democracy is not limited 
to his administration. During the 2004 presidential campaign, Senator John Kerry 
(D-Mass.) emphasised the need for greater political reform in the Middle East as 
an integral part of the war on terrorism. Martin Indyk, a senior Middle East 
policymaker in the Clinton administration, has written that it was a mistake for 
Clinton to focus on Arab-Israeli peace while downplaying Middle East 
democracy, and he has urged Washington to concentrate on political reform … 
Morton Halperin, the director of policy planning in Clinton's State Department, 
argues that the roots of al Qaeda lie in the poverty and educational deficiencies of 
Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Pakistan, and that these deficiencies were caused by the 
authoritarian nature of those states and can be combated only through 
democratisation. The New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman has done 
more to sell this logic to the public than anyone else (2005: 62-3). 
 
The notion that America must spread democracy in the Middle East to combat terrorism 
has come from a wider political spectrum.  Many voices have been added to this debate.  
There are individuals associated with neoconservatism such as Charles Krauthammer 
who proposed a doctrine of ‘democratic realism’.  He has argued that ‘there’s nothing 
neo about Bush, and there’s nothing neo about Blair’, and regarding democracy 
promotion in the MENA claims that, 
                                              
33 This was evident in the Republican-led House, which voted 296-133, and the Democrat-led Senate 
voting 72-23 (Reid 2002: 20). 
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There is not a single, remotely plausible, alternative strategy for attacking the 
monster behind 9/11.  It’s not Osama bin Laden; it’s the cauldron of political 
oppression, religious intolerance, and social ruin in the Arab-Islamic world-- 
oppression transmuted and deflected by regimes with no legitimacy into virulent, 
murderous anti-Americanism. It’s not one man; it is a condition … This is war, 
and in war arresting murderers is nice. But you win by taking territory—and 
leaving something behind (Krauthammer 2004a; Krauthammer 2004b). 
 
However, the need to promote democracy in the MENA has also come from neoliberal 
“hawks” and political “moderates”.  This is evident in Madeline Albright’s (2003) claim 
that, 
Although I was proud of the Clinton administration’s foreign policy, and I 
understand that democracy cannot be imposed from the outside, I regret not 
having done more to push for liberalisation in the Arab world. 
 
Further still, individuals such as Kenneth Pollack, former director of Persian Gulf affairs 
at the NSC (2006) have argued that,  
The end state that America’s grand strategy toward the Middle East must envision 
is a new liberal order to replace a status quo marked by political repression, 
economic stagnation, and cultural conflict … America  must move aggressively 
and creatively to help reformers throughout the Arab world. 
 
Similarly, Larry Diamond and Michael McFaul have written for a think tank affiliated 
with the Democratic Party, The Progressive Policy Institute, claiming that, 
In this new embrace of democratic reform in the Middle East, Bush has been 
correct in intent, even if late to the cause … Over time, expanding political 
freedom and accountability through democratising reforms would help to change 
the political and socio-economic conditions that have spawned terrorist groups 
and ideologies in the region (2006: 49-50). 
 
This line of argument strongly resembles that put forward by a Council on Foreign 
Relations task force; directed by Steven A. Cook, and co-chaired by Madeline Albright 
and Vin Weber.  One of the central conclusions of this report was that, 
The United States should support democracy consistently and in all regions of the 
world.  Although democracy entails certain risks, the denial of freedom carries 
much more significant long-term dangers.  If Arab citizens are able to express 
grievances freely and peacefully, they will be less likely to turn to more extreme 
measures.  They will also be more likely to build open and prosperous societies 
with respect for human rights and the rule of law (2005: 3-4). 
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Further still, in the most sustained analysis of the Freedom Agenda to date, Freedom’s 
Unsteady March, Tamara Cofman Wittes argues that promoting democracy in the Middle 
East is ‘neither a luxury nor a pipe dream.  It is a necessity’ (2008b: 146).  Wittes draws 
attention to current instability in the MENA region caused by demographic change, 
economic stagnation and increasing alienation, which are challenging the ‘Rents, 
Rhetoric and Repression’ strategy that sustains autocratic regimes  (2008b: 30-55). 
 
The emergence of a consensus between “neoconservatives”, “neoliberal” hawks and parts 
of America’s “moderate” political commentariat, have been widely discussed (see Smith 
2007; Kaye et al. 2008).  For Anatol Lieven and John Hulsman (2006) the emergence of 
this consensus represents the formation of a “Democratist ideology” or “Democratism”.   
Undoubtedly, there are risks in conflating proponents of democracy promotion into a 
single united ideology.  Whilst such an approach can be used as a heuristic tool, it runs 
the risk of obscuring significant disagreements between actors.  However, to the extent 
that there has been disagreement between proponents of democracy promotion it has 
largely concerned questions of “means”.  The most serious example of this concern is the 
use of military force, which, in light of the Iraq war, has increasingly been condemned; 
either entirely as a method of promoting democracy, or through claims that the Bush 
administration’s approach was an ‘unsound application’ of a ‘sound doctrine’ (see Traub 
2008; Lynch and Singh 2008; Carothers 2007b; Diamond 2005; Fukuyama 2005; Asmus 
and Pollack 2003).  This represents a tension between those that advocate a 
vindicationalist strategy, and those that favour exemplarism.  The distinction between the 
two positions is that those advocating the former, view ‘America as [a] crusader’, whilst 
those advocating the latter see ‘America as [a] beacon’ (Kissinger 1994: 18). 
 
A similar tension exists concerning the most fruitful methods of providing democratic 
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assistance to bring about democratic change.  In which many exponents of promoting 
democracy have debated the virtues of promoting economic growth, institutional reform 
and directly targeting civil society.  This is unsurprising given that there is no consensus 
in the democratisation literature over how best to promote democracy through foreign 
assistance.  Consequently this debate has been particularly pronounced over the question 
of ‘sequencing’ and issues concerning how to reshape America’s democracy bureaucracy 
to better coordinate and deliver assistance (see Carothers 2007a).  Accordingly, much of 
the academic and policy debate about the Freedom Agenda has persistently concerned 
issues of tempo, between exponents that view democracy promotion as best delivered 
gradually through “top-down” liberalisation of current regimes, and those that see a more 
urgent imperative in challenging current authoritarian regimes (Fukuyama and McFaul 
2007; Wittes 2008b; Gerecht 2005).   
 
A Gap in the Literature 
As this literature review has shown, there is considerable debate about the Freedom 
Agenda.  This has been based around strategic questions, reviewing issues of whether the 
United States “should” promote democracy in the MENA given other long term interests, 
and issues of whether the US “can” promote democracy given problems such as the 
“Islamist dilemma”.  In spite of those that adopt a more “realist” approach to the question 
of democracy promotion, there are those that argue democracy promotion “must” be a 
significant part of the US approach to the MENA.  Moreover, there is a significant 
coalescence of opinion between neoconservatives, neoliberals and moderate opinion, 
which has manifested itself in a bipartisan consensus towards promoting democracy in 
the MENA.  This consensus is held together by a strategic vision in spite of disagreement 
over the exact means of promoting democracy.  As a result questions of “how” to 
promote democracy are still heavily contested. 
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 Despite this extensive body of literature however, there remains a significantly under 
addressed question; what did President Bush and members of his administration mean 
when they referred to “democracy” and “freedom”?  Or put differently, what exactly was 
it that the Bush administration believed the Freedom Agenda was supposed to be 
promoting?  These are particularly pertinent questions given that both “democracy” and 
“freedom” are essentially contested terms (see Whitehead 2003).  Both terms are 
descriptive labels as well as values, which are highly contested between and within 
specific cultures.  Moreover, such concepts are temporally specific; the “democracy” of 
Ancient Greece is not the same as the “democracy” of modern day America.  Similarly, 
what the Founding Fathers meant by the term “freedom” is not the same as how the term 
“freedom” is deployed in modern day America.  Carl Becker summed up this problem 
when he referred to “freedom” as a “magic but elusive word” (in Foner 1998: xiv).  The 
obvious implication of this is that deploying essentially contested concepts is not a 
neutral act.  Through deploying such terms dialogue emerges with other competing 
meanings. 
 
The current omission within the literature is significant.  It demonstrates a failure to 
address first order questions whilst simultaneously obfuscating a greater understanding of 
the Freedom Agenda.  It excludes an explicitly hermeneutic dimension, and instead 
proceeds straight to critiques of praxis.  On a superficial level, the literature has partially 
addressed questions of how and why the Freedom Agenda developed.  For many it is 
simply a result of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, which led the Bush 
administration to move from a “realist” to “idealist” foreign policy (see Mazarr 2003).  
Yet, to posit this binary fails to explore the space between them, and evaluate the 
importance of the “crisis” itself.  In turn, such a failure stymies an understanding of how 
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the Freedom Agenda was constituted, and questions of why it was done in this way.  
Simply put, this has prevented deeper lessons about the Freedom Agenda being learnt at a 
philosophical level, through to the level of policy praxis. 
 
To fill this gap in the literature it is necessary to return to first order questions and 
explicitly add a hermeneutic dimension.  It is only by doing this that it is possible to 
reactivate the sedimentary logics that underpinned the Freedom Agenda34.  This 
Husserlian aim is of critical importance given the role of “ideology” within the Bush 
administration.  Indeed President Bush advocated a ‘foreign policy based on liberty’ and 
a ‘hopeful ideology called freedom’ to defeat extremists and their ‘hateful ideology’ 
(Bush 2006_07_28).  That the President described his strategy as “ideological” raises 
questions about the assumptions upon which this ideology rested and how these affected 
the Freedom Agenda.   
 
To add this hermeneutic dimension and create a greater understanding of the Freedom 
Agenda, it is necessary to elucidate a methodology.  Such a methodology must be capable 
of theoretically and historically (re)-constructing the context from which the Freedom 
Agenda developed and therefore be sensitive to institutional changes.  Moreover, it must 
include the ability to analyse both the underpinning philosophy of the Freedom Agenda 
and the manner in which this was turned into praxis.  This will not only address the 
current gap in the literature, and therefore add value to this research area, but the 
methodology itself will be a contribution to knowledge in the area of Foreign Policy 
Analysis.  It is to this task that section two of this research will now turn.  
 
                                              
34 Here ‘sedimentation’ refers to the concealment of an original act of institutionalisation, and ‘reactivation’ 
is to make such acts visible again (see Laclau and Mouffe 2001: viii). 
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Section Two:  
Constructivist Institutionalism and Narrative 
Discourse Analysis 
 
Constructivism is a theoretical stance whose name points up its central and 
distinctive claim.  Social relations make people social beings; people as social 
beings make up a whole world, and not just a world of meaning, out of their 
social relation … The most obvious implication is that scholars (people, relations) 
always begin in the middle. Context is unavoidable. So are beginnings. I begin 
with the process whereby we (as people, scholars) make the world and the world 
makes us.  
 
Nicholas Onuf (1997: 7) 
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4. Constructing a Methodology and Establishing a Worldview 
 
To explicate the methodology used in this research, it is necessary to outline the 
principles and theories which guide the choice of method.  Accordingly, it is necessary to 
establish an ordering–framework, and elucidate the conceptualisations and prescriptions 
that underpin a particular way of thinking about the world.  Yet, the purpose of 
establishing such a worldview is to answer a set of research questions that emanate from 
a concern with, and a desire to understand, the current state of US-MENA relations and 
the Freedom Agenda in particular.  Chiefly, the aim of the methodology is to underpin an 
answer to developmental and mechanical puzzles, which are at the core of this research35.  
These puzzles can be parsimoniously summarised as: 
 
• How and why did the Freedom Agenda develop?  
• How was the Freedom Agenda constituted and why was it done in this way? 
 
Positing such questions however comes with a note of caution, as they do not emerge 
from ‘nowhere’.  Rather, they are already embedded within a framework of ontological 
and epistemological assumptions and prescriptions36.  These assumptions direct the 
espoused perspective of the world.  As such, in the often quoted terms of Robert Cox, 
‘theory is always for someone and for some purpose’ (1981: 128), and the theories 
embedded in the methodology that follows are no different.  With this in mind, it is 
proposed that in the following section it would be prudent to explicitly set out the 
ontological and epistemological assumptions that underpin this research’s methodology. 
                                              
35 Although it is worth adding that the methodology clearly represents the manner in which I look at the 
world, and as such has already informed the nature of the puzzle I have sought to research.  These two 
aspects, world-view and puzzle are not separate. 
36 This is done by suggesting distinctive types of analysis over others.  In this case, that of understanding 
over explaining. 
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 The most accurate term to label the methodology pursued in this research is 
‘constructivist institutionalism’.  Yet, using this term is highly problematic and without 
explication does little to inform or orientate the reader.  This problem is exacerbated by 
the multitude of constructivist positions which can be taken.  Many authors have 
documented the voluminous plethora of positions that fall under the constructivist 
umbrella, and added many adjectives as a result.  For John Gerard Ruggie there is 
‘neoclassical’, ‘postmodernist’ and ‘naturalistic’ (1998a: 35-6).  For Katzenstein, 
Keohane and Krasner there is ‘conventional’, ‘critical’ and ‘postmodern’ (1998: 675-8).  
For Christian Reus-Smit (2005) constructivism has evolved into ‘systemic’, ‘unit-level’ 
and ‘holistic’ variants.  Moreover, Emanuel Adler (1997: 335-6) originally settled on 
cleavages between ‘modernist’, ‘rule-based’, ‘narrative knowing’ and ‘postmodernist’, 
but then altered the boundaries to ‘modernist’, ‘modernist linguistic’, ‘Critical’ and 
‘Radical’ (2005: 95-8).  Still some authors simply choose to distinguish between the 
constructivism espoused by various scholars, thus distinguishing ‘Wendt-ian’, 
‘Kratochwil-ian’ and ‘Onuf-ian’ constructivism (Zehfuss 2002).  The list of possible 
adjectives that could be applied to constructivist approaches does appear to be dizzyingly 
endless along a spectrum of ‘thick’ to ‘thin’. 
 
As a consequence of this, adding ‘institutionalism’ to a constructivist framework would 
appear to be just another adjective, added to the plethora that is “constructivism”.  Yet, 
the term does serve a function.  Firstly, the term ‘constructivist institutionalism37’ has 
arisen from ‘new institutionalist’ literature in comparative political analysis.  As such, the 
term implies a distinctive analytical position for those that are familiar with this literature.  
Significantly, it should be recognised that constructivist institutionalism has affinities 
                                              
37 This has also been termed discursive, ideational, and economic constructivism (see Schmidt 2006: 109; 
Hay 2006a: 56; Campbell and Pedersen 2001: 193-275). 
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with constructivism in IR, but the two ‘are perhaps best seen as parallel if initially distinct 
developments’ (Hay 2006a: 64).  However, whilst their origins are distinct, the 
methodology outlined below will seek to synthesise constructivist institutionalism with 
‘rule-based/ modernist linguistic’ constructivism.  The intention of this synthesis is to 
stress the centrality of complex institutional change and the specific ontology that this 
implies, whilst providing an account of social reality in which social facts are constituted 
by language and rules.  The aim of this is to allow an empirical, historical and interpretive 
account of the Freedom Agenda to emerge. 
 
The desire to assert such a methodology arises from dissatisfaction with other forms of 
constructivism, which have serious limits in their ability to answer the research questions.  
It is recognised that IR ‘constructivism’ contains epistemologically opposed and therefore 
incommensurable positions.  Consequently:  
[E]ven to talk of “a” social constructivism is problematic: there are many, and this 
poses the question of just how useful it is to use this blanket term, as is commonly 
done when talking of a “constructivist turn” in IR theory (Smith 2001: 40). 
 
Thus, what is needed for this research, and what constructivist institutionalism supplies, 
is a specific form of constructivism that is both compatible with Foreign Policy Analysis 
(FPA) and sensitive to issues of social and political change.  It is through these virtues 
that it can help add value to the current literature on US-MENA relations and the 
evolution of the Freedom Agenda.   
 
Dissatisfaction with “Constructivism”: Towards a Solution 
Before explicating the premises of constructivist institutionalism it is necessary to justify 
and explain the dissatisfaction that calls for its adoption.  Thus, it is essential to briefly 
survey constructivism in IR.  However, given the wide ranging set of distinctions and the 
many texts classified under this methodological title this is an intimidating task.  As a 
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result, this section has two specific aims, firstly, to identify the core of constructivist 
approaches, and secondly, to identify why “mainstream constructivism” is not compatible 
with the aims of this research.  This will not only justify the adoption of constructivist 
institutionalism but also help elucidate the position in the latter sections of this 
methodological section. 
 
The various divisions in the constructivist school of thought, highlighted above, 
demonstrate an important vivacity with regards to various analytical controversies at the 
ontological, epistemological and methodological levels.  Instructively, these problems 
force analytical choices and give rise to various analytical perspectives.  As such, it 
would appear that it is more accurate to talk of constructiv-‘isms’, as various scholars 
navigate and (re)construct alternative routes through the Political Analysis/International 
Relations landscape.  In this sense, constructivism can be seen as a theoretical association 
which, like Elgar’s Enigma, is bound by Variations on an Original Theme.  
 
Accordingly, what binds even incommensurable constructiv-‘isms’ is an appeal to a 
meta-theoretical position from which to study social phenomena (Adler 1997; Dunne 
1995; Hopf 1998; Ruggie 1998a).  As such ‘constructivism is not a theory, but rather an 
analytical framework’ (Reus-Smit 2005: 202).  It is perhaps best to regard constructivist 
approaches as being espoused from a similar worldview rather than antagonistic solo 
pieces.  This is apparent in the birth of the constructivist paradigm, which was an explicit 
reaction to the dominance of Rationalist approaches in the study of International 
Relations.  Most notably in light of the Cold War and the dismal ability of Rationalist 
approaches to predict change, constructivism has become a highly attractive approach in 
IR (Checkel 1998).  Constructivists reject appeals to parsimonious general theories of 
international politics.  Put simply, such theories are unviable because of the constitutive 
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role of ideas, agency, norms, identity, rules, and culture38.  These factors are seen to 
lesser or greater degrees as inherently historical and socially contingent and therefore 
central to analysis.  This highlights the need for analytical sensitivity when dealing with 
issues of structure and agency, which is the most fiercely contested debate within the 
constructivist paradigm (see Gould 1998; Adler 2005: 104-6).  Moreover, it is a 
disagreement over the nature of structure and agency that creates the largest cleavages 
within constructivist literature. 
 
Thus, it should come as no surprise that this research must engage with the structure and 
agency debate.  Moreover, as a basic premise, this research adopts an appreciation for 
Steve Smith’s assertion that,  
a priori, social constructivism should be particularly relevant to foreign policy 
analysis (FPA), precisely because social construction starts from the assumptions 
that actors make their worlds, and this assumption lies behind most of the foreign 
policy analysis literature (Smith 2001: 38). 
 
Accepting this premise has consequences for the type of constructivist methodology that 
can be adopted by this research.  Not all forms of constructivism accept this premise as 
an axiom carried through their research.  As such this premise provides the basis for 
rejecting ‘mainstream’ constructivism, and the need to assert constructivist 
institutionalism to provide a conception of social change and social action39 more in tune 
with Smith’s assertion.  This of course begs the question what exactly is understood as 
mainstream constructivism and why is it being rejected? 
 
The acme of mainstream constructivism is most closely associated with the work of 
                                              
38 These factors are stressed to different degrees by various authors, which help construct alternative 
analytical frameworks within constructive-isms. 
39 Note that although this study is explicitly concerned with ‘US foreign and security policy’, the term 
social is being used.  This is an important term as it stresses the extent to which in the post-Cold War world 
International Relations theory has come to acknowledge and problematise the implicit social theories that 
underpin the discipline.  Notably this is most clearly the case in Wendt’s Social Theory of International 
Politics.  (For further discussion on this point see Hay 2002). 
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Alexander Wendt.  Not only did Wendt (1987) first instigate discussion of The Agent-
Structure Problem in International Relations, but the publication of  Social Theory of 
International Politics (1999) has produced the most comprehensive account of 
constructivist thinking to international politics.   This is highly significant because it is 
Wendt, and the ‘mainstream’ constructivism that he espouses, that constitutes the most 
influential social constructivist position in IR theory (see Guzzini and Leander 2006: 
xvii-xix).  Notably, this accolade is a result of Wendt’s desire to construct a ‘middle way’ 
or via media between rationalist and reflectivist approaches to IR (Wendt 1992, 1999; 
Smith 2000a, 2001; Zehfuss 2002: 38-93).  The structural idealism his position espouses 
focuses on social constructs at the systems-level, which Wendt argues can fill the 
explanatory void evident in neo-realism and neo-liberalism.  Ideas, Wendt contends, 
construct preferences and interests, and are therefore important in understanding systemic 
change.  Moreover, it is ideas through constructed identities that allow materially similar 
states to act divergently within the international system (Wendt 1999; see Hudson 2007: 
10-14). 
 
This would suggest that Wendt’s constructivism would be an excellent place from which 
to start an analysis of the role of both structure and agency in US foreign policy decision 
making; this however is not the case.  Most discernibly, this is because Wendt’s 
constructivism is a systems-level account of IR.  The state is simply a ‘black box’, which 
is a unitary and rational actor in the state system.  State identities and interests are 
determined exogenously by the relational position in the international political system.  
This drives foreign policy.  There is no room for domestic factors; domestic actors and 
domestic processes are deemed plainly irrelevant to the study of International Relations.  
Those wishing to challenge this conception of the state and the conclusions it leads to are 
simply mistaken and should ‘leave well enough alone’ (Wendt 1999: 196).  For Wendt, 
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‘states are people too’ and ‘we can legitimately attribute anthropomorphic qualities like 
desires, beliefs, and intentionality’ (Wendt 1999: 215; 197).  This assertion highlights a 
fundamental paradox at the heart of Wendt’s mainstream constructivism40, and generates 
a systematic failure of such a methodology when applied to FPA.  To elucidate, Wendt 
argues that he gives ‘equal weight to agency and structure’.  The logic behind this comes 
from the ontological assumption that ‘[t]hey are mutually constitutive and codetermined’ 
(emphasis in original, Wendt 1999: 184).  Yet, by focusing on the state level he writes 
out human agency, problematically shifting agency beyond human control to the 
systemic-level.  An inconsistency is created.  Agency is discussed but conflated with a 
collective social form.  Consequently, in this schema, there is little conceptualisation of 
human agency at all (see Wight 1999: 125-29; Smith 2000a: 161-62; Sarvary 2006)41.  
Wendt’s appeal to a positivist/scientific realism leads social constructivism to be an 
‘adjunct explanation for those things that the positivist mainstream finds difficult to 
explain’ (Smith 2001: 39).   
 
To anthropomorphise the state is highly problematic to this research project, as it writes 
out the possibility of this being a legitimate study.  As Steve Smith argues, ‘Wendt’s 
position seems to make foreign policy analysis redundant or even impossible’ (Smith 
2001: 50). The very adoption of the Wendt-ian form of constructivism excludes questions 
concerning the development and impact of the normative and ideational foundations of 
the Freedom Agenda being asked.  It lies in stark contrast to the desire in FPA to treat the 
state as an actor but also open up the black box and look inside.  Wendt’s theory operates 
at a different level to Foreign Policy Analysis and subsequently does not allow for 
sufficient agency in the construction of US foreign policy.   
                                              
40 This ‘mainstream’ approach can take various forms such as ‘soft’, ‘moderate’, ‘structure/norm-
orientated’, ‘neo-classical’ or ‘modernist’ (Kubalkova 2001: 32-4; See Adler 2005: 97-8; Ruggie 1998a: 
35). 
41 For a vigorous critique of Wendt’s position see Colin Wight (1999: 125-29) and Steve Smith (2000a). 
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 It is in the critique of this anthropomorphic reification that it is possible to construct 
constructivist institutionalism and navigate this approach in synergy with Foreign Policy 
Analysis.  The starting point of this critique is simply to reject Wendt’s parsimonious 
premise; via the ontological contention that a state is incapable of having an idea42.  As 
Valerie Hudson argues,  
Only human beings have ideas … create identities … change identities … [and] 
act on the basis of identity … Only humans are agents in international relations … 
When you drop those humans out, you are left with a machine (2007: 10-11). 
 
The significance of such an assertion is that it undermines Wendt’s form of 
constructivism by placing the construction of social reality with human actors that make 
their world.  This in turn makes it possible to genuinely align constructivism with Karl 
Marx’s assertion that ‘men [sic] make their own history, but they do not make it as they 
please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves’ (2002 [1852]: 
329).  As such human actors are now centre stage within social structures; and what 
social structure can be more important to foreign policy than that of the state, albeit now 
defined as a corporate bureaucracy and not an individual actor.   
 
Constructivist Institutionalism and Foreign Policy Analysis 
The impact of moving down a level from Wendt’s systemic theory is that it allows an 
alternative constructivist conception of the state and how foreign policy is made to be 
asserted.  Contra Wendt, the state can be conceived not as an agent but as a structure 
created by agents (see Wight 1999: 136; Hollis and Smith 1991).  This is of crucial 
importance because once understood as a structure, and therefore as a constituted 
contingent entity, a micro-level understanding of human agency can be (re)introduced.  
                                              
42 It is illuminating to recall that Wendt’s appeal to a ‘state-as-actor’ logic was originally based on 
convention, as this is the ‘accepted practice of mainstream international relations discourse’ (Wendt 1992: 
397).  It is an odd form of constructivism that does not acknowledge the constructed nature of this 
discourse and reflect upon it! 
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This stresses the interconnected and mutually constitutive nature of both the ‘domestic’ 
and the ‘foreign’.  As Christopher Hill asserts, ‘foreign policy can never be abstracted 
from the domestic context out of which it springs.  Without domestic society and the state 
there would be no foreign policy’ (2003: 37).  This clearly concurs with Bob Jessop’s 
assertion that ‘it is not the state which acts: it is always specific sets of politicians and 
state officials located in specific parts of the state system’43 (Jessop 1990: 367).  One 
could easily add that they are also the agents that do the constructing so central to 
constructivism; to miss this point is to miss the added value that constructivism can bring 
to FPA44.    
 
Significantly, by defining the methodology in this research as constructivist 
institutionalism, it is implied that a conception of the state is fundamental to this research.  
The aim is to signal an affiliation with ‘new institutionalist’ literature that has 
increasingly sought to ‘bring the state back into’ political analysis45 (Schmidt 2006: 98).  
A further implication of this is to reject intentionalist approaches to the study of foreign 
policy and the domination of behaviouralism in FPA46 (see Hudson and Vore 1995: 215-
22; Kubalkova 2001).  Such input-orientated theories lack an adequate conception of 
structure and fail to recognise that politics, ergo foreign policy, takes place within 
institutional settings.  However, it should be noted that not all ‘institutionalisms’ are the 
                                              
43 This could read as methodological individualism.  This is not the intention.  To argue that the micro-level 
is ontologically primary, is not the same as saying the macro-level is ontologically non-existent or 
constitutive in some way.  What is being questioned is the status - actions and conditions must be 
accounted for.  Levels exist in relation to one another through collective intentionality. 
44 This is of paramount importance because for any constructivist position to espouse the mutually 
constitutive nature of agency and structure the internal micro-level must be ontologically primary.  Indeed 
John Searle asserts that ‘It is only from the internal point of view of the participants that the institution can 
exist at all’ and therefore concludes that the ‘internal micro-level is ontologically primary’ (Searle 1995: 
98).   
45 Moreover the term ‘Constructivist Institutionalism’ signals a connection to literature in European Union 
Studies, State Theory and Political Economy.    
46 This begs the question, why have I been so keen to assert that this study is in the academic discipline of 
foreign policy analysis?  The answer is in Hermann and Kegley’s description that what sets FPA apart from 
the more mainstream IR is an insistence that foreign policy explanation cannot treat the decider 
exogenously (Hermann and Kegley 1995: 514). 
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same.  Much like constructivist literature in IR, a varied and incommensurable set of 
positions are espoused ranging from Rational Choice institutionalism to Discursive 
institutionalism47 (see Schmidt 2006).  Apparent in each is not only a different 
conception of what an institution is, but as a logical consequence the nature of the state 
and how to study it.  Constructivist institutionalism arises from an engagement with this 
literature and a desire to overcome its limitations.  Thus, as Colin Hay argues: 
                                             
Constructivist institutionalists were motivated by the desire to capture, describe, 
and interrogate institutional disequilibrium.  As such, rational choice and 
normative/sociological institutionalism, which rely albeit for rather different 
reasons on the assumption of equilibrium, were theoretical non-starters … most 
routes to constructivist institutionalism can trace their origins to historical 
institutionalism.  Yet, if historical institutionalism has typically served as an 
initial source of inspiration for constructivist institutionalists, it has increasingly 
become a source of frustration and a point of departure (2006a: 57-60). 
 
The underlying logic of historical institutionalism is that of presumed equilibrium 
exemplified by the term ‘path-dependent’.  Fundamentally, this draws to different extents 
on calculus and cultural logics both of which either presume equilibrium or are 
equilibrating (Hay 2006a: 61; also see Hall and Taylor 1996).  Such schemes could only 
take this research so far in answering its central developmental puzzle.  If carried forward 
they would desensitise the study to post-formative institutional change after September 
11, 2001.  Moreover, without a well-built conception of change it is particularly difficult, 
if not impossible, to develop an understanding of the Freedom Agenda, its formation and 
subsequent changes.  Thus: 
Accounts which see actors as driven either by utility maximisation in an 
institutionalised game scenario (rational choice institutionalism) or by 
institutionalised norms and cultural conventions (normative/sociological 
institutionalism48), or indeed both (historical institutionalism), are unlikely to 
have much purchase on questions of post-formative institutional change 
(emphasis added Hay 2006a: 61). 
 
Accordingly, the notion of actors being ‘driven’ is highly problematic, not only in 
 
47 For an excellent overview of new institutionalist scholarship see Peters (2005), Steinmo, Thelen and 
Longstreth (1992) and Campbell and Pedersen (2001). 
48 One could add modernist forms of constructivism that use terms like identity and norms as ‘drivers’ of 
behaviour. 
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relation to understanding social change, but more fundamentally to a notion of agency.  If 
agency is to be understood as a concept which expresses the free will that actors exercise 
in social action, then to the extent that actors are ‘driven’, this is reduced.  The greater the 
reduction; the greater the structuralist tendency.  This undermines considerations of 
agency at a methodological level and fails to identify that individual agents create and 
remain at the centre of these very “drivers”.  Actors are ascribed a determined behaviour 
by context itself, parsimoniously characterised as reproducing a rational mode of action.  
Such an approach is empirically problematic when taken to its logical conclusion of an 
inbuilt logic fated to be reproduced irrespective of which agents hold power over the 
American foreign policy-making apparatus.  Without addressing issues of interpretation 
and strategic action, agents become characterised as cultural dupes destined to perform 
rigid acts of social (re)construction without any reflexivity or possibility of societal 
change.   
 
It is noteworthy that this was not the original intention of Historical Institutionalism.  In 
the text that gave rise to the name Historical Institutionalism the aims of this approach 
were explicitly stated.  Thus, as Thelen and Steinmo declared: 
Working at the level of midrange theory, institutionalists have constructed 
important analytical bridges: between state-centred and society-centred analyses 
… institutional analysis also allows us to examine the relationship between 
political actors as objects and as agents of history.  Institutions…can shape and 
constrain political strategies in important ways but they are themselves also the 
outcome (conscious or unintended) of deliberate political strategies, of political 
conflict, and of choice (emphasis added 1992: 10). 
 
If this were the case in historical institutionalist literature then the contrast with 
constructivist institutionalism would be merely one of analytical emphasis.  However, 
Historical Institutionalism has ‘increasingly been “hollowed-out” by building bridges to 
Rational Choice Institutionalism’ (Hay 2006a: 63).  As such it has lost the project’s 
intended ontological stance as it has developed. 
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 As this would suggest, constructivist institutionalism takes its ontological starting point 
from that which has been lost in historical institutionalist literature.  However, it has 
developed a distinct ontology of its own, by refusing to substitute actors in the name of 
analytical parsimony.  This reflects a synergy between ‘constructivist institutionalism’ 
that arises from new institutionalist literature, and ‘modernist linguistic/rule orientated 
constructivism’ which has arisen in IR49.  These two approaches have been developing in 
near isolation from one another and yet have striking parallels, because of their concern 
for subjective hermeneutics and an emphasis on the discursive construction of social 
reality.  The former provides highly specific methodology, whilst the latter provides an 
explicit and firm philosophical underpinning from Martin Heidegger through to John 
Searle.  As such they provide an excellent opportunity to cross-fertilise and inform this 
research.  It is to this task that this research will now turn, starting with an explicit 
account of structure and agency. 
 
Structure and Agency: The Strategic-Relational Approach 
The basic crux of the structure and agency debate revolves around how these two factors 
relate to one another (Adler 2005: 104).  Notably, in IR literature, it is difficult to 
discover a position that refers to the structure and agency debate in such stark terms as to 
exclude the other entirely.  It is therefore more useful to think of positions in IR as 
degrees between two extreme poles of structuralism and intentionalism.  Thus, even 
Kenneth Waltz’s neo-realist position explicitly asserts that states are not and have never 
been the only actors, but that they are the most important actors.  More recently, he has 
argued that:  
Structures condition behaviours and outcomes, yet explanations of behaviours and 
                                              
49 For an overview of this thought see the book series International Relations in a Constructed World 
edited by Vendulka Kubalkova, Nicholas Onuf and Ralph Pettman and published by M.E. Sharpe. 
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outcomes are indeterminate because both unit-level and structural causes are in 
play … structures shape and shove.  They do not determine behaviours … the 
shaping and shoving of structures may be resisted … with skill and determination 
structural constraints can sometimes be countered (Waltz 1986: 343). 
 
This is a significant admission highlighting that even the most systemic theories cannot 
do without both structure and agency if they are to withstand critique50 (see Hollis and 
Smith 1991: 92-118).  Thus, the structure and agency ‘problem’, as it is often referred to, 
is not a problem at all.  It does not need a ‘solution’ in the form of a definitive answer, 
and therefore research cannot be reduced to a stir-and-bake recipe of “one part agency to 
every three parts structure”.  Framing the debate as a ‘problem’ simply treats an 
ontological issue as if it were an empirical riddle (Hay 2002: 90-3).  An account is 
needed of how structure and agency interact, which resonates with human experience and 
provides a vernacular to be carried through this research; not an attempt to transcend the 
problem.  Such an account can provide foundations upon which to understand social and 
political phenomena. 
 
In constructivist institutionalist literature this has been attempted.  Central to the 
position’s focus has been an attempt to understand complex institutional change, and it is 
through its account of structure and agency that this is made possible.  As Colin Hay 
argues, 
Actors are strategic, seeking to realise certain complex, contingent, and constantly 
changing goals.  They do so in a context which favours certain strategies over 
others and must rely upon perceptions of that context which are at best incomplete 
and which may very often prove to have been inaccurate after the event51 (2006a: 
63). 
 
                                              
50 Indeed as Stanley Rosen points out, the intelligibility of structure requires the ‘absence of structure’ 
(2003: x). 
51 This has a striking similarity to Onuf’s assertion that: When we, as human beings, act as agents, we have 
goals in mind, even if we are not fully aware of them when we act. If someone asks us to think about the 
matter, we can usually formulate these goals more or less in the order of their importance to whomever we are 
acting as agents for, starting with ourselves. Most of the time, agents have limited, inaccurate, or inconsistent 
information about the material and social conditions that effect the likelihood of reaching given goals. 
Nevertheless, agents do the best they can to achieve their goals with the means that nature and society 
(together—always together) make available to them (Onuf 1998: 60) 
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Whilst this may appear to be a deceptively obvious statement it is worth deconstructing 
and developing further.  Notably the ‘actor’ is seen as an analytically distinct entity that 
engages with and within social structures.  As a result, it is worth making a further 
analytical distinction between Dasein52 and agency.  The former is literally an entity 
‘being-there’, and as a term is ‘purely an expression of its being’ (Heidegger 1967: 33).  
Dasein is “thrown” into the world and has agency when it engages with its social 
condition (see Gadamer 1994; 2004: 244-53).  The term agency refers to such action and 
social conduct53; its etymological roots lie in the term agentem, meaning ‘to do’.  This 
distinction implies intentionality54 which is an intrinsic property of Dasein and provides 
the capacity to act consciously with free will and at least deliberate between choices and 
potential routes of action.  However, Dasein, by definition is a ‘being-in-the-world’ and 
consequently is constrained/bound by the context that world provides.  The importance of 
this is that the mind and the body become intricately linked to the world removing the 
‘Cartesian anxiety’ and also make the distinction between structure and agency a purely 
analytical construction.  Accordingly, structure and agency are in practice completely 
interwoven; a premise that provides a pragmatic starting point for analysis. 
 
A similar dialectical position is adopted by Nicolas Onuf and the Miami International 
Relations Group.  Central to this group’s thinking is that the distinction between agency 
and structure is an analytical one, as one implies the other.  In such circumstances to 
                                              
52 This term is being used because it is an accepted term in philosophy and therefore carries with it a 
conceptual baggage that I want to introduce.  The term literally means ‘being-there’ referring to an 
inquiring entity (Heidegger 1967: 28-9) Heidegger: ‘The essence of Dasein lies in its existence.  
Accordingly those characteristics which can be exhibited in this entity are not ‘properties’ present-at-hand 
of some entity which looks so and so and is itself more than that…so when we designate this entity with the 
term ‘Dasein’, we are expressing not its what (as if it were a table, house or tree) but its being’ (BT42). 
53Relatedly Dasein has free will in the sense of it ability to choose how it will be and lives through its 
possibilities.  It is always engaged with the world and the entities within it.  This is a fundamental 
conception to transcending the Cartesian dualism upon which mind/body- agency/structure are separated. 
54 Note that this is intentionality-with-a-t, which is a property of the mind by which it is directed at or about 
or of objects and states of affairs in the world independent of itself.  This should not be confused with 
intensionality-with-an-s (see Searle 2004: 122-5).   
 - 77 -
remove either removes the ontological status of the other.  Both are mutually constitutive.  
Thus: 
Fundamental to constructivism is the proposition that…social relations make or construct 
people – ourselves - into the kind of beings that we are. Conversely, we make the world 
what it is, from the raw materials that nature provides, by doing what we do with each 
other and saying what we say to each other…people make society, and society makes 
people. This is a continuous, two-way process (emphasis added Onuf 1998: 59). 
 
To assert this ontological dualism55 between structure and agency creates analytical 
problems.  It implies a need for what Anthony Giddens calls a ‘third ontology’ beyond 
both structuralism and intentionalism (Giddens 1976, 1979, 1984).  Indeed both 
constructivist institutionalism and rule-orientated constructivism owe a great deal to 
Giddens’ structuration theory.  The similarities clearly lie in the rejection of ontological 
individualism and pure ontological structuralism.  Yet both constructivist institutionalism 
and rule-orientated constructivism have departed from structuration theory in significant 
ways.  Notably, the reason in both cases is that structuration theory fails to provide a 
mechanism capable of merging structure and agency at a methodological level.  Both 
point to an irony in Giddens’ work in which he ‘appeals to an ontological duality 
(interlinking) of structure and agency, [whilst] he delivers an analytical dualism 
(separation)’ (Hay 2002: 120; also see Layder 1998: 100; Gould 1998: 79-81).   
 
The attempt to transcend the structure-agency dualism is however done in different ways.  
The most established approach in constructivist institutionalism draws on Bob Jessop’s 
‘strategic-relational approach’.  The focus of which is ‘upon the dialectical interplay of 
structure and agency in real contexts of social and political interaction’ (Hay 2002: 127).  
As a result, the focus is shifted to focusing on the strategic actor and the strategically 
selective context; not on the inseparable ontological factors of structure and agency.  
Thus, the terms inscribe the dualism within them (see Jessop 2005; Hay 2002: 126-134).  
                                              
55 Note: Not duality which implies separation much like the Morphogenetic approach. 
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By focusing on the strategic content of action, it is accepted that,  
agents both internalise perceptions of their context and consciously orient 
themselves towards that context in choosing between potential courses of action 
… Yet for that action to have any chance of realising such intentions, it must be 
informed by a strategic assessment of the relevant context in which strategy 
occurs and upon which it subsequently impinges (Hay 2002: 129). 
 
The innovation behind this approach is that it provides a method of describing the 
dualism of structure-agency, but also recognises that Dasein orientates itself towards its 
environment and in doing so comes up against a strategically selective environment.  In 
such a schema, certain strategies are more likely to be rewarded than others and whatever 
the context, outcomes are never determined structurally.   As such an actor’s preferences 
are never assumed to be fixed, nor to be determined by the material circumstances in 
which they find themselves (Hay 2002: 129-30).  Therefore, different actors in similar 
material circumstances will construct their interests and preferences differently.  
Moreover, the same actor will review, revise and reform their perceived interests and 
preferences over time (Hay 2002: 130).  
 
Once Dasein is recognised as possessing strategic ability, which is a capacity to devise 
and revise in order to realise its intentions, it is implied that Dasein engages with its 
environment by judgement.  Dasein becomes an agent with agency, and that agent’s 
knowledge of the world and strategic orientation towards that world is in a continuous 
process of pragmatic interpretation (see Sharpcott 1994: 71).  As such the strategic 
relational approach provides, 
[A] dynamic understanding of the relationship of structure and agency which 
resolutely refuses to privilege either moment (structure or agency) in this 
dialectical and relational interaction … this provides a range of crucial insights 
into the analysis of political power and political change, whilst exhibiting a 
particular sensitivity to the role of ideas (ideational factors) in the understanding 
of political dynamics (Hay 2002: 134).   
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Ideas, Material and Interests 
Once Dasein is seen as strategic in its engagement with the world, ideas assume a critical 
relevance because it is ideas that provide the point of mediation between Dasein and its 
environment.  The perceptions that Dasein holds are at best incomplete and may prove to 
be inaccurate after an event.  As such Dasein is normatively orientated towards the 
strategically selective context (see Hay 2006a: 63).  Thus:  
Desires, preferences, and motivations are not a contextually given fact - a 
reflection of material or even social circumstances - but are irredeemably 
ideational, reflecting a normative (indeed moral, ethical, and political) orientation 
towards the context in which they will have to be realised (Hay 2006a: 63-4). 
 
Such sentiments represent constructivist institutionalism’s commitment to a ‘turn to 
ideas’. 
 
In opposition to rationalist theories, constructivist institutionalism takes interests as 
needing to be explained rather than to do the explaining with (Blyth 2003: 702).  This 
directly challenges the distinction between interests and ideas.  This lies in stark 
contradiction to the manner in which ideas are often treated in the analysis of foreign 
policy.  For many scholars ‘ideas’ are frequently treated as objects that provide an 
explanatory variable that are persistently separated from interests (see Laffey and Weldes 
1997).  The seminal volume exemplifying this trend is Judith Goldstein and Robert 
Keohane’s (1993) Ideas and Foreign Policy.  Whilst ‘ideas’ are introduced as a variable 
this is not intended to ‘challenge the premise that people behave in self-interested and 
broadly rational ways’ (1993: 5).  As such ‘variations of interests are not accounted for 
by variations in the character of the ideas that people have’ (1993: 27).  Within this 
scheme, consideration of where interests come from is avoided and ideas are reduced to 
post-hoc rationalisations that justify policies made on the grounds of already given 
material interests (see Laffey and Weldes 1997: 199-201). 
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For constructivist institutionalism, ideas are constitutive and define interests.  Interests 
are seen as social constructions and therefore are not natural or independent of Dasein.  
Consequently, interests are produced, reproduced, and transformed through the discursive 
practices of strategically selective actors, and emerge out of the representations they 
construct of the strategically selective context they face (see Weldes 1998: 218).  Thus, it 
is out of descriptions of the situation, and definitions of the problem (representations), 
that state officials make sense of the world around them and resultantly construct 
interests56 (Weldes 1996: 280).  The implications of this are clearly applicable to the 
concept of the ‘national interest57’.  Thus, 
national interests … are social constructions that emerge out of a ubiquitous and 
unavoidable process of representation through which meaning is created.  In 
representing for themselves and others the situation in which the state finds itself, 
state officials have already constructed the national interest58 (Weldes 1996: 283). 
 
This clearly demonstrates constructivism’s desire to return to first order questions and 
focus on interest formation, rather than a rationalist focus on interest satisfaction (Reus-
Smit 2005: 203).  Moreover, this all rests on the ontological nature of ideas and the 
distinctions made between modernist constructivism and constructivist institutionalism.  
Whilst the former, epitomised in The Culture of National Security (Katzenstein 1996), 
largely conceptualises norms and identities as constituted by culture and therefore as 
stagnant ideational structures; the latter rejects such naturalistic assumptions59 in favour 
of espousing narrative explanatory protocols that account for the dynamic nature of ideas 
                                              
56 Weldes notes that the concept of interest is itself a construction.  The very notion that interests motivate 
action and therefore should be referred to in explanations of behaviour and social outcomes is itself a 
relatively new concept that came with the rise of liberalism and capitalism (Weldes 1996: 306). 
57 For alternative constructivist conceptions of the national interest see Wendt (1999), Finnemore (1996a), 
and  Chafetz, Spirtas and Frankel eds. (1999).  For an excellent overview of this literature see Burchill  
(2005). 
58 The Weldes version of constructing the national interest places a clear emphasis on agency in 
constructing the national interest.  Finnemore however stresses normative structures. 
59 The reason I have termed these naturalist assumptions is because of the manner in which Jepperson, 
Wendt and Katzenstein (1996: 65) refer to the methodologies espoused throughout the book as explanatory 
in there engagement with “normal science”, and thus posit ‘causal effects either of identities or of the 
cultural/institutional content of global or domestic environment’.  For a more thorough critique see Ruggie 
(1998b: esp. 38), however it should be noted that because it is an edited book the extent to which 
naturalism is subscribed varies across authors.   
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(see Schmidt 2006: 112).  This creates a ‘tipping-point’ between modernist 
constructivism, which has a close affinity with sociological institutionalism (see 
Finnemore 1996b; Berman 2001), and constructivist institutionalism that asserts the 
importance of how actors (re)conceptualise the world ‘as a resource to promote change’ 
(Schmidt 2006: 112).  As such the dividing line rests on how ideas and ‘causation’ are 
related to behaviour; whether ideas are ‘causes of action’ or ‘reasons for action’ (see 
Ruggie 1998b: 22).   
 
Ideas: Towards a Conception of Continuity and Change 
The turn to ideas is central in answering both the developmental and mechanical puzzles 
at the heart of this research.  At the acme of the constructivist institutionalist position is a 
definition of institutions as ‘codified systems of ideas and the practices they sustain’60 
(Hay 2006a: 58).  This is important because, if ideas provide the basis of institutional 
creation and perpetuation, then institutions are ‘observer-dependent’.  As John R. Searle 
explains:  
A feature is observer-dependent if its very existence depends on the attitudes, 
thoughts and intentionality of observers, users, creators, designers, buyers, sellers 
and conscious intentional agents generally.  Otherwise it is observer (or 
intentionality) independent.  Examples of observer-dependent features include 
money, property, marriage and language.  Examples of observer-independent 
features of the world include force, mass, gravitational attraction, the chemical 
bond, and photosynthesis (2007: 82). 
 
This distinction has a significant impact on the study of politics and political change, not 
least because most of political reality is observer-dependent.  Accordingly ‘something is 
an election, a parliament, a president or a revolution only if people have certain attitudes 
toward the phenomena in question’ (Searle 2007: 83).  Political phenomena therefore 
require ontological subjectivity, which once acknowledged opens a subjunctive “ontology 
                                              
60 The emergence of this definition has largely arisen from the observed empirical regularity that ‘ideational 
change invariably precedes institutional change’ (Hay 2006a: 66).   
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of possibility”.  Consequently, the notions of political continuity and change are 
inseparably linked representations of the world and how these help generate regulative 
and constitutive rules for strategic agents. 
 
Although not broken down in this way, constructivist institutionalists have reached 
similar conclusions about the role of ideas and agency in relation to political continuity 
and change. Such a position is highly indebted to Peter Hall’s (1993) sustained, 
consistent and systematic attempt to accord a key role to ideas in institutional outcomes 
whilst synthesising it within a historical context.  Notably, Hall draws an analogy 
between Thomas Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) and the policy-
making process.  This allowed Hall to introduce the concept of paradigms into 
institutional analysis.   
 
Kuhn argued that science develops in a succession of enduring paradigms which are 
punctuated by periods of ‘revolutions’.  Within the revolutionary period the existing 
paradigm is challenged and replaced.  Subsequently, it is possible to distinguish a phase 
of ‘normal science’ in which the paradigm is ascendant and uncontested.  Within the 
‘normal’ period the paradigm provides an interpretive framework for ‘routine puzzle-
solving’, which demarcates the boundaries and methods of scientific competence.  By 
contrast, however, with an increase and accumulation of ‘anomalies’ a challenge to the 
paradigm can emerge because of a loss of confidence, and thus create a period of 
‘exceptional’ science.  Within such a period, the anomalies cause some scientists to reject 
the former paradigm’s constraints in search of answers not provided by the old paradigm.  
This creates a period in which competing approaches emerge, until a consensus can be 
created and institutionalised.  Thus, the space created by the failure of the old paradigm is 
replaced with a new paradigm which emerged in the ‘exceptional science’ period, 
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consequently establishing a new phase of normal science under the domination of a new 
paradigm (see Kuhn 1996; Hall 1993; Hay 2001: 196-7; Benton and Craib 2001: 58-63). 
 
Hall extends this analogy to the policy-making arena, by arguing that policy is made 
within context of a ‘policy paradigm’.  Thus Hall asserts that, 
policymakers customarily work within a framework of ideas and standards that 
specifies not only the goals of policy and the kind of instruments that can be used 
to attain them, but also the very nature of the problems they are meant to be 
addressing … this framework is embedded in the very terminology through which 
policymakers communicate about their work, and it is influential precisely 
because so much is taken for granted and unnameable to scrutiny as a whole … 
this interpretive framework [is] a policy paradigm (1993: 279). 
 
A policy paradigm is internalised by politicians and policy experts, and acts as a source 
of guidance for conducting and evaluating policies, which defines the range of legitimate 
methods available.  This in turn demarcates the very intentions and objectives of policy 
itself.  This in short ‘comes to circumscribe the realm of the politically feasible, practical 
and desirable’ (Hay 2001: 197).  Ideas are therefore not perceived as static objects but 
rather dynamic social products that can help maintain continuity and produce change.  
Such thinking has increasingly been incorporated into the study of foreign policy-making 
by authors such as Jeffrey Legro, who has argued that, 
in addition to preferences and strategies, actors must also have ideas or beliefs, 
that is, some notion about which strategy … is best suited to achieving the 
preferred outcome.  For example to know that states prefer security above all 
other goals tells us little about what behaviour they believe will achieve it (Legro 
2005: 24-5). 
 
It is from this premise that an appeal to ideas is made that occurs in a similar pattern to 
that espoused by Hall’s use of Kuhn’s theory: 
 
‘Ideational Orthodoxy (Continuity)’ Shock (Collapse; Change)  Consolidation of 
New Orthodoxy (Continuity)61 (see Legro 2005: 1-48). 
 
 
                                              
61 This is somewhat cruder than that presented by Legro but serves the purpose intended.  For a more 
detailed account of Legro’s ‘Two-Stage Model of Change’ refer to his diagram (2005: 14). 
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As this diagram demonstrates there are three distinct ‘phases’ to this conception of 
continuity and change.   Notable is the manner in which it deals with the form of change 
and not the content of change.  It does not provide an account of what will change, but 
how change will occur62.  This conception of social change is often characterised by the 
term ‘punctuated equilibrium63’.  As such it draws a ‘basic analytic distinction … 
between periods of institutional creation and periods of institutional stasis’ whilst 
asserting that ‘new structures originate during periods of crisis’ (Krasner 1984: 240). 
 
By representing the form of political change in this way, it is possible to refine the 
mechanical research question and ask ‘what preceding crisis, if any led to the 
development and consolidation of the Freedom Agenda for MENA?’  This question 
appears to have a resounding answer in the form of “September 11, 2001”.  The impact of 
that day’s events, whilst not epochal, are often cited as a catalyst for change in US 
foreign policy, as ‘the terrorist attacks provided a rare clarifying moment in the nation’s 
collective consciousness, when both American national identity and US foreign policy 
were reinvigorated’ (McCartney 2004: 400).  As Francois Heisburg concisely 
summarised, ‘with the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States…begun to 
transform its security strategy - radically altering its postulates but imprecisely reforming 
its doctrine and operations’ (2003: 75).  The events of that day are seen as path shaping 
due to their ability to change American foreign policy maker’s conceptions of threat and 
the national interest. 
 
Understanding political change in this form provides a conceptual framework that has 
clear methodological implications.  It ‘links’ the events of September 11, 2001, to the 
adoption of the Freedom Agenda policy at a theoretical level, and therefore provides a 
                                              
62 For a detailed account of this and other approaches to social change see Boudon (1986: esp. 16-8). 
63 This term was first introduced in political analysis by Stephen Krasner. 
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framework on which to support empirical data.  Moreover, by linking the process of 
change to strategic agent’s representations of the world, this form of change is not 
epiphenomenal.  The task is to identify the meanings strategic actors construct to 
understand events, and not look for hidden ‘causes’ ‘driving’ action.  Thus, the context of 
post-crisis action cannot be divorced from an understanding of the crisis, and 
consequently to understand the Freedom Agenda requires tracing its genealogy back to 
the moment of crisis that shaped its birth.  This point is all the more serious if it is 
accepted that ‘policy responds less directly to social and economic conditions than it does 
to the consequences of past policy’ (Hall 1993: 277).  Such thinking highlights the 
strategic manner in which policymakers develop ideas and engage with their environment 
in a ‘constant process of evaluation and assessment of the consequences of prior policy 
choices’ (Hay 2001: 198).  As a result the moment of crisis and the manner in which it is 
understood are seen as pivotal, as the theoretical assertion being made is that a change in 
ideas precedes a change in policy.  Consequently, defining and elucidating what is meant 
by the term ‘crisis’ is fundamental, and is a task that this research must now turn to.   
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5. Crisis, Narratives and Articulating Ideological-Discursive 
Formations 
 
“Crisis” is an often evoked, but ill defined term.  Significantly, the literature within IR, 
FPA and Crises Studies tends to converge on a definition that focuses on situations that 
have a  “high risk of war”.  Such approaches have taken considerable amounts of research 
down the route of identifying ‘under what conditions do crises lead to war, and when are 
they resolved peacefully?’ (Richardson 1994: 3).  As such, the aim has been to treat 
crises as self-evident empirical challenges, and all too often what constitutes a crisis is 
received uncritically as “a-problem-to-be-solved”.  Once a crisis is defined by its 
referential descriptive elements, the next step is to go about ‘setting a strategy’ to resolve 
the ‘problem’.  Such accounts demonstrate little appreciation or desire to analyse the 
observer-relative nature of ‘crises’.  They consequently fail to return to first order 
questions about how threats are recognised, how enemies are labelled, how groups come 
to imagine danger and how these help constitute a ‘crisis’.  Such factors are paramount to 
this research’s aim of understanding the formation of the Freedom Agenda and 
commenting on contemporary US-MENA relations. 
      
An excellent example of this referential theory of crisis, which has understandably 
received considerable attention, is the Cuban Missile Crisis.  According to the popular 
narrative the crisis was constituted by the Soviet Union strategically placing offensive 
weapons on Cuba64 (see Young and Kent 2004: 236-41).  Yet, such a description is 
problematic, especially once it is considered that early on Secretary of Defence Robert 
McNamara65 identified that placing missiles on Cuba made no difference to the strategic 
                                              
64 ‘The crisis which resulted from Khrushchev’s decision secretly to install intermediate and medium-range 
nuclear missiles in Cuba in 1962’ (Young and Kent 2004: 236) 
65 Recorded 16 October 1962 in ExComm in transcript and reiterated at the Hawks Cay Conference held in 
5-8 March 1987. 
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balance66 (see Weldes 1999a: 84-6; Allison and Zelikow 1999: 89; Hudson 2007: 92).  
This creates the need for a moment of reflection and analytical distinctions to be made.  
What made the Cuban Missile Crisis a ‘crisis’ was not, to use John Searle’s distinction, 
the ‘brute facts67’; it was not the ontologically real placement of the weapons on Cuba 
itself.  The intrinsic qualities of the weapons themselves were incapable of generating a 
“high risk of war”.  A closer look at the historical record demonstrates that 
representations and meaning attached to the objects are of critical importance.  Thus, as 
Jutta Weldes has demonstrated: 
[T]hough the missiles were irrelevant to the strictly military aspects of the 
strategic balance, they still had to be removed … the basic reason was US 
credibility.  Allowing the missiles to remain in Cuba “would have politically 
changed the balance of power.  It would have appeared to, and appearances 
contribute to reality” [Kennedy 1962] (Weldes 1999a: 85)68. 
 
The introduction of ‘appearances’, is significant because it introduces the subjective 
hermeneutical quality that underlies an observer-dependent phenomena.  This moves us 
closer to understanding how a particular situation becomes understood as a ‘crisis’ and 
therefore to answering the question ‘what exactly is a crisis?’  Accordingly, a closer 
inspection of the etymology of crisis highlights this observer-relative quality. 
 
The term was originally used in drama and medicine, to denote ‘moments when the 
intensification of processes requires some resolution’ (Sztompka 1994: 34).  This 
etymology is reflected in Habermas’ medical analogy.  The thrust of the analogy asserts 
that a crisis is ‘the phase of illness in which it is decided whether or not the organism’s 
                                              
66 Which, according to Kennedy’s National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, ‘most of us agreed with 
McNamara’s summary judgement at the outset, that the Cuban Missiles did not change the strategic 
balance- ‘not at all,’’ (in Weldes 1999a: 95).  For an excellent account see Errol Morris’ film The Fog of 
War. 
67 See John R. Searle (2005 [1969]: 50-3, 1995: 1-9). 
68 Moreover as Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr argued in 1965, ‘the shift in the military balance would be less 
crucial than that in the political balance.  Every country in the world, watching so audacious an action 
ninety miles from the United States, would wonder whether it could ever thereafter trust Washington’s 
resolution and protection’ (inWeldes 1999a: 85). 
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self healing powers are sufficient for recovery’ (Hay 1996b: 86).  The significance of 
such a proto-definition is, as Habermas argues, that ‘the crisis cannot be separated from 
the viewpoint of the one who is undergoing it … to conceive of a process as a crisis is 
tacitly to give it a normative meaning’ (1975: 1).  Thus, to term a situation as a ‘crisis’ is 
to interpret and make a judgement about that situation.  Moreover, as Colin Hay argues: 
[I]f we trace the etymology of the term, we find that this fusion of subjective 
perceptions and objective considerations is in fact crucial to the origins of the 
term.  ‘Crisis’ … literally ‘to decide’- is a moment of decisive intervention, a 
moment of rupture and a moment of transformation (1996b: 87; also see Bell 
1971; Brecher, Wilkenfeld, and Moser 1988). 
 
This implies abrupt systemic transformation, which highlights that a crisis is not just a 
moment of impending demolition evident in a policy’s failure, but rather a catalyst for 
alteration and development, ‘a moment in which a new trajectory is imposed upon the 
system in and through crisis’.  Thus, a crisis represents a lived experience ‘and a moment 
of action and intervention in the shaping of institutions and the reshaping of the state’ 
(Hay 1996b: 87).  Consequently, a crisis is a process of destruction and construction; 
Dusk and Dawn (Keane 1984: 11-12).  To paraphrase Wendt, crises are ‘what states 
make of them’; that is to say that crises are what the strategic foreign policy agents bound 
within a strategically selective context ‘make of them’.   
 
Any conception of crisis, when understood in these terms, requires both ontologically 
objective and subjective considerations; of both brute and institutional facts.  What 
constitutes a foreign policy crisis as a crisis is not intrinsically self-apparent in the events 
themselves.  The events themselves, to paraphrase Mark Blyth (2003), ‘do not come with 
instruction sheets’.  Members of America’s foreign policy bureaucracy did not wake up 
on September 11, 2001, with a guidebook telling them that “in the event of a terrorist 
attack using aircraft as kinetic weapons follow these procedures to achieve the 
exogenously given national interests…”.  Policy-makers were presented with 
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‘uncertainty’ and ‘complexity’ in a manner that strongly resembles the conditions 
outlined in John D. Steinbruner’s classic The Cybernetic Theory of Decision (2002: 15-
18).  In such circumstances not only are strategic actors faced with the ‘uncertainty 
condition’, but also disagreement amongst actors across a large bureaucracy.  This 
culminates in a situation where  
agents must argue over, diagnose, proselytize, and impose on others their notion 
of what a crisis actually is before collective action to resolve the uncertainty 
facing them can take any meaningful institutional form (Blyth 2002: 9). 
 
Within this scheme representations ascribed to a particular situation assume critical 
importance.  No longer is a crisis definable by reference to the existence of objective 
conditions external to the actors themselves.  Crises are ‘constructions’ to the necessary 
extent that they entail a perception of the need to make a decisive intervention (Hay 
2001: 203).  Crises are part of the political process, where strategic interpreters, 
embedded in a strategically selective context intervene.  Crises are ‘acts of intervention 
where sources of uncertainty are diagnosed and constructed’ (Blyth 2002: 10). 
 
Crisis Narration: The Content of Political Change    
Once foreign policy actors are seen as strategic interpreters, the fact that they puzzle 
under conditions of general uncertainty should come as no surprise.  Representations of 
September 11, 2001 become crucial not only to the initial creation of the war on terror, 
but additionally to post-formative policy development and institutional evolution. Herein 
lays the key relationship between September 11, 2001, the war on terror and the eventual 
formation and adoption of the Freedom Agenda.  Thus, as Stuart Croft argues: 
 
America’s ‘response’ to those attacks was not obvious, not ‘natural’, nor based on 
some objective standard of ‘common sense’.  Policy had to be built on a narrative 
that could be shared amongst those who felt threatened; and that had to be 
America’s government and importantly, American society as a whole (2006: 2). 
 
This point is particularly salient because it fuses the espoused definition of crisis, with 
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one of the key practical insights of Narrative Policy Analysis.  Namely that: 
Stories commonly used in describing and analysing policy issues are a force in 
themselves, and must be considered explicitly in assessing policy options … these 
stories often resist change or modification even in the presence of contradicting 
empirical data, because they continue to underwrite and stabilise the assumptions 
for decision making in the face of high uncertainty, complexity, and polarization 
(Roe 1994: 2).  
 
These points resonate and have a ‘family resemblance’ with the spirit of the cybernetic 
theory of decision, but it is narrative that becomes the medium in which uncertainty is 
suppressed.  Strategic foreign policy actors attempt to assimilate the meaning of new 
events in terms of past experience, and therefore confidently maintain beliefs.  As such 
narratives embed representations of ‘what has gone wrong’ and of ‘what is to be done’.  
Part of the process of constructing a crisis is therefore explaining the failure of previous 
policy by narrating its causes and establishing a model for crisis resolution.  Strategic 
policy makers are forced to fix a narrative of the past as it is only by doing this that it is 
possible to create an understanding of how to proceed.  Whilst punctuated evolution 
describes the form of change, the content and directionality of change is derived from and 
tied to resulting ‘crisis narratives’. 
 
The critical importance of narratives is that they are by necessity distorted representations 
of events serving a social function, rather than simply mirroring ‘reality’; thus deploying 
a narrative is not a neutral discursive act69.  When narratives are articulated they consist 
of logically structured plots and configurative emplotment of events and actors into a 
storyline, pragmatically establishing order and meaning70.  Moreover, they identify 
forces, attribute motivations and lessons for the future, giving rise to ‘a collective 
understanding of how to understand the past, situate the present and act towards the 
                                              
69 It involves the encoding and ascription of meaning to events, in order to represent them to the recipient 
narratees for the process of active interpellative decoding.   
70 Since Aristotle’s Poetics, narrative is regarded as a temporal sequencing of events into a beginning, 
middle and end (see Dienstag 1997: 18).  The term “emplotment”, referrers to the assembly of historical 
events into a narrative, within a plot. 
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future’ (Barnett 1999: 8).  Story-telling becomes a communicative method of ‘securing 
and endorsing the assumptions needed to make decisions under conditions of uncertainty 
and complexity’ (Roe 1994: 9). 
 
The implication of this is that narratives are generated from and help reconstruct 
particular theoretical substructures that influence praxis.  This is important because it has 
been a long accepted premise of many FPA scholars that: 
[P]rofessional analysts of foreign affairs and policy makers (as well as ordinary 
citizens) think about problems of foreign and military policy in terms of largely 
implicit conceptual models that have significant consequences for the content of 
their thought (Italics in original, Allison and Zelikow 1999: 3). 
 
It is narratives that embody these in the social world and make this content publicly 
accessible.   This ‘theoretical substructure’ has been given many names ranging from 
‘Heuristic content’ to ‘security imagery’ to ‘policy paradigm’, but the point remains that 
it is ontologically subjective.  It is inseparably tied to Dasein’s existential intrinsic 
constitution, with being in a world that is constantly changing and vastly complex, 
requiring simplification by re-presentation71.  But in the same process,  
What the facts are, what kind of event has occurred, which interpretation of an 
event makes sense and can therefore become myth, and which facts are relevant to 
the understanding of an event are all in part determined by the narratives in which 
these facts and events are embedded and through which they take on meaning 
(Weldes 1999a: 40). 
 
As the aim of the research is to understand the transformation of US foreign policy that 
led to the rise of the Freedom Agenda, then the mechanisms and processes by which 
perceptions of the September 11 crisis were mobilised and shaped assume a critical 
importance.  Consequently, the process of crisis “narration” is fundamental to the 
empirical account of the Freedom Agenda, as this social act constructs how threats and 
identities are discursively constituted and born throughout a crisis.  As Jutta Weldes’ 
                                              
71 Thus instead of the Cartesian ‘Subject – Object’ divide, this is a distinction between ‘Organism –
Environment’.    
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argues, ‘crises are social constructions that are forged by state officials in the course of 
producing and reproducing state identity’ (1999b: 37).  Within this framework cultural 
practices of representation assume a critical importance, and have vital implications on 
methodological analysis.  Under such conditions, there is little choice but to accept the 
perceptual and discursive qualities of the moment of crisis in an analysis of subsequent 
institutional change (Hay 2001: 204).  This realisation has a very important impact on the 
following analysis.  If it is narratives of crisis that represent events and are responded to, 
rather than the conditions that gave rise to the crisis, then the response to the crisis can 
only be studied by de-structuring72 the narrative.  This creates a separation between the 
conditions that gave rise to the crisis and the response, because the crisis narration need 
not be sophisticated or accurate in its understanding of the crisis context (Hay 2001: 204).  
As Colin Hay argues, the success of a crisis narrative 
generally resides in [its] ability to provide a simplified account sufficiently 
flexible to narrate … in the post-crisis world, crisis narratives must make sense to 
individuals of their experiences of the crisis … they must also be sufficiently 
general and simple to identify clear paths of responsibility and an unambiguous 
sense of the response that must be made if catastrophe is to be adverted (emphasis 
in original; 2001: 204)73. 
 
This has clear implications on the methods deployed in this research.  A variety of 
narrative discourse analysis is required that allows for theoretically-informed process-
tracing, in addition to allowing the theoretical substructure of policy narratives to be 
rendered apparent. 
 
 
 
                                              
72 The term “de-structuring” has been used here as an affinity to Gadamerian method.  Notably the term is 
derived from the Heideggerian method of Destruktion.  Using this term was a deliberate move by Gadamer 
to locate a common dimension between his hermeneutical project and the projects of both Heidegger and 
Derrida (see Michelfelder and Palmer 1989: 6-8). 
73 Michael Barnett could be seen as adding to this argument through his assertion that narratives provide a 
mechanism to “situate events and to interpret problems, to fashion shared understanding of the world, to 
galvanize sentiments as a way to mobilize and guide social action, and to suggest possible resolutions to 
current plights” (1999: 15).   
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Discourse and Ideological Effects 
Crucial to the espoused constructivist institutionalist methodology is a concern with how 
ideas are sedimented in ‘discourses’ which are articulated through narratives.  What is 
being espoused by this methodology is the manner in which ‘discourses’ come to provide 
‘a cognitive filter, frame or conceptual lens or paradigm through which social, political 
and economic developments might be ordered and rendered intelligible’ (Hay and 
Rosamond 2002: 151).  Under these circumstances to identify a discourse is,  
to point to the existence of structured sets of ideas, often in the form of implicit 
and sedimented assumptions, upon which actors might draw in formulating 
strategy and indeed, in legitimising strategy pursued for quite distinct ends (Hay 
and Rosamond 2002: 151). 
 
This not only highlights the importance of agents in the construction of institutions, but 
also in the maintenance of an institution in its post-formative period and transformation.  
In this schema it is ideas that become sedimented into discourses which help to 
(re)produce institutional rules and practices.  Consequently, by defining social institutions 
as codified systems of ideas and the discursive practices they sustain, the manner in 
which institutions are a product of and embedded in a tapestry of “ideological-discursive 
formations” 74 (IDFs) can be rendered apparent.  This is of crucial importance because 
institutions are seen as ‘an intermediate level of social structuring, which faces Janus-like 
‘upwards’ to the social formation, and ‘downwards’ to social actions’75 (Fairclough 
1995: 37). 
                                             
 
An IDF can be understood as a system of signification that is complicit in producing the 
practice of domination and subjugation.  This can be elucidated by looking at how 
discourse relates to ideology.  In a general sense, discourse commonly refers to language, 
 
74 Note:  This is not ideological-language formations, as discourse is defined more broadly.  Indeed of 
central interest is ideological significance as expresses in overall argumentative and narrative structure of 
texts.   
75 Janus is a reference to the Roman God of gates, doors, doorways, beginnings, and endings.  
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yet it has come to mean something more specific.  Due to the influence of Michel 
Foucault on ‘Discourse Theory’, the term discourse is often used to define various 
‘systems of representation’ (see Hall 2001; Foucault 2002; Foucault and Gordon 1980).  
Thus, as Stuart Hall explains, by ‘discourse’ what is being referred to is, 
a group of statements which provide a language for talking about – i.e. a way of 
representing - a particular kind of knowledge about a topic.  When statements 
about a topic are made within a particular discourse, the discourse makes it 
possible to construct the topic in a certain way.  It also limits the other ways in 
which the topic can be constructed (Hall 1996b: 201). 
 
Not only is the constructed and constitutive nature of knowledge recognised within such 
a definition, but so too is historical contingency76.  Discourses provide a way of 
representing knowledge about a particular topic at a particular historical moment through 
language (Hall 2001: 72).  Discourses are therefore complicit in the construction of social 
reality.  Not only do they help (re)constitute systems of knowledge and beliefs, but in 
doing so they help constitute social subjects and social relations (Fairclough 1992: 36).  
The power of a discourse therefore culminates in its ability to constitute identities and 
perceived interests, and therefore help to frame interpretations of behaviour (see Klotz 
and Lynch 2007: 11).  Moreover, discourse has the ability to create a form of power when 
institutionalised which is qualitatively different to that of brute physical force (see 
Lincoln 1989: 3-12); discourse (re)constructs deontic powers.  The internalisation of a 
discourse brings with it rights, duties, obligations, commitments, authorisations, 
requirements, permissions and privileges; all of which ‘exist as long as they are 
acknowledged, recognised, or otherwise accepted’ (see Searle 2007: 93).  As such it is 
discourses that help establish and constitute rules. 
 
 
                                              
76 The impact of adopting this definition may appear to represent a fundamental contradiction between the 
early appeals to John Searle’s work.  The key point however is to note that with regards to truth claims this 
research is underpinned by a ‘minimal perspectivism’ or ‘soft philosophical realism’and not relativism (see 
Prado 2006).  This is akin to Richard Bernstein’s (1983) Beyond Objectivism and Relativism. 
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Rules, however, do not determine behaviour, but rather, 
a rule is a statement that tells people what we should do.  The “what” in question 
is a standard for people’s conduct in situations that we can identify as being alike, 
and can expect to encounter.  The “should” tells us to match our conduct to that 
standard.  If we fail to do what the rule tells us to, then we can expect 
consequences that some other rule will bring into effect when other people follow 
the rule calling for such consequences.  All the ways in which people deal with 
rules - whether we follow the rules or break them, whether we make rules, change 
them, or get rid of them - may be called practices (Onuf 1998: 59). 
By emphasising the role of discourses in the construction of social reality, it is clear that 
‘speaking is doing’ (Gould 1998: 81), and speech acts are both representative and 
performative.  Speaking consists of prescriptive statements that establish rule(s) for 
action, which are constitutive and regulative.  Moreover, as relatively stable sets of rules 
take shape and help form institutions, the ruling structure embodied in the institution 
always works to the advantage of some agents at the expense of others (Onuf 1997: 15).  
Moreover, rule(s) provide a universal social experience that Dasein is thrown into and 
can never escape (see Onuf 1998: 63).  Once understood in this way, discourses can be 
seen as constituting towards ‘rule-making’ and the ‘naturalisation’ of ideologies.  This 
role is clear if it is accepted that whilst discourses are complicit in processes of 
signification, once reified into prevailing systems of rule(s), the term ideology can be 
used to represent ‘effects’. 
 
Although traditionally the term ideology has had clear Marxist connotations towards the 
problematic dichotomy of ‘True’ and ‘False’ consciousness, if understood as the effects 
of discourse this need not be carried forward77.  Whilst discourses define the rule(s), in 
doing so they seek to legitimise power relations which have ‘directionality’ and ‘ideology 
effects’ born out from the rule structure they seek to maintain.  Such effects are 
‘ideological’ to the extent that they pertain to ‘relations of domination/subordination, 
                                              
77 Within the espoused ‘critical’ view ideology is not simply reducible to an ideational disposition, but 
rather as a modality of power (see Fairclough 2003: 9, 1992: 86-96). 
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[and] facilitates their reproduction … what makes some discourses ideological is their 
connection with systems of domination’78 (Purvis and Hunt 1993: 497).  The crucial 
point to note is the manner in which this ‘operates systematically to reinforce and 
reproduce dominant social relations’ (Purvis and Hunt 1993: 497; also see Eagleton 1991; 
Thompson 1984; Dijk 1998; Fairclough 2003).  Indeed, as Nicolas Onuf emphasises, 
‘rules yield rule’ (1998: 74), by being re-articulated to legitimise systems of rule and the 
hierarchies they help to maintain.  This point is all the more pertinent if one takes the 
example of Edward Said’s Orientalism.  The discourse signifies to the extent that it deals 
with the Orient [sic] as a constructed object, but this process is not separate from 
ideological effects and systems of rule(s).  As Said points out,  
Orientalism can be discussed and analysed as the corporate institution for dealing 
with the Orient - dealing with it by making statements about it, authorising views 
about it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short, 
Orientalism as a Western Style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority 
over the Orient ([1978] 2003: 3). 
 
To understand IDFs therefore requires an understanding of the imbricated articulations 
that underpin it as well as the systems of rule(s) this helps (re)construct.  It is only by 
doing this that the Husserlian aim of ‘reactivating’ the IDFs, which underpin the war on 
terror and the Freedom Agenda’s ‘sedimentation’,79 is possible.  Moreover, such a move 
recognises that ‘understanding a practice involves theoretically and historically (re)-
constructing its context’ (Grossberg 1992: 55).  Therefore, at an empirical level it is 
necessary to diachronically investigate the processes of articulation and interpellation.  
These are the very processes in which ideas are drawn together to produce discursive 
representations which culminate into IDFs more generally and the war on terror crisis 
narrative in particular.  Once ‘articulation’ and ‘interpellation’ are seen as mechanisms, 
                                              
78 The ideas that follow from here come from a synthesis of Hall, Weldes, Onuf and Searle.  Thus it is 
crucial to understand that what I have done here is mix vocabularies to construct a worldview, the result of 
which is that I remain oblivious to the extent to which these authors would individually agree with this 
synthesis.   
79 Here ‘sedimentation’ refers to the concealment of an original act of institutionalisation, and ‘reactivation’ 
is to make such acts visible again (see Laclau and Mouffe 2001: viii). 
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they provide a route into analysing existing structured sets of ideas and the implicit and 
sedimented assumptions discourses contain.  These concepts go beyond the notion that all 
that is important to politics is representations, and raise first order questions about ‘how 
dominant constructions were produced and why alternatives, which were theoretically or 
logically possible, were easily marginalised’ (Weldes 1999a: 119).  Therefore, to 
understand the Freedom Agenda as a strategic policy pursued for quite distinct ends, 
requires an understanding of articulation and interpellation.  
 
Articulation 
To utilise the concept of articulation, it clearly requires delicate unpacking80.  Thus, as 
Stuart Hall argues,  
[T]he term has a nice double meaning because ‘articulate’ means to utter, to speak 
forth, to be articulate.  It carries that sense of language-ing, of expressing, etc. But 
we also speak of an ‘articulated’ lorry (truck): a lorry where the front (cab) and 
back (trailer) can, but need not necessarily, be connected to one another.  The two 
parts are connected to each other, but through a specific linkage that can be 
broken (Hall and Grossberg 1996: 141).   
 
The definition that Hall provides is instructive as it draws to attention the etymological 
roots the term has from the Latin ‘articulāre’, which means to divide (meats etc) into 
single joints.  An ‘articulation’ refers to ‘a joint’ and a ‘setting of bones’.  Once this is 
acknowledged, it provides Hall with a starting point to build upon: 
[A]n articulation is thus the form of the connection that can make a unity of two 
different elements, under certain conditions.  It is a linkage which is not 
necessarily, determined, absolute and essential for all time … So the so-called 
‘unity’ of a discourse is really the articulation of different, distinct elements which 
can be rearticulated in different ways because they have no necessary 
‘belongingness’.  The ‘unity’ which matters is a linkage between that articulated 
discourse and the social forces with which it can, under certain historical 
conditions, but need not necessarily, be connected (Hall and Grossberg 1996: 
141). 
                                              
80 This research does not reduce all social practices to the discursive, that is to say it does not follow in the 
footsteps of Laclau and Mouffe’s later work in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (2001).  The ‘worldview’ 
stated above is clearly a rejection of anti-foundationalist discursive idealism.  As such Stuart Hall’s 
definition of the term is particularly instructive as ‘he elevates the importance of articulating discourse to 
other social forces, without going ‘over the brink’ of turning everything into discourse’ (Slack 1996: 121).   
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Thus, to articulate is to generate a moment of speculative ‘closure’ or ‘fixity’.  It is to 
signify, which inevitably draws upon and works with discursive formations, and thus 
reconstitutes them  (see Weldes 1999a: 98).  This opens a situation where the existential 
nature of being-in-the-world determines that articulations must occur.  However, the 
content of such articulations are neither random nor necessary, as they draw on a variety 
of historically contingent resources, such as tradition and language, which are historically 
contingent (see Weldes 1999a: 98-100).  This introduces an element of the ‘conventional’ 
into the analysis, and if articulations embed a history/genealogy, then, they are not 
arbitrary but a  ‘specific product of the people who have developed the language in 
question’ (Williams as cited in Weldes 1999a: 100).  Moreover, it is through the process 
of articulation that speech acts are able to connote socially meaningful assumptions and 
logics, that is to say that they (re)present a propositional content that is larger than a 
strictly lexical interpretation of the content would allow; they carry a hermeneutic 
element that is not necessarily the same to all observers.  In this manner articulations help 
re-construct, represent and regulate a ‘common sense’ which acts as a ‘background’ for 
future articulations; contingent connections are therefore presented as ‘inherently or 
necessarily connected, and the meanings they produce come to seem natural, come to 
seem an accurate description of reality’ (Weldes 1999a: 99).  Thus, 
Insofar as linguistic phenomena cannot represent the world, they constitute a 
world of their own, a world true only to itself.  Words are performative, but only 
in a theatrical sense.  By enacting the propositional content of what is spoken, any 
such performance simultaneously objectivizes the world it creates and hides 
behind its representational success81 (Onuf 2001: 246). 
 
Onuf’s theatrical metaphor is particularly fecund, as it echoes a wealth of constructivist 
literature that utilises the heuristic metaphor of ‘game-play’ (see Milliken 2001; Howard 
2004).  The use of this metaphor, however, differs greatly from that of ‘Game Theory’ 
                                              
81 This point reflects Searle’s notion of the “ontologically subjective”.  For example we can say that the US 
Presidency is an observer relative phenomena, hence ontologically subjective, but it is an epistemically 
objective fact that G.W. Bush was the 43rd President (see Searle 2007: 82-4). 
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and ‘Rational Choice’ approaches.  Whilst the latter indulge in the language of ‘utility 
calculations’ and notions of positivist objectivity, the constructivist institutionalist 
approach outlined above remains dedicated to a hermeneutical-understanding approach82.  
Such a position recognises that the social world is woven together by rules and 
meanings83 (see Hollis and Smith 1991: 5; 68-91), and fundamentally rejects any form of 
reductionism/functionalism that excludes qualia84.   
 
This puts aside the behaviouralist tradition which has dogged FPA from its conception, 
and places rules and meaning as central for consideration.  For strategic agents rules and 
meaning act as resources in organised human practices, as they,  
constrain and enable participants to identify others behaviour as a certain type of 
move in a certain type of ‘game’ and to know how to act and respond in ways 
which are appropriate to ‘playing’ this game (Milliken 2001: 8). 
 
The adoption of this metaphor is significant because it challenges the notion that 
September 11, 2001 was ‘epochal’, yet allows the analysis to cut to the crisis moment 
where a decisive intervention in the form of a re-articulation of ideological discourses 
was being performed.  Thus, out of the brute moment of destruction, brought by turning 
aircraft into kinetic weapons, US foreign policy agents were able to construct a crisis85, 
and from the narrative that pursued develop an alternative policy paradigm.  Starting the 
analysis at this historical point in time however runs the risk of suggesting that September 
11, 2001 provided an epochal moment.  This is not what is being put forward, as it is 
rather more helpful to think of the events of September 11, 2001 as an escalation in an 
                                              
82 By extension this should highlight that within FPA this study sits on the side of the Hermeneutical 
divide, and not that of behaviourism (see Hollis and Smith 1991: 68-91).   
83 Note that consistent with the above worldview, such notions are not considered causal factors. 
84 The use of this term is from philosophy of mind and refers to qualitative states.  The use of the term is 
intended to signify Searle’s arguments against materialism, thus ‘Qualia really exist, so any theory like 
functionalism that denies their existence, either explicitly or implicitly, is false’ (2004: 59). 
85 To use the language of John R. Searle the events had an intrinsic quality, but the ‘crisis’ is an observer-
relative phenomena, as such it is constructed.  It is important to note that because something is a ‘construct’ 
it does not make it real.  But rather recognises an intrinsic quality of Human intentionality to project itself 
onto the world.  Searle’s analysis of money provides an excellent analogy.   
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already ongoing round of interactions; a rearrangement and not a rupture with the past.  
At the heart, since World War II, US-MENA relations have been forged by a set of 
intermingled partnerships and conflicts.  Yet, the events of World War II did provide the 
catalyst for a transformation in the rules of that game, and helped establish subsequent 
categorisational logics embedded in America’s war on terrorism discourse.  This is 
important because the manner in which the war on terror and Freedom Agenda were 
constructed did not arbitrarily arise from a vacuum, but equally were not 
epiphenomenally determined.  The construction of the crisis marks a period of ‘bound 
innovation’, in which path-shaping discourses were (re)articulated and framed by 
strategic agents to enact an elite project.   
 
To enact such a project is not a simple task.  Within highly complex societies like the 
United States, foreign policy cannot simply be imposed from the top-down; it must be 
articulated to the public at large and translated down the line to the level of policy 
implementation.  In effect, policy change requires cooperation and acceptance if it is to 
be institutionalised (see Jackson 2005: 8).  To understand the role of strategic foreign 
policy actors and the elite project they have termed the Freedom Agenda, the notion of 
articulation is invaluable, as it is through articulation that foreign policy actors were able 
to render intelligible their historical situation on September 11, 2001.  Moreover, it is 
from this process of articulation that the crisis was constructed; as a particular 
phenomena which was represented in a very specific way and given very particular 
meanings on which action was then based.  To postulate the role of articulation in this 
process, is to render apparent the power of the foreign policy elite.  This was not merely 
confined to the power to respond to a crisis, but additionally located in identifying, 
defining and constituting a crisis discourse.  This is instructive because it establishes that 
politics finds its sources not only in power-relationships ‘but also in uncertainty … 
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[g]overnments not only ‘power’ … they also puzzle.  Policy-making is a form of 
collective puzzlement on society’s behalf’ (Heclo as cited in Hall 1993: 275-6).  Thus, 
strategic political agents do not just project their representations onto the world with a 
prescriptive will, but rather they react to phenomena as it happens; they react and 
prescribe.  
 
Strategic policy makers are forced to fix a narrative of the past as it is only by doing this 
that it is possible to create an understanding of how to proceed.  The process of 
constructing a crisis discourse is therefore not imposed by outside actors, but rather 
constructed inside the state, by actors who are bound by the normative context in which 
they find themselves (see Fay 1996).  In this manner narratives, and the discourses they 
articulate together, have cognitive and normative functions which attempt to produce 
perlocutionary effects.  They assert a representation of the world that resonates with, and 
attempts to reconstruct, national identities as well as provide the foundations for 
conceptually sound policy programmes in the hope of producing a motivational force; 
they structure cognition and provide a model for future action86.  The narratives 
embodied in the war on terrorism discourse therefore provide a key locale for analysis 
because they embody the articulations that gave rise to, and are embedded in, the 
institutionalisation of the Freedom Agenda policy.  
 
Interpellation and Identity 
The concept of interpellation is analytically separable from articulation, yet is inseparably 
linked in the process of social construction.  The term was first used by Louis Althusser 
in Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses, to suggest that 
[I]deology ‘acts’ or ‘functions’ in such a way that it ‘recruits’ subjects among the 
individuals (it recruits them all), or ‘transforms’ the individuals into subjects (it 
                                              
86 For a more specific use of these categories see Vivien Schmidt (2000).   
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transforms them all) by that very precise operation which I have called 
interpellation or hailing, and which can be imagined along the lines of the most 
commonplace everyday police (or other) hailing: ‘Hey, you there!’ (1971: 163). 
 
The significance of this is that the individual becomes the subject in the moment of 
interpellation, through the process of recognition and interaction.  Therefore, 
interpellation represents a ‘double constitutive’ moment.  The first moment is the 
construction of a subject position which creates the possibility of identity.  The second is 
the moment in which the concrete individual is interpellated or ‘hailed’ into the 
constructed subject position and takes on that identity (Althusser 1971: 160).  This 
second moment is insertive, as an individual’s intentionality is projected into a position 
and takes on the ‘role’ that a particular identity provides87.  In this moment it is possible 
to take on a social identity under the subject positions of ‘we’, ‘us’, ‘America’, ‘the West’ 
etc. which provide the basis of social action through collective intentionality.   
 
These actions therefore provide the possibility of discourses having communicative and 
coordinative functions that culminate in ideological effects.  Stuart Hall outlines this by 
arguing that different systems of representation locate a potential interpellated subject 
differently, for example, 
[A]s worker, capitalist, wage worker, wage slave, producer, consumer, etc.  Each 
… situates us as social actors or as a member of a social group in a particular 
relation to the process and prescribes certain social identities for us.  The 
ideological categories in use … position us in relation to the account of the 
process as depicted in discourse ... All these inscriptions have effects which are 
real.  They make a material difference, since how we act in certain situations 
depends on what our definitions of the situation are (1996a: 39-40).  
 
Interpellation is a particularly useful concept within a game-play metaphor.   Constructed 
subject positions provide ‘gateways’ from which to ‘enter the game’, whilst additionally 
inscribing a set of social rules and expectations that can be followed by the strategic actor 
in the strategically selective context.  This is significant because it draws attention to 
                                              
87 And can act in accordance with contingently prescribed ‘rules’ an identity denotes. 
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representations of identity and the adoption of subject positions, but also demonstrates 
that ‘identity is an inescapable dimension of Being, rather than an epiphenomenal 
property, for both individual and collective subjects’ (Campbell 1998: 226).  This is all 
the more important because this inescapable property of Being means that all strategic 
actors adopt a subject position or identity, which carries with it ‘particular ways of 
functioning in the world’  (Weldes 1999a: 104), but is simultaneously embedded in 
rule(s) and power relations.   
 
The power of narratives greatly relies on the process of interpellation.  Through 
emplotment, subject positions are asserted and members of the audience are being asked 
to insert themselves into the horizon being articulated.  This is crucial because the power 
of the articulator does not lie in direct indoctrination but in the seduction of the audience.  
The power of a strategic political agent’s articulations lies in their ability to encode and 
‘frame the discursive context within which political subjectivities are constituted, 
reinforced and re-constituted’ (Hay 1996a: 261).  However, ‘the basis of interpellation 
lies in the inherently imaginative process of decoding through which we, the readers, 
inject ourselves into the narrative structure’ (Hay 1996a: 262).  The moment of dialogue 
is therefore a political moment of negotiation in which the articulator and audience fuse 
in a process that culminates in degrees of recruitment or rejection, which is anything but 
passive or static.  The concept of interpellation therefore helps highlight both the 
conflictual and the cooperative side of politics, which is an integral part of any society. 
 
By introducing the concept of interpellation it is possible to stress the importance of the 
“9/11” crisis narrative in constructing consent for the war on terrorism.  The power of a 
narrative ‘stems from its complexity’ (Polletta 2006: vii), in its ability to fill a story board 
by articulating multiple aspects of social reality.  Indeed, ‘even the most ‘simple’ of 
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stories is embedded in a network of relations that are sometimes astounding in their 
complexity’ (Cobley 2001: 2).  Yet, despite the complexity of its construction, to be 
successfully interpellated, the narrative needs to resonate with a broad audience (see 
Weldes 1999a: 104).  This creates a situation in which it is important to recognise that, 
Foreign policy problems are … not handled de nova as their solution is written 
into a discursive terrain that is already partially structured through previously 
articulated and institutionalised identities.  These structuring discourses stretch 
from the general and abstract, from ‘national identity’, ‘national interest’ and 
‘strategic interests’, to particular one like ‘Danish identity’, ‘civilisation’, 
‘developed’ and ‘European’.  To argue policies that radically break with these 
constructions is not impossible, but it is a daunting task, in particular when 
political opposition can mobilise these historically (re)produced constructions 
(Hansen 2006: 26). 
 
This generates a milieu in which identities are concurrently both a product of and the 
justification for foreign policy.  As such, the manner in which identities are articulated in 
the crisis narrative is of crucial importance, not least as a starting point for any systematic 
textual analysis. 
 
The process of interpellation is inherently linked to narratives and identity through the 
process of subjectification and identification.  To stipulate a decoder is to raise questions 
concerning the politics of location, in which the Subject is ‘dislocated88’ but interpellated 
into subject positions made possible within discourses.  When defined in this way, it is 
possible to see how ‘identity is the understanding of oneself in relation to others’ (Barnett 
1999: 9; Huntington 2005: 21-33).  As something which both individuals and groups can 
take possession of rather than be intrinsic or essentialist.  Identity, as an expression of 
socially recognised differences, is, ipso facto, overwhelmingly constructed.  Under such 
circumstances identities are never unified, but ‘fragmented and fractured’; the interactive 
process itself helps produce multiple constructions which can be antagonistic as they 
intersect (Hall 2000: 17).  ‘National identity’, which underlies the very concept of the 
                                              
88 That is, dependent upon an ‘outside’ that both denies them and provides the conditions of their possibility 
(Du Gay, Evans, and Redman 2000: 2). 
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national interest, is one such construction (see Anderson 1983).  As Michael Barnett 
argues,  
Identities, in short, are not personal or psychological they are fundamentally 
social and relational, defined by the actor’s interaction with the relationship to 
others; therefore, all political identities are contingent, dependent on the actor’s 
interaction with others and place within an institutional context.  This relational 
perspective informs the view that national identities are partly formed in relation 
to other nation states - that the identities of political actors are tied to their 
relationship to those outside the boundaries of the community and territory, 
respectively (Barnett 1999: 9). 
 
Apparent in this definition is the extent to which identities depend on the construction of 
an ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ status; and collectively an ‘us’ and a ‘them’ that exists in the 
socially negotiated imagination of the identity holder.  This contingency highlights not 
only the historical nature of ‘the nation’, but also the manner in which identities are in 
constant motion as the process of interaction and negotiation unfolds.  National identities 
must themselves be narrated and (re)presented in a collectively understood ‘geo-
biography’.  This relies on strategic agents articulating the constitutive inside and outside, 
which relies on logics of equivalence and difference to open and close the boundaries of 
the nation.  The notions of articulation and interpellation therefore highlight the 
communicative, coordinative, cognitive and normative functions of IDFs in 
(re)constructing the ‘United States’ as much as the ‘foreign Others’; nation-building is 
therefore a constant two way process ‘internally’ and ‘externally’.  As such it is possible 
to agree with Richard Jackson’s assertion that, 
[T]he language of the ‘war on terrorism’ is not simply an objective or neutral 
reflection of reality; nor is it merely accidental or incidental ... Rather, it is a 
deliberately and meticulously composed set of words, assumptions, metaphors, 
grammatical forms, myths and forms of knowledge - it is a carefully constructed 
discourse - that is designed to achieve a number of key political goals: to 
normalise and legitimise the current counter-terrorist approach; to empower the 
authorities and shield them from criticism; to discipline domestic society by 
marginalising dissent or protest; and to enforce national unity by reifying a 
narrow conception of national identity.  The discourse of the ‘war on terrorism’ 
has a clear political purpose; it works for someone and for something; it is an 
exercise of power (Jackson 2005: 2).    
 
 - 106 -
6. Adopting Research Methods 
Over the last two chapters this research has explicitly set out the ontological and 
epistemological assumptions that underlie a constructivist institutionalist methodology.  It 
has established a “worldview”, to aid analysis and generate a greater understanding of the 
Freedom Agenda.  However, it has not set out the techniques and procedures that were 
used to collect and analyse data.  Nor has it set out the research methods adopted, and the 
tools that were utilised.  The methods that were adopted, however, are a direct result of 
this methodology.    By positing the importance of narratives in the construction of crises, 
and the role of articulation and interpellation in underpinning IDFs, a set of methods was 
necessary to allow an analysis of these phenomena.  Consequently, the constructivist 
institutionalist methodology outlined above requires a set of methods with a dual 
function.  The first is to conduct a theoretically informed process-tracing of the 
emergence of the Freedom Agenda.  This allows the evolutionary logics of the Freedom 
Agenda to be rendered apparent, it is therefore explicitly concerned with how the policy 
was formed and evolved over time.  This unambiguously seeks to answer the research 
question ‘How and why did the Freedom Agenda develop?’  The second function of the 
methods adopted, is to allow a textually oriented discourse analysis to be conducted.  
This allows a hermeneutic dimension to be rendered apparent, and is therefore concerned 
with the ideas, beliefs and definitions that underpin the Freedom Agenda.  This 
unambiguously seeks to answer the research question: ‘How was the Freedom Agenda 
constituted and why was it done in this way?’ 
Notably these two research questions are analytically separable, but are strongly 
interrelated.  One cannot trace the process by which the Freedom Agenda emerged, 
without analysing the evolving meanings that underpin it.  Similarly one cannot fully 
understand the meanings that underpin the Freedom Agenda without tracing the context 
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from which these meanings emerged.  Consequently, this dual movement requires both a 
diachronic survey of the Freedom Agenda’s historicity, by locating and investigating 
practices and logics in a larger historical and social context, and a discourse analysis 
which focuses on interpreting a broad range of texts.  The adoption of this dual function 
takes a wide interdisciplinary perspective which combines social and textual analysis (see 
Fairclough 2003: 2-3, 1995, 1992).  This perspective recognises that textual analysis is 
insufficient in edifying the relationship between discourse and social practice, and 
therefore reinforces it by combining a ‘textually oriented discourse analysis’ with a social 
approach to Foreign Policy Analysis.  Such a method maintains the premises that, 
 Language is an irreducible part of social life; and therefore foreign policy. 
 One way of doing foreign policy research is through a focus on language, and 
therefore the deployment of discourse analysis. 
 This deployment can be reinforced by other analytical strategies and in this 
research is done so with a social and institutional analysis to foreign policy; as set 
out by the constructivist institutionalist methodology. 
Consequently, this study resonates with and draws upon other research carried out on the 
war on terrorism more broadly, such as Richard Jackson’s (2005) Writing the War on 
Terrorism and Stuart Croft’s (2006) Culture, Crisis and America’s War on Terror.  
However, it is qualitatively different.  Not only is the focus explicitly on the Freedom 
Agenda, but this research adds value to such studies by diachronically analysing post-
crisis transformation in US foreign policy discourse.  This recognises a distinctive quality 
of discourses that is in fact embedded in the etymology of the term.  Discourse, which 
obtains its roots from the Latin discursus, literally means to ‘run about’ or to ‘run here 
and there’, which captures a sense of movement, interaction, haste and disturbance  (see 
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Virilio 1991: 113-4).  A diachronic analysis allows this sense of movement to be 
captured, and highlights how the Freedom Agenda is the result of political processes; it is 
a social response to a crisis and consequently, the focus of this study is to foreground the 
lexicon of definitions, rules and discourses that construct the Freedom Agenda as a policy 
paradigm, and elucidate the ideological effects of constructing a policy in this way at the 
level of policy implementation.   
 
The Freedom Agenda Loci 
Significantly, positing a constructivist institutionalist methodology raises a series of 
research questions that can not be easily dismissed.  Such questions concern author-ity, 
such as “whose articulations are important in the construction of crises narratives?” and 
“whose articulations are important in the (re)construction of the Freedom Agenda?”  
Simply put, these questions require an answer to larger questions concerning ‘who makes 
US Foreign and Security Policy?’  The answers to such questions have a significant 
impact on the methods adopted, because ultimately they shape the data selection process.  
Determining whose discourse is to be traced and de-structured, ultimately determines the 
selection of texts to be analysed.   
This research consequently makes an analytical decision to regard foreign policy 
production as an elite project.   This accepts Richard Jackson’s theoretically based but 
empirically informed premise that ‘the war on terrorism is an elite-led project and these 
elites have provided the primary justifications and overall vision.  It thus seems logical to 
focus primarily on their words’ (2005: 26).  Thus, it is with caution that it is noted that 
US foreign policy is run by contingently bound elites.  Such caution is undoubtedly 
required because the term ‘elite’ could imply absolute social cohesion among strategic 
agents who are entirely divorced from civil society.  This is not the intended definition.  
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Rather the term is intended to refer to the limited number of strategic agents located in 
specific parts of the state system; to custodians of the machinery of the state89.  Thus, if 
foreign policy is regarded not as a noun, but as a continuous process, then it is possible to 
view the elite as those in control of this ongoing decision-making process.  Under such 
circumstances ‘political elites’ exist in addition to ‘politico-technocratic elites’ which 
culminates in a situation where ‘Foreign Policy may be ‘for the people’ in a fundamental 
sense, but it is largely still made on their behalf by cognoscenti’ (Hill 2003: 42). 
 
The decision to focus on elites and their production of the Freedom Agenda, is purely 
analytical, and subscribed to based on its ability to refine the focus of this research.  
Within such a pluralistic society as the United States domestic consent of foreign policy 
cannot simply be disregarded.  There are other actors outside government that compete 
with the state in the construction of public narratives.  Indeed, the role of the media in the 
process of representation has been well documented (see McAlister 2005; Croft 2006: 
189-3; 226-33).  Although such research is fruitful, any attempt to seriously integrate 
more pluralistic factors into this research would simply make it too porous, unwieldy and 
go beyond the focus of the research questions.  Consequently, this research fits within 
broader literature employing discursive methods in ‘foreign policy studies’.  The focus of 
such literature was best summarised by Jennifer Milliken, who outlines a contemporary 
focus on discursive productivity, 
by analysing how an elite’s ‘regime of truth’ made possible certain courses of 
action by the state (e.g. intervening militarily in the Gulf War) while excluding 
other policies as unintelligible or unworkable or improper (e.g. doing nothing, 
                                              
89 The conception of state being ascribed is similar to that of Jessop and Poulantzas, where the state is a 
strategic site, ‘a specific institutional ensemble with multiple boundaries, no institutional fixity and no pre-
given formal or substantive unity’ (Jessop 1990: 267; Poulantzas 1978).  Or as Colin Hay notes ‘The state 
is a dynamic and constantly unfolding system.  Its specific form at a given moment in time in a particular 
national setting represents a ‘crystallization of past strategies’ which privileges certain strategies and actors 
over others’ (2006b: 75). 
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seeking a diplomatic settlement) (1999: 236)90. 
Consequently, a qualitative approach was taken, focusing on interpreting the Bush 
administration’s discourses as they pertain to the Freedom Agenda and its evolutionary 
logic.  However, this was widened to include other ‘political elites’.  Thus, although this 
research focused on President Bush and senior members of his administration, it moved 
vertically down through the executive branch, but also horizontally across the legislature 
and judiciary.  Such an emphasis reflects the manner in which  
The executive departments of government, and the political appointees who head 
them, are at the core of the foreign policy-making process, particularly the 
Department of State and Defense (Wittkopf et al. 2002: 360). 
But crucially recognises Christopher Hill’s assertion that ‘the United States has the most 
developed system of legislative participation in foreign affairs’ (Hill 2003: 132). 
 
Text Selecting and Generating 
In chapter one of this research it was argued that the Freedom Agenda is a liberal grand 
strategy that has culminated in coercion, legislation and a set of institutional practices.  
However, these practices are based on a series of assumptions, definitions and beliefs that 
are embedded within and a product of a master narrative.  Such a narrative requires an 
entire language to enable it to be communicated.  This language is contained and stored 
within ‘texts’.  A text is an act of spoken or written language, but can also be attributed to 
symbols.  It is therefore an umbrella term for speeches, interviews, hearings, legislation, 
web postings, government documents, internal government reports and documents, press 
releases, letters, emails, and written articles by leading figures within the administration.  
Thus, as Richard Jackson argues, 
                                              
90 For examples of this being conducted see David Campbell (1993); Jutta Weldes and Diana Saco (1996) 
and Jennifer Milliken (2001). 
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text…sets out the parameters of official thinking and forms the basis of policy and 
action; it establishes the core principles, assumptions and knowledge … implies 
the kind of actions that will be undertaken and provides the overall story or 
narrative for public understanding of the issue (2005: 17). 
By accepting the premise that foreign policy is an elite project, a logical consequence was 
to gather texts that pertained to the Freedom Agenda, but which were produced by elite 
actors within the state system.  Text selection was based on the two key criteria.  Firstly, 
the importance of the source, which was determined by either a high level of public 
attention or which was important symbolically.  The second was relevance to the 
Freedom Agenda policy.  This produced around 800 texts ranging from the time that G. 
W. Bush was running for Presidential office, to his last days in office.  It therefore 
covered the period from September 23, 1999 to January 19, 2009.  Undoubtedly, this 
favoured analysing texts produced/delivered by President Bush, because of his central 
role in communicating the Freedom Agenda to the public.  Moreover, the role of 
President allowed him to be a privileged storyteller, with the author-ity to utilise the 
power of the state to garner media attention.  However, text selection was not isolated to 
Presidential speeches and public addresses; it included remarks and speeches made by 
senior officials within the administration, congressional hearings, legislation, and official 
documents produced by the administration and the democracy bureaucracy.  There was a 
high level of access to such sources in the form of speeches, interviews, press briefings, 
press releases, policy documents, fact-sheets, reports to Congress, legislation and 
congressional debates.  Notably, in many cases, these sources intentionally target a public 
audience and were transcribed into public records and official department websites. 
By selecting sources based on their association with the foreign policy elite, text selection 
was highly specific.  However this was supplemented with semi-structured interviews 
carried out in Washington DC between May to July 2008.  The focus of these interviews 
was on generating a deeper understanding of the Freedom Agenda.  Notably a key 
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objective of this research was to gather primary data from the policy actors that work 
within the Freedom Agenda institutions.  However this proved to be an impossible 
undertaking for reasons of access.  A significant contributor to this lack of access was the 
inability to secure a visa due to racial profiling, which resulted in a seven month delay in 
this research.  Under section 221(g) of the US Immigration and Nationality Act a visa 
application made on November 7, 2007, was send for “additional administrative 
processing”.  This was a result of the US Embassy in London being unable to “exclude 
the applicant as a possible match to an ineligible person” (see Appendix 1) (see Hassan 
2008b).  This raised serious unforeseeable problems, notably because it made access to 
the Department of State problematic; how does one interview members of the very 
institution that is excluding you access91? 
Once a visa was granted however access issues remained.  Not only were requests for 
interviews met with a wall of silence, but in some cases with hostility.  Such situations in-
and-of themselves provide a significant insight into the US counter-terrorism effort and 
sensitivity of researching the Freedom Agenda.  However to bypass these issues, semi-
structured interviews were targeted at policy experts outside government; at institutions 
such as the Brookings Institute, the Council on Foreign Relations and the National 
Endowment for Democracy (NED).  This was not an ideal situation, but rather a 
pragmatic step taken as a direct result of silence and hostility from members of the Bush 
administration.  The interview length varied from one to two hours, and proved fruitful 
by targeting individuals that had worked closely with the Department of State on issues 
regarding the Freedom Agenda.  
                                              
91 Multiple attempts were made to contact officials in the State Department and Freedom Agenda 
institutions by email and telephone.  Individuals were traced through both the State Department website 
and contact details available in the Federal Yellow Book directory (published by Leadership Directories, 
Inc.).  However, out of the forty three individuals contacted only one agreed to talk directly with me (under 
the condition of anonymity).  This however failed to materialise because the interviewee withdrew at the 
last minute. 
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Overview of Data Analysis Methods 
 
Once texts were selected they were placed into QSR NVivo 8 database.  This helped 
generate a series of just under 800 documents within an NVivo project.  This allowed a 
computer-assisted qualitative data analysis (CAQDAS) to be conducted.  This method 
was specifically chosen to allow a large volume of texts to be made more physically 
manageable.  Thus, the software does not, and cannot, carry out analysis.  Rather it is a 
tool that allows manual labour to be cut, so that more time can be spent focusing on the 
analysis of texts.   
 
Upon entering each text into the NVivo project, it was given a title.  The title started with 
the year, month and day in which the text was produced.  This allowed the texts to be 
ordered temporally and chronologically analysed.  Accordingly, a theoretically informed 
process-tracing of the Freedom Agenda was conducted, which allowed significant 
periods of policy formation and alteration to be identified.  Examples of the title format 
include: 
 
 1999_09_23 Citadel Period of Consequences (G.W. Bush) 
 2000_10_05 Vice Presidential Candidate Debate (R. Cheney & J. Liberman) 
 2006_08_07 ME Crisis between Lebanon and Israel (G.W. Bush & C. Rice) 
 
Step one of the data analysis process was to conduct a detailed review of the texts, to 
maintain consistency of format throughout the database.  Step two required subjecting the 
text to analysis, in which sections of the text were manually coded.  This was done by 
making extensive notes using the DataBit function and coding the data at each source.  
Thus, a “Code whilst Browsing” method was adopted that created a series of “Free 
Nodes” (See Appendix 2 & 3).  Once completed, step three was undertaken, which 
reviewed the complete series of free nodes for overlaps and inconsistencies.  
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Consequently, the coding process was an active research process culminating in iterative 
yet cumulative manoeuvres.  Step four consisted of a series of computer assisted 
searches, notably focusing on word frequency, co-occurrence between nodes, and to 
ensure completeness.  Step five consisted of converting “Free Nodes” into “Tree Nodes”, 
which created clusters of nodes around hierarchical concepts.  For example, nodes 
pertaining to the construction of American identity were brought together under Tree 
Node title “Representations of American Identity” (See Appendix 4).  Once completed 
step five was to review the project to ensure accuracy, detail and consistency.  Adopting 
these steps allowed greater familiarity with the texts and a rigorous analysis to take place. 
 
Coding Text using Narrative Discourse Analysis 
Discourse Analysis, as David Howarth has argued, has ‘no purely algorithmic methods 
and procedures of social science investigation’.  Consequently, ‘in each instance of 
concrete research, theorists have to modulate and articulate their concepts to suit the 
particular problems they are addressing’ (2000: 133).  In this theoretically driven but 
empirically rich research, the solution to this was directly derived from the constructivist 
institutionalist methodology outlined above.  By asserting the need for both process-
tracing and a textually oriented discourse analysis, the constructivist institutionalist 
methodology required a narrative discourse analysis to be conducted.  Ultimately, this 
allowed the ideological-discursive formation that underpins the Freedom Agenda to be 
identified, whilst also tracing the process by which the Freedom Agenda emerged and 
evolved.   
To conduct a narrative discourse analysis and code each individual text within the NVivo 
project, each text was subjected to a series of questions: 
 How are actors in the text represented and how are identities constructed? 
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 What motives are ascribed to actors? 
 What argument structures are used; both “rational” and “emotional”? 
 How are events sequenced within the text? 
 What representations of the past, present and future are embedded within the text? 
 Is there a plot running through the text and cases of emplotment? 
 What causal links are ascribed to, or inferred within the text? 
 What ontological and epistemological claims are being made within the text? 
 What assumptions, beliefs and values underlie the language of the text? 
 What articulations are being made within the text? 
 What are the histories and embedded meanings of the important words in the text? 
 What meanings are implied by the context of the text, and how does this context 
alter the meaning of the words? 
 What patterns can be observed in the language, and how do different parts of the 
text relate to each other? 
 How consistent are the discursive constructions within the text? 
 What regulative and constitutive ‘rules’ are (re)-constructed within the text? 
 What are the power functions of the discursive constructions? 
 What knowledge or practices are normalised and legitimised by the language of 
the text? 
 How does the language create, reinforce or challenge power relations? 
 How does the current text relate to the previous text? 
 To what degree does the current text represent continuity and/or change with the 
previous texts? 
As a direct result of these questions individual “free nodes” were created, which were 
then organised into hierarchical node trees.  The results that follow from this approach 
were distinguished by their oscillation between specific textual analysis92, and the ‘order 
of discourse’ which was a ‘relatively durable social structuring of language which is itself 
one element of the relatively durable structuring and networking of social practices’ 
                                              
92 Which included analysis of vocabulary, grammar, co-occurrence, themes, nominalizations and so forth 
(see Fairclough 2003). 
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(Fairclough 2003: 3; 220).  Specific attention was paid to recurring themes and the 
manner in which a narrative is constructed and framed.  This latter stage was completed 
by analysing small parts of texts, whole texts and across texts.  The purpose of which will 
be to rigorously reconstruct the dominant logics, representations and intentions that are 
put forward in relation to the Freedom Agenda.  The fruits of this labour produced the 
analysis that follows.   
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Section Three:  
The Punctuating “9/11 Crisis” and the Evolution of 
the Freedom Agenda 
 
Each cultural work is a vision of a moment, and we must juxtapose that vision with the 
various revisions it later provoked … In addition, one must connect the structures of a 
narrative to the ideas, concepts, experiences from which it draws support. 
 
Edward Said (1994: 79) 
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7. The Strategically Selective Context of the Post-Cold War 
Era: Paradigm Lost and Freedom Defined 
 
To elucidate how and why the Freedom Agenda was developed necessarily requires a 
brief analysis of the post-Cold War context, and the 2000 Presidential election campaign.  
This point has been mute in the literature engaging with the Freedom Agenda, much to its 
detriment.  To a significant extent, this period has been ignored due to assertions that G. 
W. Bush was a “realist” but “9/11 changed everything”.  This post-9/11 tyranny of the 
epochal has become a dominate contention in academic deliberations.  However, a closer 
inspection of G. W. Bush’s presidential campaign is fruitful because it is in this period 
that the candidate publicly set out an ideological-discursive formation that would in many 
ways characterise his administration’s tenure in office.  Moreover, by understanding the 
post-Cold War period it is possible to generate a greater understanding of continuity and 
change in US foreign policy.  This point is particularly pertinent to the construction of the 
Freedom Agenda, as it was between late 1999 and early 2001 that candidate Bush began 
to articulate and define concepts such as ‘freedom’, ‘power’, ‘peace’, and the ‘national 
interest’.  Consequently, understanding how these terms were deployed prior to 
September 11, 2001 can significantly inform any understanding of how the terms were 
used post-hoc and then came to be embedded in the institutionalisation of the Freedom 
Agenda.   
 
In this chapter, it will be shown that candidate Bush tried to establish himself as 
‘Reaganesque’ prior to taking office in January 2001.  This was done in an attempt to 
legitimate his candidacy and provide an overarching rationale to US foreign policy, 
which had been lost in the post-Cold War era.  Yet, although candidate Bush failed to do 
this, he presented the need for a foreign policy based on American primacy and a 
‘Distinctly American Internationalism’ (Bush 1999_11_19).  Ultimately, this 
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‘internationalism’ was an all encompassing term calling for the promotion of neoliberal 
marketisation.  Inscribed in such policy prescriptions candidate Bush was promising to 
utilise American power to extend ‘peace’ and ‘freedom’ and ‘renew America’s purpose’, 
and ultimately set out ideas that undoubtedly influenced the manner in which the 
Freedom Agenda was eventually constructed. 
 
Candidate G. W. Bush and the Post-Cold War Era 
That the collapse of the Soviet Union had a profound impact on American foreign policy 
throughout the 1990s has become something akin to received wisdom.  Gone was the 
overarching rationale of containment, and in swept a period of uncertainty about how to 
use American global supremacy as the lone superpower.  In effect, the fall of the Soviet 
Union led to a collapse of an ideational orthodoxy used to guide US foreign policy, 
leaving policy-makers deprived of consensus and an overarching paradigm for routine 
puzzle-solving.  This was reflected in American’s wider political discourse, as the desire 
for a ‘peace dividend’ fractured both the Democrat and Republican parties on Capitol 
Hill.  Whilst the Democrats were struggling to compose a method of marrying 
progressive policies with American power, the Republican Party fractured into 
isolationists, contract Republicans, realist pragmatists and neoconservative idealists 
(Chollet and Goldgeier 2008: 318-26; Bowen and Dunn 1996: 1-29).  This made 
achieving a foreign policy consensus on most issues highly problematic, as this historical 
period became defined by the mêlée being waged in Washington and the nation more 
generally.   
 
Accordingly, exactly where on the political agenda foreign policy should feature was 
being re-examined and redefined as domestic issues began to be deemed just as, or more, 
important for some.  As various strategically selective political actors began to view the 
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strategically selective context differently, the “market place of ideas” was filled with 
policy prescriptions that would have been contentious in the Cold War period.  This was 
certainly reflected in President Clinton’s approach that ‘put America's commercial 
interests - promoting exports and opening markets - on par with the country's traditional 
security interests’ (Sanger 2001: 65).  This marked an important adjustment in the 
country's foreign policy priorities and demonstrated a recognition that ‘the Cold War had 
ended and that Europe and Japan had long put their competitive interests first’93 (Sanger 
2001: 65). Moreover, it represented a noteworthy downgrading of Cold War objectives 
by revising the previously circumscribed policy options of the Cold War and asserting 
that ‘there is no clear division today between what is foreign and what is domestic’ 
(Clinton in Bowen and Dunn 1996: 21).  This is not to argue that a radical reform had 
taken place.  Given the profound nature of the change within the international system, 
numerous critics have argued that ‘many of the broader objectives sought by the United 
States since 1989 actually bear a strong resemblance to those it pursued before the end of 
the Cold War’, which included a rejection of isolationism, support for democracy, and a 
tendency to see the new order as conterminous with American national interests (Cox 
1995: 5).  Yet, without an overarching rationale or purpose to American Foreign policy 
the concepts of ‘security’ and ‘threats’ began to broaden beyond traditional military 
views and existential threats to the state.  Undoubtedly, this was reflected in the Clinton 
administration’s endeavour to understand globalisation and the strategically selective 
context this presented.   
 
That American foreign policy lost a sense of purpose with the collapse of the Soviet 
Union was captured by the very term “post” Cold War, as such a label revealed that 
                                              
93 This was reflected in Clinton’s successful establishment of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) forum, the passing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Uruguay 
Round of General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (see Bowen and Dunn, 1996, pp.24-5).   
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people knew where they had been, but not where they were, much less where they were 
heading (Haass 1997: 21).  Consequently, two predominant temperaments prevailed in 
this period of uncertainty; pessimistic declinism and triumphant exhilarance.  The first of 
these temperaments was captured in Paul Kennedy’s (1987) bestseller, The Rise and Fall 
of the Great Powers.  Spanning from 1500 to 1980 Kennedy laid out a pattern of rise and 
decline that Great Powers have undergone.  Yet, he extended his analysis through to the 
end of the twentieth century predicting the rise of powers such as China, Japan, and the 
European Economic Community, whilst predicting the decline of the Soviet Union and 
the United States.  This decline was regarded as an ‘enduring fact’ given US ‘imperial 
overstretch’ and the notion that the ‘United States’ global interests and obligations [were] 
far larger than the country’s power to defend them all simultaneously’ (see Kennedy 
1987: 565-698). 
 
Conversely, it was Francis Fukuyama’s (1989) National interest article titled The End of 
History? which came to represent triumphant exhilarance.  In an attempt to understand 
the importance of the end of the Cold War, Fukuyama sought to place the events into a 
‘larger conceptual framework’.  Consequently, drawing on Hegel and Kojève, he set out 
an argument that described a new state of history characterised by the ‘triumph of the 
West, of the Western idea’.  For Fukuyama this represented an ‘unabashed victory of 
economic and political liberalism’ evident in the ‘total exhaustion of viable systematic 
alternatives to Western liberalism’.  This constituted the ‘end of history’, defined as the 
‘the end point of mankind's [sic] ideological evolution and the universalisation of 
Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government’.  This was a bold and 
encouraging argument, which placed the ‘West’ into the category of ‘post-historical’ 
whilst the “Rest” was classified in the ‘historical’ phase of this teleological progression.  
Relatedly, whilst offering no policy prescriptions, the reader of the article could conclude 
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either that America should support democracy wherever possible, or that ultimately the 
‘historical’ part of the world would inevitably succumb to, and enter, the post-historical 
bloc (see Chollet and Goldgeier 2008: 21-3; Callinicos 1995: 15-43).  Philosophical 
problems aside, this was a deeply influential article that permeated post-Cold War 
America. 
 
These two temperaments offered contrasting views of the politically feasible, practical 
and desirable, for America’s foreign policy.  On the one hand, pessimistic declinism 
suggested a cautious more prudent foreign policy, and if taken to the logical extreme it 
could even be used to advocate neo-isolationism.  Yet, on the other hand, triumphant 
exhilarance suggested a bold inevitability of Western superiority; cautious or not the 
‘historical’ bloc would inevitability arrive at the ‘post-historical’ phase of human 
existence.  In essence, triumphant exhilarance seemed to provide a purpose; to ensure that 
other countries arrive at, and accept, the dominance of economic and political liberalism.  
This dichotomy is parsimonious; however it provides a heuristic device for understanding 
the prevailing circumstances in which the 2000 presidential campaign was fought.  
Moreover, it allows the political platform that George W. Bush ran on to be explicated. 
 
That G. W. Bush ran for presidential office claiming that he would reinvent a national 
purpose was not unusual.  All American presidencies aspire to provide symbolic 
leadership and a reinvention of national purpose, whether it is in the form of a New Deal, 
New Frontiers, New Foundations, New World Order, New Covenant or Democratic 
Enlargement (Dumbrell 1997: 54-6; Chollet and Goldgeier 2008: 315).  Candidate Bush 
declared his early offering at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, proposing a 
‘Distinctly American Internationalism’ (Bush 1999_11_19).  This was well received by 
commentators such as William Kristol and Robert Kagan, who argued that the speech,  
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[R]epresent[ed] the strongest and clearest articulation of a policy of American 
global leadership by a major political figure since the collapse of the Soviet 
Empire. In his call for renewed American strength, confidence, and leadership, 
Bush stakes a claim to the legacy of Ronald Reagan (1999: 7). 
 
Appearing to be the heir of the Republican darling Ronald Reagan was certainly the 
intention of this stagecraft.  Why else would you hold a speech in the symbolic terrain of 
the Reagan Library?  This was a sure sign of the admiration the candidate had for the 
former President94, and demonstrated how the Reagan ‘philosophy’, of ‘limited 
government, tax cuts, and of peace through strength’, would act as candidate Bush’s 
loadstar (see Bush 2001: 177).  Given such circumstances, it is odd that so many 
commentators have referred to the ‘pre-9/11’ Bush as a realist.  Indeed, Thomas 
Carothers, a leading authority on democracy promotion and democratisation at the 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, has argued that,  
[D]uring the 2000 presidential campaign Bush and his advisers had made it very 
clear that they favoured great-power realism over idealistic notions such as 
nation-building or democracy promotion (Carothers 2004). 
 
That Bush and his team were seen as realists was certainly helped by candidate Bush 
claiming, in his ‘Distinctly American Internationalism’ speech, that: 
In the defense of our nation, a president must be a clear-eyed realist. There are 
limits to the smiles and scowls of diplomacy. Armies and missiles are not stopped 
by stiff notes of condemnation. They are held in check by strength and purpose 
and the promise of swift punishment (Bush 1999_11_19). 
 
This is an often quoted paragraph used to uphold the dominant narrative concerning 
Bush’s so called realism.  Yet, what is often omitted is a series of caveats that were 
included later in the speech: 
Some have tried to pose a choice between American ideals and American 
interests—between who we are and how we act. But the choice is false. America, 
by decision and destiny, promotes political freedom – and gains the most when 
                                              
94 Indeed President Bush would later write in an autobiographical account of his journey to the White 
House “It was a great honor to meet president-elect Reagan … President Reagan was resolute in his goals 
and confident in his philosophy.  He set a clear agenda of limited government, of economic growth through 
tax cuts, and of peace through strength.  His Presidency was a defining one … President Reagan realized 
the greatness of America was found not in government in Washington, but in the hearts and souls of 
individual Americans” (Bush 2001: 177). 
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democracy advances … I will address these responsibilities … To each, I bring 
the same approach: A distinctly American internationalism. Idealism, without 
illusions. Confidence, without conceit. Realism, in the service of American ideals 
(Bush 1999_11_19). 
 
Such a statement gives pause for thought, not least because it seems to suggest a much 
more complex vignette than the label “realist” captures.  Bush’s ‘Distinctly American 
Internationalism’ openly inscribed a tension between both realism and idealism.  This 
dialectic is unsurprising given the extent to which the battle between idealism and realism 
has shaped the history of American foreign policy.  However, upon closer analysis of the 
Bush campaign it is clear that these two larger philosophical bodies of thought were 
playing out through the temperament of pessimistic declinism and triumphant exhilarance 
embedded in a very distinct ideological-discursive formation. 
 
The prevalence of pessimistic declinism was certainly evident in the Bush campaign’s 
critique of President Clinton.  During the 2000 Presidential campaign, candidate Bush ran 
on a foreign policy platform that sought to discredit the Clinton administration, and 
therefore undermine the appeal of his political opponent Al Gore.  At the 2000 
Republican National Convention, he asserted that, 
[F]or eight years, the Clinton/Gore administration has coasted through prosperity 
… Our current president embodied the potential of a generation … to what end? 
... no great purpose … Little more than a decade ago, the Cold War thawed … But 
instead of seizing this moment, the Clinton/Gore administration has squandered it. 
We have seen a steady erosion of American power and an unsteady exercise of 
American influence (Bush 2000_08_15). 
 
In juxtaposition to Al Gore’s Clintonesque platform, the Bush campaign began to frame a 
narrower definition of what constituted the nation’s interests; emphasising American 
power and primacy as the lone superpower (see Krauthammer 2001).  Consequently, 
Thomas Carothers was correct in asserting that the Bush campaign derided nation-
building.  In the first presidential candidate debate, when questioned directly about when 
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it would be appropriate to use force, candidate Bush replied: 
Well, if it's in our vital national interest, and that means whether our territory is 
threatened or people could be harmed, whether or not … our defense alliances 
are threatened, whether or not our friends in the Middle East are threatened. That 
would be a time to seriously consider the use of force … I don't think we can be 
all things to all people in the world. I think we've got to be very careful when we 
commit our troops. The vice president [Al Gore] and I have a disagreement about 
the use of troops. He believes in nation-building. I would be very careful about 
using our troops as nation builders … I believe we're overextended in too many 
places. And therefore I want to rebuild the military power (Bush 2000_10_03). 
 
By making reference to an overextended and declining military Bush certainly appealed 
to pessimistic declinism.  Candidate Bush sought to construct an image of himself as a 
more prudent candidate, willing to use force, but if and only if more traditional security 
threats presented themselves.  Yet, embedded in the candidate’s response was something 
of a paradox.  Why was it necessary to rebuild military power, if the number of military 
missions was to be lower as a result of abandoning smaller nation-building exercises? 
 
In part, the Bush campaign’s answer to this came in the form of a stark description of 
deep military decline: 
Not since the years before Pearl Harbor has our investment in national defense 
been so low as a percentage of GNP. Yet, rarely has our military been so freely 
used – an average of one deployment every nine weeks in the last few years. 
Since the end of the Cold War, our ground forces have been deployed more 
frequently, while our defense budget has fallen by nearly 40 percent (Bush 
1999_09_23). 
 
Invoking Pearl Harbor is a powerful discursive tool.  In this context, Bush was clearly 
trying to invoke a sense of danger and the potential results such military weakness could 
invoke.  Conspicuously, this depiction of military decline was silent on the fact that the 
US had the world’s largest defence expenditure and between 1999 to 2000 outspent the 
next six nations combined95 (Chamberlin 2004: 5).  Nor was it mentioned that defence 
cuts began under President Bush Snr, or that 1999 saw the Pentagon receive the biggest 
                                              
95 This included mainland China, Japan, France, the United Kingdom, Russia and Germany which totalled 
approximately US $275,100 million, compared to the US military expenditure of $281,000 million.   
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financial boost since the end of the Cold War (Chollet and Goldgeier 2008: 297).  The 
prevailing narrative was simply that: 
Eight years ago, the Clinton-Gore administration inherited a military ready for 
dangers and challenges facing our nation. The next president will inherit a 
military in decline. But, if the next president is George W. Bush, the days of 
decline will be over (Bush 2000_11_03). 
 
What is perhaps more interesting about the narrative presented by the Bush campaign 
however, is that it embedded a deeper more ideological answer as to why the US should 
rebuild military power.  In particular, Bush’s ‘Distinctly American Internationalism’ 
articulated the need for American primacy inspired by the ideals of hegemonic stability 
theory.  It was throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s that advocates of a primacy 
strategy had drawn on hegemonic stability theory to begin advancing an alterative policy 
to containment.  Their interpretation had led to the conclusion that peace is a collective 
good which is best secured by the unqualified and unchallenged preponderance of US 
power.  The logic being espoused was that peace and stability could be secured by having 
such overwhelming preponderance that others would not dare attack (see Nye 2007: 64-
5).  This was the view put forward in President Bush’s inaugural address in January 2001, 
we will build our defenses beyond challenge, lest weakness invite challenge … 
The enemies of liberty and our country should make no mistake: America remains 
engaged in the world by history and by choice, shaping a balance of power that 
favors freedom (Bush 2001_01_20). 
 
Much has been made about the last part of this quote, notably because the phrase ‘a 
balance of power that favors freedom’, was later used by the Bush administration in its 
2002 National Security Strategy of the United States; which many regard as a document 
to legitimate the 2003 Iraq war.  That this phrase was used in President Bush’s inaugural 
address has been widely overlooked.  Yet, what is important about the notion of a 
‘balance of power’ in the context used by President Bush, is that it was not referring to an 
equilibrium.  The superficial articulation of the two terms ‘balance of power’ and ‘favors 
freedom’ creates an oxymoron.  That this balance favours freedom, would suggest 
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imbalance and a forward-leaning approach to foreign policy; not equilibrium.  This rules 
out the most typical manner in which a ‘balance of power’ is traditionally used by 
Realists in International Relations theory.  That is to say that it is not being used in a 
classical Realist sense, where states consciously adjust their alliances to ensure that no 
single state dominates the international system.  Rather, as Christian Reus-Smit points 
out, the phrasing suggests primacy as ‘it is sustained American ascendancy that will 
favour human freedom’ (2004: 35).   
 
Once understood in this context, it is clear that the Bush administration from the moment 
it took office sought to maintain US supremacy in what Charles Krauthammer termed the 
‘unipolar moment’.  This was deemed to be in both the American national interest and the 
interest of the world; or more boldly expressed, what was good for America was good for 
the world.  Such a US-centric approach was certainly advocated by candidate Bush.  
What clearer expression of this could be made than Bush’s response to the question 
‘Have you formed any guiding principles for exercising this enormous power?’: 
I have, I have. First question is what's in the best interests of the United States? 
What's in the best interests of our people? When it comes to foreign policy that 
will be my guiding question (Bush 2000_10_11). 
 
In part this US-centric position reflected the Bush campaign’s perceived need to reassert 
American interests that were regarded as neglected in the Clinton era (Bush 2001: 239-
41; Dunn 2003: 286).  This was captured in the repetitious Bush campaign watchwords 
‘we will renew America’s purpose’ (Bush 1999_09_23, 2000_08_15).  As candidate 
Bush narrated the past he described an American foreign and security policy drifting in 
the post-Cold War world, failing to develop an overarching rationale to seize and utilise 
American supremacy.  This position also reflected appeals to the Reaganesque premise of 
‘peace through strength’.  Such sentiments were expressed in claims that the US military 
should be used to ‘fight and win war and therefore prevent war from happening in the 
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first place’ and ‘I know that the best defense can be a strong and swift offense’ (Bush 
2000_10_03, 1999_09_23).  Yet instructively, because such statements were being 
articulated through the prism of primacy inspired by hegemonic stability theory, it is 
possible to conclude that throughout the 2000 campaign, and taken into office, was a 
desire to ensure that America would maintain freedom of action and preserve it position 
of preponderance (see Rice 2000). 
 
Such a position infers a noteworthy definition of ‘power’.  In particular, ‘power’ was 
described as something quantifiable and derived from the possession of military and 
economic superiority.  This wrote out conceptions of ‘social power’, or rather deontic 
powers, such as rights, duties, obligations, commitments, authorisations, requirements, 
permissions and privileges (see Searle 2007: 93; Reus-Smit 2004: 45-50).  Such factors 
were dismissed as a product of ‘discomfort’, ‘reflexive appeals’ or of ‘second-order’ 
importance, rather than being seen as possessing intrinsic value for the pursuit of foreign 
policy goals.  This position underpinned the unilateral emphasis that would accompany 
the Bush administration into office; manifesting itself in policies towards the Anti-
Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, the International Criminal Court, global climate change, 
distrust of the United Nations, North Korea and Iran (see Buzan 2004: 166-70).  This 
was, in a term coined by Richard N. Haass, ‘à la carte multilateralism’.  The term reflects 
the ‘unilateral bias’ and ‘ideological leanings’ of the Bush administration that was ‘too 
quick to dismiss the benefits of multilateralism and legal frameworks and too quick to go 
it alone’ (Haass 2009: 182-3).  In essence, the Bush administration put forward a narrow 
definition of power, which made military and economic factors their main preoccupation.  
This was done in the expectation that this form of power would maintain US 
preponderance, because ‘America’s pursuit of the national interest’ was expected to 
deliver global conditions for ‘freedom, markets and peace’. 
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 Notably, this narrow quantifiable theory of power was not the only conception of power 
put forward throughout the Bush campaign.  Many accounts of this campaign have 
written out the extent to which the Bush team put forward a conception of power that was 
directly related to the triumphant exhilarance of the post-Cold War era.  In particular the 
Bush campaign articulated a conception of ‘freedom’ with ‘power’: 
Now, we trust freedom. We know freedom is a powerful, powerful, powerful force, 
much bigger than the United States of America (Bush 2000_10_11).  
 
This conception of ‘power’ is clearly not the same as that of military or economic power.  
Rather, power here is seen to be a property of ‘freedom’, which was described as having 
an ontological status in the ‘human spirit’: 
Military power is not the final measure of might. Our realism must make a place 
for the human spirit.  This spirit, in our time, has caused dictators to fear and 
empires to fall … The most powerful force in the world is not a weapon or a 
nation but a truth: that we are spiritual beings, and that freedom is "the soul’s 
right to breathe” (Bush 1999_11_19). 
 
In part, the Bush campaign represented its ontology of Being through allusions to 
Fukuyama’s teleological argument.  This was done by claiming that the US was on the 
‘right side of history’ (Bush 1999_11_19; Rice 2000), and pointing at the empirical 
consequences of democratic ‘waves’ throughout the twentieth century:   
In the dark days of 1941 – the low point of our modern epic – there were about a 
dozen democracies left on the planet. Entering a new century, there are nearly 
120. There is a direction in events, a current in our times. "Depend on it," said 
Edmund Burke. "The lovers of freedom will be free." … We believe, with George 
Washington, that "Liberty, when it begins to take root, is a plant of rapid growth." 
(Bush 1999_11_19). 
 
Such claims were more widely and directly declared once the Bush administration was in 
office: 
Through much of the last century, America's faith in freedom and democracy was 
a rock in a raging sea. Now it is a seed upon the wind, taking root in many 
nations.  Our democratic faith is more than the creed of our country, it is the 
inborn hope of our humanity, an ideal we carry but do not own, a trust we bear 
and pass along (Bush 2001_01_20). 
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There is a current in history and it runs toward freedom (Bush 2001_11_10). 
 
Yet, in addition to this teleological argument, the ‘power of freedom’ in the ‘human 
spirit’ was also given a theological tone; freedom was the ‘soul’s right to breathe’, and 
American was on ‘the right side of history – the side of man’s dignity and God’s justice’ 
(Bush 1999_11_19).  As this shows, ‘freedom’s power’ was an articulation of both the 
teleological and the transcendental.   
 
Unsurprisingly, candidate Bush and his team were vague when it came to explaining 
exactly what was meant by the term ‘freedom’.  They certainly did not write a treatise on 
the subject or engage in any public philosophical rumination.  It was simply asserted that 
‘the basic principles of human freedom and dignity are universal’ (Bush 1999_11_19).  
To the extent that these ‘universal’ values were elucidated, it was simply asserted that:  
People should be able to say what they think. Worship as they wish. Elect those 
who govern them. These ideals have proven their power on every continent … We 
value the elegant structures of our own democracy – but realise that, in other 
societies, the architecture will vary. We propose our principles, we must not 
impose our culture (Bush 1999_11_19). 
 
The tone of this statement is certainly modest, and appears to be respectful of cultural 
plurality albeit bound by some form of democratic legitimacy.  Yet, further to this, the 
Bush campaign did make some remarkably telling statements concerning their guiding 
definition of ‘freedom’ and how it would be promoted.  Once again candidate Bush 
appealed to the legacy of Ronald Reagan, and in particular the notion that the free market 
was a necessary foundation for individual freedom: 
America believes in free markets and free trade – and benefits most when 
markets are opened … We believe, with Alexander Hamilton, that the "spirit of 
commerce" has a tendency to "soften the manners of men." … I view free trade as 
an important ally in what Ronald Reagan called “a forward strategy for 
freedom.”  The case for trade is not just monetary, but moral. Economic freedom 
creates habits of liberty. And habits of liberty create expectations of democracy. 
There are no guarantees, but there are good examples, from Chile to Taiwan. 
Trade freely with China, and time is on our side (Bush 1999_11_19). 
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What is particularly striking about this passage, and many other statements made 
throughout the campaign, is that candidate Bush was espousing a dedication to 
modernisation thesis.  This put forward a particular understanding of how liberalisation 
and democratisation are linked to political economy.  The benefits of free trade were 
portrayed as a method of reducing poverty and unemployment, and fundamentally as a 
method of linking economic and political liberalisation.  This is a theory of political 
change, which posits modernisation as a functionalist and economistic outcome of 
capitalism.  Moreover, modernity is seen as a single universal model in which 
democratisation is achieved through pursuing economic growth that results from 
integration into the global market (Grugel 2002: 47-48; Lockman 2004: 133-140).  Thus, 
the idea is that free-market reforms can act as tools for democratisation, because 
economic liberalisation, and the economic growth it generates, will build an 
independent middle class that will demand secure property rights, due process of 
law, and eventually political rights and freedoms from their governments (Wittes 
and Yerkes 2006b: 6). 
 
This is certainly what Bush meant by the phrase ‘soften the manners of men’ and 
assertion that ‘habits of liberty create expectations of democracy’.  Within this schema 
economic freedom is paramount, and capitalism is seen as the heart of democracy 
because it produces wealth that is assumed will “trickle down” and lead to a higher level 
of mass consumption, and a well educated middle class that will demand cultural changes 
favourable to democracy.  This was candidate Bush’s ‘vision of freedom … nurtured by 
free markets’ (Bush 1999_09_23).   
 
That candidate Bush was espousing modernisation thesis as a premise for his future 
administration’s foreign policy should come as no surprise.  US foreign policy has long 
drawn on this ‘old thinking in academia’ (Goldgeier 2008b).  It was institutionalised into 
the US foreign policy bureaucracy when the U.S. Agency for International Development 
(USAID) was established.  USAID drew on the ideas of Walt Whitman Rostow who 
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served as deputy national security assistant and national security adviser under the 
Kennedy and Johnson administrations respectively (Wiarda 1997: 16).  As an economist 
Rostow’s work had set out a teleological argument in The Stages of Economic Growth: A 
non-communist manifesto, in which he asserted that societies go through five distinctive 
stages of economic growth and social change.  Most notably he posited a ‘takeoff into 
growth’ stage that provided the link between turning traditional societies into high mass 
consumption societies characteristic of the West.  When USAID was established it 
premised much of its development planning on Rostow’s argument and focused on the 
‘takeoff into growth’ stage (USAID 2005).  By institutionalising the ideas of Rostow in 
USAID, US foreign and security policy has since embodied an explicit teleological link 
between economic growth and democratisation.  Furthermore, modernisation thesis is 
now institutionalised in the growing democracy bureaucracy in the United States.  As 
James Goldgeier explained, in a personal interview at the Council on Foreign Relations,  
[I]n Washington the extent to which people think about it [democracy promotion], 
it is modernisation theory.  The economic development comes first, and then you 
can have democracy.  And the fact that that is hugely debated now within 
academia, I don’t think it has penetrated … I mean there is a lot of work in 
academia now that challenges that, but that debate isn’t known in Washington.  
There is not a lot of thinking about that.  And I think that if you compare the 
economists to the other, to the people doing democracy stuff, you know people 
serving at the treasury and working at the IMF, their economists, they know 
economic theory.  They know what they think is necessary to build markets and 
they follow from that.  People doing democracy promotion they are not political 
scientists, and they don’t know the political science literature (Goldgeier 2008b). 
 
Strikingly, the difference between candidate Bush’s espoused modernisation thesis, and 
its Cold War anti-communist archetype, is that the Bush campaign had fused it with a 
staunch neoliberal philosophy (see Antonio and Bonannolt 2006).  This is unsurprising 
given that candidate Bush wanted to emulate and expand the ‘Reagan revolution’.  The 
term ‘neoliberalism’ clearly requires explaining as it is an allusive term, which is often 
conflated with globalisation.  Although related, the two terms are not equivocal.  Notably, 
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neoliberalism is a theory of political economic practices that places a heavy emphasis on 
an institutional framework characterised by strong private property rights, free markets, 
and free trade.  For neoliberals, such an institutional framework is seen as the best 
method of securing human well-being as it liberates individual entrepreneurial freedoms 
and skills.  Within such a schema, the role of the state is to create and preserve an 
institutional framework appropriate for strong private property rights, free markets, and 
free trade.  As a result, the state has the duty of securing the quality and integrity of 
money and setting up military, defense, police and legal structures required to secure 
private property rights.  The ultimate purpose of the state is therefore to secure the proper 
functioning of markets; by force if necessary.  Moreover, as David Harvey exemplifies,  
[I]f markets do not exist (in areas such as land, water, education, healthcare, 
social security or environmental pollution) then they must be created, by state 
action if necessary.  Beyond these tasks the state should not venture.  State 
interventions in markets (once created) must be kept to a bare minimum because, 
according to the theory [neoliberalism], the state cannot possibly possess enough 
information to second-guess market signals (prices) and because powerful interest 
groups will inevitably distort and bias state interventions (particularly in 
democracies) for their own benefit … It holds that social good will be maximised 
by maximising the reach and frequency of market transactions, and it seeks to 
bring all human action into the domain of the market (2005: 2-3). 
 
The importance of neoliberalism is that the philosophy is accompanied by a particular 
understanding of freedom.  This philosophy is inspired by Friedrich A. Hayek and Milton 
Friedman’s ‘Chicago Boys’ and their notion that all forms of state intervention 
undermine individual freedom by removing an individual’s right to choose.  This is not 
just in monarchies, dictatorships, and oligarchies, but also in ‘momentary 
majorities’(Friedman 1962 [2002]: 15).  Consequently the philosophy embodies 
antistatism as an approach to political and economic affairs, in favour of allowing 
markets to rule.  As Friedman argued, ‘the private sector is a check on the powers of the 
governmental sector and an effective protection of freedom of speech, of religion, and of 
thought’ (1962 [2002]: 3).  Freedom is understood as decentralised political power, 
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limited government and a free market economy because, 
[C]ompetitive capitalism … [is] a system of economic freedom and a necessary 
condition for political freedom … economic freedom, in and of itself, is an 
extremely important part of total freedom … the kind of economic organisation 
that provides economic freedom directly, namely competitive capitalism, also 
promotes political freedom because it separates economic power from political 
power and in this way enables the one to offset the other (1962 [2002]: 3;8;9). 
 
As Eric Foner points out, ‘what set these “libertarian” conservatives apart from other 
social critics … was their equation of individual freedom with unregulated capitalism’ 
(1998: 309).  More fundamentally they turned the philosophy of nineteenth century 
‘Radicals’ such as Jeremy Bentham on its head; no longer was it political freedom that 
delivered economic freedom, but ‘economic freedom as a means to political freedom’ 
(Friedman 1962 [2002]: 10-12).  In this attempt to capture what Hayek called ‘the almost 
indispensable term’ from ‘the left’, freedom was now defined in individualistic and 
economic terms, with political freedom being described as ‘the absence of coercion of a 
man by his fellow men [sic]’ (Friedman 1962 [2002]: 15).  When Ronald Reagan brought 
this definition of freedom into the presidential office, succeeding where Barry Goldwater 
failed in the 1964 campaign, he shifted the “official” discourse of freedom.  Freedom was 
no longer articulated through the vernacular of civil rights, free expression and equal 
opportunity but rather tax cuts, deregulation and military superiority.  Special interests 
were not the economic elites of big business corporations and finance, but those in favour 
of state ran social welfare programmes, unions and environmental groups.  Democracy 
was no longer the realm of public goods and citizens, but the domain of entrepreneurial-
market-consumers and a dedication to private property (Antonio and Bonannolt 2006: 11; 
Foner 1998: 307-32).  This was a radical shift in the manner in which freedom had been 
conceived though various stages of US history, but it was a definition that G. W. Bush 
keenly appropriated into his ideological-discursive formation. 
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This definition of freedom was embedded in candidate Bush’s appeals to ‘compassionate 
conservatism’, and proclamations that ‘big government is not the answer’.  The solution 
proposed to social problems was ‘helping the helper’ because ‘Government cannot do 
this work’ (Bush 2000_08_15).  Inconsistently, this individualistic definition of freedom 
was not applied to all areas of the private and/or social, as it lies in tension with 
transcendental Christian values, which President Bush clearly subscribed to and sought to 
institutionalise in both domestic and foreign policy96 (Mansfield 2003).  Whilst Friedman 
believed that ‘a major aim of the [neo] liberal is to leave the ethical problem for the 
individual to wrestle with’ (1962 [2002]: 12), Bush’s compassionate conservatism tried to 
balance the spiritual with the material, informing citizens of what constitutes a moral life 
on issues such as abortion.  This is an inconsistency shared by the Christian Right, but 
overlooked by individuals such as Jerry Falwell who has previously proclaimed ‘the word 
of God in both Old and New Testaments’ justifies ‘capitalism and free enterprise’ (in 
Foner 1998: 317).  That Bush had a dedication to neoliberalism is however 
unquestionable.  Bush himself attributes it to a trip to China he undertook in 1975, 
I’ll never forget the contrast between what I learned about the free market at 
Harvard and what I saw in the isolation of China.  Every bicycle looked the same.  
People’s clothes were all the same - drab and indistinguishable.  Central planners 
restricted choices; a free market frees individuals to make distinct choices and 
independent decisions.  The market gives individuals the opportunity to demand 
and decide, and entrepreneurs the opportunity to provide.  It was clear that 
China’s restrictions of markets limited individuality and competition … My visit 
underscored my belief in the power and promise of the marketplace, and 
deepened my belief that by introducing capitalism and the market place, China 
will free her people to dream and risk (Bush 2001: 61). 
 
The lessons Bush learnt at Harvard Business School, or what he termed ‘the West Point 
of capitalism’, were not just limited to the benefits that capitalism could bestow to others.  
Free trade, he alleged, would also benefit the United States: 
                                              
96 On the President’s first day in office, he not only called for a national day of prayer, but also cut federal 
spending on abortion.  Bush’s White House was also renowned for its Bible study and prayer meetings (see 
Mansfield 2003). 
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I believe the best way to help American oilmen and farmers and producers and 
entrepreneurs is to open new markets by tearing down barriers, everywhere, so the 
whole world trades in freedom (2001: 66). 
 
The phrase ‘trades in freedom’ is a particularly suggestive double entendre.  One 
interpretation suggests that the world trades without restraint, yet, a second meaning is 
clearly neoliberal in its suggestion that freedom is being exchanged like a currency 
through trading.  Bush deployed this double meaning consistently arguing that it was in 
fact a president’s duty to ‘promote a fully democratic Western Hemisphere, bound 
together by free trade… [and] lead toward a world that trades in freedom’ (Bush 
1999_11_19), and that,  
 
The cause of freedom rests on more than our ability to defend ourselves and our 
allies. Freedom is exported every day, as we ship goods and products that 
improve the lives of millions of people. Free trade brings greater political and 
personal freedom (Bush 2001_02_27). 
 
By articulating ‘freedom’ as both a transcendental value and ontological property of 
Being, the Bush campaign referred to freedom as a noun; as the name of an object that 
can be transplanted through free trade mechanisms.  This often led to freedom being 
equivocated with free trade.  In essence, this led to the essentially contested concept 
becoming a nominalisation, which undermined the adjectival quality of ‘freedom’ and 
obfuscated a process into a noun.  In turn, this marginalised social and agential qualities.  
Freedom was simply a set of ‘universal values’, predominantly defined and delivered by 
free trade.  The adoption of which, it was argued, would not only produce global 
prosperity but also ‘extend peace’ and security: 
Our world, shaped by American courage, power and wisdom, now echoes with 
American ideals. We won a victory, not just for a nation, but for a vision. A vision 
of freedom and individual dignity – defended by democracy, nurtured by free 
markets, spread by information technology, carried to the world by free trade. 
The advance of freedom – from Asia to Latin America to East and Central Europe 
– is creating the conditions for peace ... Building a durable peace will require 
strong alliances, expanding trade and confident diplomacy (Bush 1999_09_23). 
 
By understanding free trade as the engine of modernisation, the Bush campaign put 
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forward a utopian vision of an interdependent, prosperous, secure and peacefully 
organised world, which it would encourage from a ‘position of strength’ (Bush 
1999_11_19).  This vision also propagated a mode of democracy promotion, albeit 
understood as the product of free trade.  This challenges the notion that the Bush 
administration came into office without a ‘democracy promotion agenda’ per se.  Rather, 
a closer inspection of the espoused ideological-discursive formation, underpinning the 
campaign’s narrative, reveals a desire to promote democracy vis-à-vis modernisation 
through free trade. 
 
An Important Election? 
The 2000 presidential campaign, between Al Gore and George W. Bush, was largely 
unexceptional, up until the votes had been cast and the Supreme Court intervened to 
make George W. Bush the forty-third President of the United States.  Candidate Bush’s 
national security goals were far from transformational and demonstrated a limited global 
agenda.  This was much more closely aligned with congressional Republicans than 
neoconservatives, which was why many neoconservatives backed Arizona Senator John 
McCain and his more ambitious ideas in the Republican primaries (Chollet and Goldgeier 
2008: 295).  Yet, the 2000 campaign is important because it laid the foundations for a 
distinctive ideological-discursive formation.  It combined primacy with hegemonic 
stability theory as a philosophy for preventing American decline and securing global 
peace.  It also characterised America as a ‘benign hegemon’ that would use military force 
prudently and decisively in pursuit of more limited national interests.   
 
The importance of this ideological-discursive formation is that it provided definitions, 
and set out a distinctive understanding, of concepts such as ‘freedom’, ‘democracy’, 
‘peace’ and ‘security’.  This was not done explicitly, but rather these definitions were 
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embedded within the narrative put forward by the Bush campaign.  It is fundamental to 
draw attention to these definitions because they would later be relied upon in the 
construction of the Freedom Agenda and its institutionalisation.  As Henry Kissinger 
once argued, 
It is not possible to conduct foreign policy without a vision of the world that one 
wants to bring about, some definition of what one means by peace, and by justice 
and by order and by stability and by progress (in Amstutz 2001: 177). 
 
Moreover, it is clear from the analysis above that democratisation was very much part of 
the vision constructed by candidate Bush.  This was not yet being articulated through the 
prism of US-MENA relations, but rather presented as a general philosophy that would 
restore ‘American purpose’, through a ‘Distinctly American Internationalism’.  To this 
extent ‘it is important to note that although primacy focuses on the maintenance of 
overwhelming U.S. power and influence, it remains strongly committed to liberal 
principles’ (Posen and Ross 1996-7: 34).  This was evident in the ideological-discursive 
formation, in which a neoliberal modernisation thesis was envisioned as the means of 
achieving a utopian organisation of democratic, prosperous, peaceful, secure 
interdependent states.  Accordingly, as John Gerard Ruggie notes, 
[A]ll hegemonies are not alike.  The most that can be said about hegemonic power 
is that it will seek to construct an international order in some form, presumably 
along the lines that are compatible with its own international objectives and 
domestic structures (1993: 25). 
 
That this was the case, was certainly suggested by the use of the term ‘a balance of power 
that favors freedom’, and consistent reference to both transcendental and material factors 
delivering all the international system to the ‘right side of history’.  Undoubtedly, this 
ideological-discursive formation would come to bear a guiding influence once the new 
administration was in office, and after the September 11, 2001 “crisis”, gradually become 
embedded in US-MENA relations and evolve into the Freedom Agenda.  It is to 
elucidating the stages of this evolution that this research must now turn. 
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8. Narrating 9/11; the Form and Content of Political Change 
 
With the accession to the Presidency, it became highly apparent that G. W. Bush’s initial 
approach to foreign policy lacked any grand vision.  Whilst the shift in Washington’s 
elites in early 2001 had the impact of modifying the operational definition of the national 
interest, the new administration did not view the strategically selective context as 
radically different from the Clinton administration.  Throughout the campaign they had 
put forward a highly distinguishable ideological-discursive formation, but within the first 
eight months the Bush foreign policy was discernible only by a modification of settings 
and instruments.  There was no large paradigm shift, and it became increasingly evident 
that the new President found himself charting a course without the advantage of an 
overarching foreign policy rationale.  Instead, domestic policy took precedence, with tax 
cuts at home being the mantra of the new administration.  Even in areas that candidate 
Bush promised to place more emphasis on, these did not manifest themselves.  
Particularly noticeable was the fact that the Clinton administration had been derided for 
its supposed chronic under-funding of the military, yet when it came to defense spending 
the new President informed Congress that ‘there will be no new money for defense this 
year’.  In turn many in the military noted that ‘it sounds like campaign promise No. 1 
being broken’ (Krugman 2001; Daalder and Lindsay 2003: 63).   
 
The lack of an overarching rationale manifested itself in US-MENA relations.  This is 
unsurprising given that, although deemed strategically important, US-MENA relations 
were not a key issue in the 2000 campaign.  Moreover, it is not unusual for an incoming 
administration to take a few months to formulate its Middle East policy through the 
National Security Council (NSC) process.  Thus, despite criticism of the Clinton 
administration, the Bush administration was largely abiding by long established policies 
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towards the region, with the national security goals of securing Israel and the free flow of 
Middle Eastern oil (see chapter two).  This lack of focus on the region was symbolised by 
the administration taking three months to appoint a senior director for Middle Eastern 
affairs to the NSC staff (Daalder and Lindsay 2003: 66).  To the extent that there was an 
alteration in US-MENA policy within the first eight months, it came in the form of 
disengaging from the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and asserting the need to focus on 
Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq. 
 
On January 30, 2001, ten days after being inaugurated, President Bush called his first 
meeting of the NSC.  The overriding focus of the meeting was on Middle East policy.  It 
was at this meeting that the President declared to all the principals of his NSC staff that 
his administration was going to abandon Clinton’s efforts at peace talks in the region.  
According to Ron Suskind’s account of this meeting, provided by former Treasury 
Secretary Paul O’Neil, the President asserted that,  
we’re going to correct the imbalances of the previous administration on the 
Mideast conflict.  We’re going to tilt back towards Israel … Clinton overreached, 
and it all fell apart.  That’s why we’re in trouble … If the two sides don’t want 
peace, there’s no way we can force them … I think it’s time to pull out of the 
situation … Sometimes a show of strength by one side [Israel] can really clarify 
things (2004: 71-2). 
 
Effectively, this meant disengaging from the peace process, whilst violence in the region 
was increasing.  The second Intifada began on September 28, 2000.  This was not just 
between Israeli soldiers and stone-throwing Palestinian youths, but also involved Fatah’s 
paramilitary Tanzim fighters and sections of the Palestinian Authority police force.  The 
violence was later exacerbated by Ariel Sharon being elected Israeli Prime Minister in 
February 2001.  Yet, far from an even-handed disengagement, it was clear that the Bush 
administration was adopting a hard-line stance against the Palestinian leader Yasir 
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Arafat97  (Frontières 2003: 7-8).  This led to the administration respecting Israeli policy 
and in effect allowing Israel to shape US policy towards the conflict (see Pressman 
2003).  Whilst the new National Security Adviser, Condoleezza Rice, was arguing that 
‘we shouldn’t think of American involvement for the sake of American involvement’ (in 
Usborne 2001), President Bush was asserting that, 
 
[Israel is] a small country that has lived under the threat throughout its existence. 
At my first meeting of my National Security Council, I told them that a top 
foreign policy priority of my administration is the safety and security of Israel. 
My administration will be steadfast in supporting Israel against terrorism and 
violence, and in seeking the peace for which all Israelis pray (Bush 2001_05_03). 
 
The Bush strategy towards the conflict clearly placed Israeli security concerns first, with 
an emphasis on containing the conflict rather than goading both parties towards a 
resolution98.  This was certainly evident at the United Nations Security Council, where 
the Bush administration continued the historical trend of stymieing any attempts at 
condemning Israeli policy.  In March 2001, the United States threatened to veto any 
resolution that denoted Israeli occupation forces surrounding and shelling Palestinian 
towns as a ‘siege’, or referred to the Geneva Conventions, international law, the principle 
of land-for-peace, or Israeli settlements as ‘illegal’ (Zunes 2003: 116). 
 
Yet, whilst the Bush administration was making the case to lower the priority of 
resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, it was prioritising a harder approach on Iraq.  As 
                                              
97 This followed advise given by President Clinton, in which he told President-elect Bush not to misjudge 
Arafat in the same way he had during his own attempts in the Peace Process (Rubin and Rubin 2003: 213). 
98 This reflected the Bush campaign’s declared approach of being selective over diplomatic engagements.  
Indeed, in late January 2001, the Bush administration had declined to send an envoy for final attempts at 
peace talks in Egypt, and later decided to abolish the post of a special envoy to the Middle East.  Moreover, 
when Senator George Mitchell reported back with his report on the causes of the second Intifada in April 
2001, his three-step peace plan was endorsed by the administration but given little political support.  By 
June 2001, escalating violence in the region did lead the administration to make a slight reversal on the 
decision to disengage, leading to the President dispatching the CIA director George Tenet to act as a special 
envoy to negotiate a cease-fire. However, like the Mitchell Plan it was endorsed but given little political 
support by the higher echelons of the administration (Quandt 2005: 385-96; Daalder and Lindsay 2003: 
66). 
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Scott McClellan, the former White House Press Secretary, has argued, 
 
[E]ven at the outset, Iraq was looming in the background.  The very first Monday 
[January 22, 2001], the New York Times ... ran a front-page story about Iraq 
rebuilding factories “that the United States has long suspected of producing 
chemical and biological weapons” … The Times called it an early test of Bush’s 
pledge to “take a tougher stance against” Saddam Hussein than his immediate 
predecessor had …. Iraq would continue to be a top issue of the administration’s 
focus and media interest in months to come.  The National Security Council made 
Iraq an early priority of the policy formulation process.  As for that first day, with 
no new policy yet firmly in place, we simply told the press that the president 
expected Saddam Hussein to live up to his agreement with the United Nations that 
his regime not produce weapons of mass destruction (2008: 89). 
 
From Paul O’Neil’s account of the January 30, 2001 NSC meeting, it is clear that the 
President, and key advisers such as Rice, Tenet and Cheney, viewed Iraq as a 
destabilising force in the region, and that ‘ten days in … it was about Iraq … Getting 
Hussein was now the administration’s focus’ (Suskind 2004: 70-76).   
 
This is not to suggest that a plan to attack Iraq was established.  Despite some members 
of the new administration, such as Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz and Dick Cheney, 
advocating regime change before coming into office, once in office these calls were 
muted as no consensus emerged concerning an overthrow strategy.  This was reflected in 
Paul Wolfowitz’s confirmation hearing when he argued that overthrowing Saddam 
Hussein ‘I think would be worthwhile’, but conditioned this with the claim that he had 
not seen a ‘plausible plan’ for changing the regime (in Katzman 2003: 7).  Instead, Iraq 
policy was largely ran by Colin Powell’s State Department, and the ‘new purpose’ 
promised throughout the 2000 campaign manifest itself in a commitment to ‘smart 
sanctions’, which attempted to alter the conditions of the UN led oil-for-food programme.  
Clinton’s Iraq policy was seen as a failure and Saddam Hussein as ‘a danger’, but Bush 
argued that it was necessary to rebuild the ‘coalition to keep the pressure on him [Saddam 
Hussein]’, and ‘absolutely not’ abandon sanctions, but make them ‘tougher’ (Bush 
2000_10_11).   
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This was not an administration determined on military induced regime change, but rather 
an administration that had no overarching rationale and no plan in place to deal with Iraq.  
There were certainly a few senior individuals that wanted to overthrow Saddam Hussein 
within the state apparatus, in particular Paul Wolfowitz, but such individuals were 
marginalised by Colin Powell’s State Department.  Before September 11, 2001 Powell 
was claiming that, 
 
I think it is important to point out that for the last 10 years, the policy of the 
United Nations, the United States has been following, has succeeded in keeping 
Iraq from rebuilding to the level that it was before … So to some extent, I think 
we ought to declare this a success.  We have kept him contained, kept him in his 
box (Powell 2001_02_23). 
 
Without a consensus on US-Iraq policy in place, ultimately the Bush administration was 
drifting whilst trying to appear ‘tougher’ with Iraq.  The prevailing narrative put forward 
by the President was that ‘our coalition against Saddam is unravelling. Sanctions are 
loosened. The man … may be developing weapons of mass destruction, we don't know 
because inspectors aren't in’ (Bush 2000_10_17).  The ‘smart sanctions’ policy was an 
“amend it, don’t end it” policy, which focused on military goods, but was relaxed on 
trade more generally.  In office, the Bush administration pursued many elements of the 
Clinton administration’s policy, favouring sanctions in conjunction with the 1998 Iraq 
Liberation Act, which had the stated goal of removing the Saddam regime by funding 
Iraqi exile groups.  However, even this was not taken to the extreme, evident in the 
Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control granting Ahmed Chalabi’s Iraqi 
National Congress (INC) a licence for information gathering but withholding backing for 
the group’s plan to rebuild its presence in Iraq (Katzman 2003: 8).   
 
The most significant attempt to look more decisive against Iraq occurred on February 16, 
2001, when, without the usual build-up and brinkmanship, the US bombed close to the 
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Iraqi capital sending Saddam ‘a clear message’ of the new administration’s willingness to 
use force (Asser 2001; Teimourian 2001).  However, rather than the bombings 
themselves being seen as a deviation from US policy, the prevailing message put forward 
by the Bush administration, was concern over Chinese workers helping the Iraqi military 
install a fibre optic communication network in the Iraqi air defense system (Ricks 2006: 
26-7).  The attacks were as significant a message to Chinese encroachment into the 
Middle East, as they were towards the Iraqi regime.  Moreover, the attacks marked an 
escalation in the willingness to use military power more readily as a method of 
deterrence, but ultimately the instruments and indeed the broad goals of US-Iraqi policy 
remained unaltered.  Evidently, the Bush administration had neither a grand strategy for 
Iraq, in particular, nor the MENA more broadly.  Maintaining regional stability remained 
the overarching rationale, and there was a conspicuous silence concerning both freedom 
and democracy in the region.   
 
To the extent that there was a noteworthy shift from past policy it was not immediately 
obvious.  The new administration’s policies towards Israel and Iraq were not substantive 
in-and-of-themselves, if taken in isolation.  Rather, what the first NSC meeting 
demonstrated was an effort to pursue a ‘de-coupling’ strategy.  Throughout the 1990s, the 
Clinton administration held the view that events in the Eastern Mediterranean impacted 
on the Gulf.  Consequently, to secure Israeli security and the flow of oil from the region 
was seen to require active engagement in the peace process.  However, the Bush 
administration reprioritised its Middle East focus, seeing peace as desirable but not vital 
to securing long term security interests.  That is to say that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict 
was perceived as less destabilising towards the region than had been considered by 
American administrations over the previous three decades.  Iraq however was seen as the 
greatest threat to US national interests because of its ‘destabilising’ effect throughout the 
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region.  As a logical corollary, the two issues were de-coupled as one was seen as 
important and the other not (Mohamedi and Sadowski 2001: 14).  The importance of the 
new administration’s stance towards Israel and Iraq is that it isolated them from each 
other, which set the backdrop of the Bush administration’s policy towards the Middle 
East before September 11, 2001.  Whilst this was a significant modification in how 
previous administrations had viewed regional politics and configured US strategy, this 
was certainly not a paradigm shift in US-MENA relations; continuity was largely the 
watchword of this pre-September 11, 2001 period.  Yet this radically changed on 
September 11, 2001.  The day’s events provided a moment of punctuation in political 
time leading to the strategic construction of a war on terror, which cumulatively evolved 
into the Freedom Agenda as a transformative liberal grand strategy for the MENA.  It is 
to explicating the first stage of this evolution that this diachronic research must now turn, 
and, as the constructivist institutionalist methodology elucidated, there is no better place 
to start than with the events of September 11 2001 themselves and the manner in which 
the Bush administration constructed a narrative of this crisis. 
The Moment of Punctuation: Stabilising Uncertainty and Securing Author-ity 
The events of September 11, 2001 are widely known and well documented: 
 At 8:46 EST. American Airline Flight 11 crashed into the North Tower of the 
World Trade Center in New York City. 
 At 9:03 EST. United Airlines Flight 175 struck the South Tower of the World 
Trade Center. 
 At 9:37 EST. American Airline Flight 77 crashed into the Pentagon building. 
 At 10:02 United Airlines Flight 93 crashed into an empty field in Shanksville, 
Pennsylvania (NCTAUS 2004: 1-14). 
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Many narratives have been constructed that order these events and their aftermath. These 
have included personal, official and fictional narratives.  There have been highly detailed 
“official” accounts, such as the 9/11 Commission Report; autobiographical accounts such 
as those collected for the Library of Congress’ American Folklife Center’s September 11 
2001 Documentary Project; bibliographical accounts such as Bob Woodward’s Bush at 
War; semi-fictional novels such as F. P. Lionel’s Clear Blue Sky; Hollywood 
blockbusters such as World Trade Center and United 93; and graphic novels such as The 
9/11 Report: A Graphic Adaptation and 9/11: Artists Respond.  This list is by no means 
exhaustive, but demonstrates how events of that day have been near endlessly reproduced 
in many genres and for many different audiences. 
It is tempting to think of these events as merely “reflecting” reality; to argue that the 
events “speak for themselves”.  Indeed this is a temperament aided by the ubiquitous 
representations of the events.  At the ontologically-objective level, the “facts” are not 
contentious; aircraft had been used as kinetic weapons, which crashed into prominent 
buildings, which were either totally or partially destroyed.  Yet, the meaning of these 
events is not easy to determine.  Rather meaning, and therefore interpretation of the 
events, exists at an ontologically-subjective level; they are human constructions.  What 
the events signified is a hermeneutical question, which once answered exists at an 
observer-dependent level.  This is a level that exists in and through language; a result of 
establishing post hoc “readings” of the events through the deployment of words.  Once 
understood in this manner, the ontologically-objective events can be considered as 
constituting part of the fabula of any narrative; as the ‘material or content’ that is worked 
into a narrative (see Bal 1997; Fairclough 2003: 83-6).  In the case of historical 
narratives, this represents ‘referential intention’ (Fairclough 2003: 85; Callinicos 1995). 
Yet, to appropriate this fabula into a narrative requires what Paul Ricoeur has termed an 
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act of ‘productive invention’.  These events must be ordered by and within the human 
imagination.  Within a narrative, plot serves this function, as it is the plot that, 
“grasps together” and integrates into one whole and complete story multiple and 
scattered events, thereby schematising the intelligible signification attached to the 
narrative as a whole (Ricœur 1984: x). 
Given that the plot within a narrative has an overarching role, it is necessary to ask, what 
was the plot presented by the Bush administration in the immediate aftermath of 
September 11, 2001? 
Through conducting a process-tracing textually oriented narrative analysis, the answer to 
this question, simply put, was that in the aftermath of the September 11 2001 attacks the 
initially constructed plot was one of “tragedy”.  Within hours of the attacks occurring 
President Bush and members of his administration began framing the events in this way: 
Today we've had a national tragedy.  Two airplanes have crashed into the World 
Trade Center in an apparent terrorist attack on our country (Bush 2001_09_11a). 
 
Today America has experienced one of the greatest tragedies ever witnessed on 
our soil (Ashcroft 2001_09_11). 
 
The President's focus right now is on helping those who have lost their -- the 
families of those who have lost their lives and those who are suffering in this 
tragedy; and then on taking whatever the appropriate next steps should be 
(Fleischer 2001_09_12). 
We are gathered here because of what happened here on September 11th. Events 
that bring to mind tragedy (Rumsfeld 2001_10_11). 
To construct the plot as a tragedy is significant.  Notably because it provided the first 
steps in filling what some analysts have termed a ‘void of meaning’  (see Jackson 2005: 
29; Der Derian 2002: 107).  The sheer visceral horror of the events created an aporia; the 
events marked a breach in the expected state of things, generating uncertainty as the 
peripeteia awoke the audience.  Thus, it was out of this chaos, a sense of order under 
attack, vulnerability and surprise that the events were constructed as a tragedy, which 
transformed the ‘inexpressible’ into the ‘expressible’ in an attempt to stabilise the 
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uncertainty created.  As Pierre Macherey points out, the function of the tragic is to reduce 
elusive silence into regulated knowledge; it is the ‘art of overcoming unmeaning’ (1978: 
6). 
 
To refer to the events as a ‘tragedy’, however, have larger implications that are directly 
related to further stabilising the uncertainty condition that emerged out of this moment of 
punctuation.  It provided the initial understanding of the events, whilst inviting a set of 
instructional rules.  At a basic level, it could be argued that the events were to be 
understood as tragic at the level of human emotions; as “distressing”, or a signification of 
“suffering”.  As Terry Eagleton points out, ‘in everyday language, the word ‘tragedy’ 
means something like ‘very sad’’ (2003: 1).  This, as President Bush made clear, was 
certainly articulated as part of its meaning: 
The pictures of airplanes flying into buildings, fires burning, huge structures 
collapsing, have filled us with disbelief, terrible sadness, and a quiet, unyielding 
anger (Bush 2001_09_11c). 
 
We are here in the middle hour of our grief. So many have suffered so great a 
loss, and today we express our nation’s sorrow (Bush 2001_09_14). 
 
In addition to this, the Bush administration made it very clear ‘who’ was supposed to feel 
these emotions.  This was a ‘national tragedy’ in which ‘we’, meaning ‘Americans’, were 
to undergo these emotions99.  This is a significant discursive move as it constructed a 
focalisation from the local to national.  This act of interpellation was directly intended to 
allow the audience to identify with the events, therefore goading participation within the 
tragedy itself.  Members of the audience were not merely spectators, but rather directly 
invited to be involved within the tragedy.  This represented what Friedrich Nietzsche 
referred to as the Dionysian aspect of a tragedy, in which interaction helps ‘forget the 
                                              
99 It is particularly noteworthy to add that the Bush administration also consistently made reference to 
‘civilisation’ as under attack therefore expanding the ‘we’.  For an excellent analysis of this discourse see 
Richard Jackson (2005) Writing the War on Terrorism. 
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self’ and experience a more mystical communal union.  This unifying experience is thus 
intended to provide an intoxicating and therapeutic outlet through the response 
(Nietzsche 2008 [1886]: 119-38).  As Stuart Croft has demonstrated, symbols of unity 
emerged after September 11, 2001 and extended throughout the cultural landscape, which 
included ‘books, popular music, television, educational materials, collectables, and that 
most potent cultural symbol, the tattoo’ (2006: 93). 
   
This emotional aspect of the tragedy plot, once framed as a national tragedy, allowed a 
more political dimension to be secured (see Falk 2002: 130).  National unity and 
patriotism100 had become the order of the day, with members of the Bush administration 
arguing that, 
[N]ow is the time for us to come together as a nation to offer our support, our 
prayers for the victims and for their families, for the rescue workers, for law 
enforcement officials, for every one of us that has been changed forever by this 
horrible tragedy (Ashcroft 2001_09_11). 
 
Americans showed a deep commitment to one another, and an abiding love for 
our country … we feel what Franklin Roosevelt called the warm courage of 
national unity … It has joined together political parties in both houses of 
Congress … Our unity is a kinship of grief (Bush 2001_09_14). 
 
This mix of emotion, uncertainty, tragedy, unity, and patriotism allowed the Bush 
administration to establish a series of regulative rules.  This began with the President 
asserting that, 
Americans are asking: What is expected of us? I ask you to live your lives and hug 
your children … I ask you to be calm and resolute … I ask you to uphold the 
values of America …We are in a fight for our principles, and our first 
responsibility is to live by them ... The thousands of FBI agents who are now at 
work in this investigation may need your cooperation, and I ask you to give it … I 
ask your continued participation and confidence in the American economy (Bush 
2001_09_20). 
 
                                              
100 A clear indicator of this level of national unity and patriotism was the extent to which American flag 
sales increased rapidly; from September 11 to September 13, 2001 Wal-Mart alone sold 450,000 and Kmart 
sold another 200,000 (Andrews 2007: 103). 
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Of particular interest about these instructional rules is the manner in which, in the name 
of patriotism, they encourage submission to the state at this tragic time.  By October 
2001, the Bush administration had been able to pass a sweeping piece of legislation 
called the USA PATRIOT Act.  This acronym reveals the temperament of the time.  Public 
Law Pub.L. 107-56 articulated the desire of Uniting and Strengthening America, under 
the banner of patriotism.  This established a direct challenge to civil liberties under the 
banner of unity and patriotism, whilst allowing the demarcation of binaries such as 
patriot/unpatriotic, American/unAmerican and ‘with us or against us’ (see Andrews 2007: 
99-107). 
 
Moreover, the rules put forward by the Bush administration were not controversial in and 
of themselves, but when articulated through the prism of patriotism worked to 
‘depoliticise’ the events and establish non-critical practises.  For example, the first 
instructional rule ‘live your lives and hug your children’ appears to be benign.  Yet, as 
Maja Zehfuss argues,  
What might at first have appeared to be an alternative approach to dealing with 
the experience of an inevitable insecurity, turned out in fact to be a deeply 
patronising comment, the ultimate closure of debate.  Concentrate on your 
families.  Do not concern yourselves with the difficult business of politics.  The 
state will provide security (2003: 525). 
 
The second set of instructional rules, concerning ‘uphold the values’ and ‘live by them’, 
are, upon reflection, equally problematic.  Such rules encouraged the unconditional 
celebration of American life, values and institutions in a benignant manner; rather than 
encouraging inquiry into the anti-American grievances so prevalent in the Arab world 
(Falk 2003: 131).  Furthermore, the third notion of what Americans should do is 
troubling, as it was suggested that American’s patriotic duty was now to spend and invest 
(see Lowenstein 2001: 20).  This notion was an anathema to the temperament of the time 
as  ‘the events of September 11 had renewed nonmaterial values’ (Silberstein 2002: 124).  
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Yet, this conflation of consumerism and patriotism sent a simple message; focus your 
attention on spending, not politics. 
What was evident from these instructional rules was that they were not coupled with 
notions of inquiry, critique and introspection.  These aspects were not part of the 
presented rule structure.  It is tempting to postulate that perhaps these notions were 
implied by reference to the amorphous rubric of ‘American values’.  However under the 
banner of unity and patriotism this was openly stymied.  There was no attempt made by 
the Bush administration to compel the American public to evaluate for themselves why 
the events had happened.  Indeed, if as Nicolas Onuf argues ‘rules yield rule’ (1998: 74), 
a tangible reason for not compelling inquiry and critique was that this would threaten the 
interpellative effect of the narrative presented by the Bush administration.  In turn, this 
would challenge the legitimacy of the narrative being presented and the political 
hierarchy it sought to maintain; the President and his administration therefore sought to 
stabilise their author-ity and remain the main storytellers.  In effect, the events of 
September 11, 2001 had created a moment of punctuation in political time, which not 
only mobilised ‘America’ as an imagined community, but also provided the Bush 
administration manoeuvrable space to redirect policy by constructing and developing a 
strategic narrative. 
 
From Tragedy to Moral play: Articulating God, Freedom and an Exceptional 
Nation 
Once the events of September 11, 2001 were constructed as a ‘national tragedy’, the Bush 
administration was able to build upon this plot and seamlessly construct a moral play.  
This is a significant dynamic that had far reaching consequences throughout the Bush 
administration’s political tenure.  In the immediate aftermath of September 11 2001, the 
Bush administration bestowed the events with metaphysical meaning: 
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Tonight, I ask for your prayers for all those who grieve, for the children whose 
worlds have been shattered, for all whose sense of safety and security has been 
threatened. And I pray they will be comforted by a power greater than any of us, 
spoken through the ages in Psalm 23: "Even though I walk through the valley of 
the shadow of death, I fear no evil, for You are with me." (Bush 2001_09_11c). 
This discursive manoeuvre is significant because its intended purpose was to provide 
comfort in a time of grief.  Once again the Dionysian aspect of a tragedy was evident, the 
implication was to forget the self and experience a more mystical communal union; albeit 
now the intoxicating and therapeutic outlet was endowed with religious meaning.  Akin 
to Karl Marx’s insight ‘religion … is the opium of the people’, comfort was now to be 
found by the nation embracing God in a time of suffering: 
Scripture says: "Blessed are those who mourn for they shall be comforted." … We 
will persevere through this national tragedy and personal loss. In time, we will 
find healing and recovery; and, in the face of all this evil, we remain strong and 
united, "one Nation under God." (Bush 2001_09_13). 
[T]he prayers of private suffering, whether in our homes or in this great 
cathedral, are known and heard, and understood … This world He created is of 
moral design. Grief and tragedy and hatred are only for a time. Goodness, 
remembrance, and love have no end. And the Lord of life holds all who die, and 
all who mourn.  It is said that adversity introduces us to ourselves. This is true of 
a nation as well (Bush 2001_09_14). 
 
A Marine chaplain, in trying to explain why there could be no human explanation 
for a tragedy such as this, said once: "You would think it would break the heart 
of God." We stand today in the midst of tragedy - the mystery of tragedy. Yet a 
mystery that is part of that larger awe and wonder that causes us to bow our 
heads in faith and say of those we mourn, those we have lost, the words of 
scripture: "Lord now let Thy servants go in peace, Thy word has been fulfilled" 
(Rumsfeld 2001_10_11). 
 
This was clearly an act of dues ex machina, as God was lowered into the narrative to 
provide meaning to the events.  The catastrophe was presented as a ‘reversal of fortune’, 
and once tragedy was articulated with a theological discourse, meaning was conferred 
upon the dead and their ‘eloquent acts of sacrifice’101 (Bush 2001_09_14).  With 
                                              
101 The term sacrifice in modern day usage often refers to a form of transference; giving one thing for 
another.  Yet the etymological roots of the term are from the Latin sacrificus; to perform priestly functions.  
This is derived from sacra - sacred rites, and facere - to perform. 
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speeches being delivered in symbolic terrain, such as the National Cathedral, the loss of 
life was given meaning through a Christian theological discourse.  The loss of life was 
not constructed as part of the “absurdity”, “inexplicability” or “unpredictability” of 
Being, which would clearly have provided the basis of an alternative narrative.  Morality 
and divine purpose were not portrayed as part of the human imagination, which is a 
readily available discourse from the works of Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, Sartre or 
Camus102.  The Bush administration had made a metaphysical move, appealing to 
theological ideas and the philosophy of Jerusalem.  Not the philosophy of Athens steeped 
in Reason or a humanist philosophy. 
                                             
 
This theological move could be seen as following “American tradition”.  It is possible to 
argue that, given the circumstances presented by September 11, 2001, this theological 
appeal was the result of a “logic of appropriateness”.  This is not meant as a culturally 
deterministic or structuralist argument.  Due to the relationship between Dasein and 
temporality, what you inherit from your forefathers you must win again anew.  However, 
the prominence of religiosity in the US makes a Christian theological discourse present 
itself as an attractive option for strategic agents working in a strategically selective 
context.  Yet, what is significant about framing the tragedy in theological terms, is the 
manner in which it seamlessly allowed acts of ‘emplotment’ to become transcendental.  
‘God’ was cast as an actor in what was transformed into a moral play: 
God's signs are not always the ones we look for. We learn in tragedy that his 
purposes are not always our own (Bush 2001_09_14). 
 
Many have discovered again that even in tragedy - especially in tragedy - God is 
near (Bush 2002_01_29). 
 
This act of emplotment is crucial to understanding the manner in which characters were 
 
102 For a detailed analysis of such authors views of tragedy see Jennifer Wallace’s (2007) The Cambridge 
Introduction to Tragedy. 
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constructed within the narrative.  Indeed, theological ideas are politically illuminating, 
and when articulated with identity politics have dramatic consequences.  Once the 
premise is accepted that God is an ontological reality, then as a logical corollary it is 
possible to posit a world of moral realism.  This is a world where there is a moral reality 
independent of moral beliefs; morality has an ontologically-objective status independent 
of Being.  Through this prism, actions have moral properties, which are genuine 
properties that are simply part of the furniture of the world (see McNaughton 1988: 3-65; 
McDowell 1978; Mackie 1977).  This premise is part of the ideological-discursive 
formation that President Bush brought with him into office.  In reference to what 
Governor G. W. Bush termed the ‘American story’, he argued that this was,   
[A] story in which evil is real, but courage and decency triumph … America has 
determined enemies, who hate our values and resent our success – terrorists and 
crime syndicates and drug cartels and unbalanced dictators. The Empire has 
passed, but evil remains (Bush 1999_11_19).  
 
Similarly, in President Bush’s speech to the United Nations General Assembly, following 
‘9/11’, he argued that ‘we know that evil is real, but good will prevail against it. This is 
the teaching of many faiths, and in that assurance we gain strength for a long journey’ 
(2001_11_10). 
 
This is a powerful and far reaching meta-ethical claim that has political consequences.  
By casting God as an actor within the tragedy plot, it was possible to foreground 
normative characterisations and make them appear organic.  Consequently, the Bush 
administration began constructing the events of 9/11 and its perpetrators as a product of 
‘evil’: 
Thousands of lives were suddenly ended by evil, despicable acts of terror … 
Today, our nation saw evil, the very worst of human nature … The search is 
underway for those who are behind these evil acts … "Even though I walk 
through the valley of the shadow of death, I fear no evil, for You are with me." 
(Bush 2001_09_11c). 
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 Instructively, by understanding that the Bush administration was using the term ‘evil’ as 
part of a moral realist claim, it is possible to infer that the term is not merely being used 
to denote strong disapproval.  Rather, an ontological claim was being made that 
depoliticised the acts.  As Richard Jackson argues, the reason for the attacks was being 
‘firmly rooted in the identity and nature of the attackers’ (2005: 54). The source of the 
attacks, and the uncertainty they produced, was diagnosed and constructed as being 
intrinsic to the identity of the enemy.  Accordingly, the events of 9/11 were not portrayed 
as a product of political grievances, but as part of an ongoing moral battle between ‘good’ 
and ‘evil’: 
This will be a monumental struggle of good versus evil.  But good will prevail 
(Bush 2001_09_12a). 
 
This binary is instructive as it established the demarcation of identities that would 
dominate the Bush administration’s political tenure.  Moreover, this was accompanied by 
a series of binary identity constructions that essentialised the identity of the “terrorists” 
and “Americans” (see table 5).  This constructed vernacular was extended to other 
strategic actors.  In President Bush’s address to the nation on September 11, the President 
personally included the statement, in consultation with Condoleezza Rice: 
We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and 
those who harbor them103 (Bush 2001_09_11c). 
 
This logic of equivalence is significant because it disregarded conceptions of national 
sovereignty with regard to terrorism.  In what some have termed the ‘first Bush doctrine’ 
the ‘evil’ enemy was not just ‘terrorists’ but also states that collaborated or permitted 
                                              
103 The word ‘harbor’ was included after the terms tolerated and encouraged were considered too vague by 
the President (Woodward 2002: 30).  Moreover it is important to note that this passage was not a 
spontaneous decision.  Candidate Bush had made a similar claim in the 1999 Republican primaries, and 
consequently this assertion was drawn from and framed by previously declared policy statements (see Bush 
1999_09_23).   
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terrorist training on their soil (see Singer 2004: 144-53).  This was a significant 
articulation, in which the Bush administration began characterising the enemy as 
‘terrorists and states’.  Moreover, it established a new set of rules concerning how other 
states should behave, as Ari Fleisher declared when asked ‘when Mr. Wolfowitz talked 
about putting an end to states that harbor terrorists, did he mean to say that U.S. policy is 
to wipe out governments that sponsor terrorists?’, his response was:  
Well, I can only say, in the President's words and as the President said, the U.S. 
will use all our resources to conquer the enemy. And anybody who chooses to be 
America's enemy will have to think about what that means (Fleischer 
2001_09_13). 
 
Evident in the construction of an American ‘we’ and the terrorist ‘Other’, in a binary 
formation, was the extent to which the Bush administration attempted to attribute 
depoliticised motivations for the attacks. The terrorist’s actions were portrayed as 
deriving from this binary identity structure; ‘they’ acted because ‘they’ are ‘evil’ and 
‘we’ were targeted because ‘we’ are ‘good’.  As Donald Rumsfeld argued, 
[I]n targeting this place [the Pentagon] … and those who worked here, the 
attackers, the evildoers correctly sensed that the opposite of all they were, and 
stood for, resided here (Rumsfeld 2001_10_11). 
 
Indeed, ‘good’, as the Bush administration deployed the term, was inextricably 
articulated with the concept of ‘freedom’.  Consequently, notions of ‘good’ were 
conflated with ‘freedom’, whilst notions of ‘evil’ were conflated with ‘tyranny’: 
 
In every generation, the world has produced enemies of human freedom. They 
have attacked America, because we are freedom’s home and defender (Bush 
2001_09_14). 
 
Americans are asking: Why do they hate us?  They hate what we see right here in 
this chamber [the US Capitol Building] - a democratically elected government. 
Their leaders are self-appointed. They hate our freedoms - our freedom of 
religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree 
with each other … These terrorists kill not merely to end lives, but to disrupt and 
end a way of life (Bush 2001_09_20). 
 
This is a long standing discourse that the Bush administration appropriated and deployed.  
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As Eric Foner expounds, 
[N]o idea is more fundamental to Americans’ sense of themselves as individuals 
and as a nation than freedom.  The central term in our political vocabulary, 
“freedom”- or “liberty”… is deeply embedded in the documentary record of our 
history and the language of everyday life (1998: xiii). 
 
This point is instructive because it demonstrates how the Bush administration re-
appropriated the American exceptionalist myth, and through semantic innovation 
interwove it within the tragedy plot.  Thus, lying behind the deployment of a ‘language of 
evil’ there are political functions, made possible by its ability to encode ‘a reservoir of 
cultural forms and meanings’ (Hariman 2003: 513). 
 
The term American exceptionalism has its origins in Alex de Tocqueville’s Democracy in 
America, where the American nation was referred to as ‘exceptional’.  It was Tocqueville 
therefore that noticed a qualitative difference between American society and ‘other’ parts 
of the world.  He described the Pilgrim’s emigration to New England as motivated by a 
desire to ‘make an idea triumph’ and noted that ‘Puritanism was not only a religious 
doctrine; it also blended at several points with the most absolute democratic and 
republican theories’ (2002 [1835]: 32).  Significantly, de Tocqueville described how the 
Puritans saw themselves as doing ‘God’s work’ in what they considered to be the ‘New 
Israel’, and argued that: 
 
It is impossible to read this beginning without receiving, despite oneself, a 
religious and solemn impression; one seems to breathe an air of antiquity and a 
sort of biblical perfume (2002 [1835]: 33). 
 
The parallel between biblical Israel and the Puritans establishment of a new nation 
dedicated to God, provided the potency from which the Puritans claimed that they were 
God’s chosen people, and the new state was a beacon of light in the world.  Such 
sentiments were echoed in a prayer given by Donald Rumsfeld in the aftermath of 9/11: 
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Ever-faithful God, in death we are reminded of the precious birthrights of life and 
liberty You endowed in Your American people … We seek Your special blessing 
today for those who stand as sword and shield, protecting the many from the 
tyranny of the few …We pray this day, Heavenly Father, the prayer our nation 
learned at another time of righteous struggle and noble cause—America’s 
enduring prayer: Not that God will be on our side, but always, O Lord, that 
America will be on Your side. Amen. (2001_09_14). 
 
Of particular interest in this passage is the manner in which there is an articulation 
between being God’s chosen people and the concept of liberty.  It reflects an insight 
made by de Tocqueville, who asserted that, 
 
I have already said enough to put the character of Anglo-American civilisation in 
its true light.  It is the product … of two perfectly distinct elements that elsewhere 
have often made war with each other, but which, in America, they have succeeded 
in incorporating somehow into one another and combining marvellously.  I mean 
to speak of the spirit of religion and the spirit of freedom (emphasis in original 
2002 [1835]: 43).   
 
This conjuncture of religious doctrine and political theory is insightful, because it 
captures what is meant by the myth of American exceptionalism.  At a simplistic level, it 
could be construed as a comparative label of difference; however, the term is far more 
than this.  It captures the profoundly religious origins of the ‘chosen-ness vision’ and an 
ideological vision of a way of life centred upon ‘freedom’ (see Hughes 2004: 19; 
Deudney and Meiser 2008).  Further still, it captures the manner in which many 
Americans believe that the United States is a force for ‘good’ in the world because its 
political system represents the acme of political progress at the centre of the international 
order.  Consequently, when members of the Bush administration began to construct a 
moral play between good/evil and freedom/tyranny they were not merely making 
normative judgements.  Rather, these strategic actors were rearticulating and assimilating 
the events of 9/11 into a well established discourse constructed at the birth of the 
American nation.  The importance of this to the eventual formation of the Freedom 
Agenda cannot be underestimated.  Once the tragedy plot was interwoven with an 
 - 159 -
American exceptionalist discourse, the narrative presented by the Bush administration 
was able to provide meaning to the events in the image of a moral play whilst also 
providing characterisations of both ‘America’ and the ‘terrorists’.  Consequently, 
American Exceptionalism provided  
the basic structure in which Americans organise their comprehension of and 
reaction to the terrorist attacks.  In addition, by employing the legitimating power 
of nationalism to furnish the “official” interpretation of September 11, President 
George W. Bush was able to provide a context in which Americans could 
understand and accept a set of foreign policy goals far broader and more 
ambitious than a simple response to the immediate attacks would have suggested 
(McCartney 2004: 400). 
 
Moreover, by invoking American exceptionalism the concept of ‘freedom’ was 
foregrounded, which provided a significant stepping-stone on the road to the eventual 
formation of the Freedom Agenda.  The narrative presented was simplistic and obscured 
any political motivations for the attack, but it provided a sufficient description of the 
situation and endowed the events with meaning.  It therefore laid the foundations for how 
the Bush administration was to market its response to the attacks; that is to say, the 
decisive intervention that would follow.   
 
The Decisive Intervention: Crisis, War and Pearl Harbor 
Thus far, in this research, it has been shown how the Bush administration constructed a 
deeply religious narrative based around a tragedy plot that seamlessly transformed into a 
moral play.  Both provided meaning to the events of September 11, 2001, and constructed 
characterisations of the actors involved.  The significance of such factors is that they laid 
the groundwork for the Bush administration’s decisive intervention to be readily 
accepted.  Not only do they reveal the subjective perceptions that helped constitute the 
‘crisis’ in the first instance, but they also defined the boundaries of what was politically 
feasible and what would be considered to be in the national interest.  However, thus far 
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this chapter has not explicitly defined the nature of the Bush administration’s decisive 
intervention.  This has been largely a heuristic decision, but also reflects the manner in 
which the Bush administration strategically dealt with the events. 
 
In Bob Woodward’s account of September 11, 2001, he argued that President Bush 
decided that the day’s events constituted an act of war upon being told that ‘a second 
plane hit the second tower’104.  In an interview with Bob Woodward,  President Bush  
recalled his thoughts at the time; ‘They have declared war on us, and I made up my mind 
at that moment that we were going to war’105 (see Woodward 2002: 15).  In this manner, 
it is evident that the decision to cast the events as a declaration of war was not a well 
considered analytical decision with a well thought out plan.  The President never 
considered plausible alternative readings of the events, such as constructing them as 
‘criminal exploits’ or ‘crimes against humanity’, which could have placed the response 
into the international litigious realm (see Lawler 2002: 171).  Nor was the President 
aware of who had perpetrated the attacks, rather ‘America’ was instantly deemed the 
victim and, consequently, ‘America’ would respond with a military response.  Thus, at 
9.44 am (Est.) September 11, 2001, the President told Dick Cheney, ‘We’re at war’ and 
that he should brief the Congressional leadership.  The President’s temperament was 
expressed at the time through reported assertions such as ‘when we find out who did this, 
they’re not going to like me as President.  Somebody is going to pay’, and ‘We’re going 
to find out who did this … and we’re going to kick their asses’ (in Woodward 2002: 17-
18). 
 
                                              
104 President Bush was told this whilst reading to second graders at the Emma E. Booker Elementary 
School in Sarasota, Florida, by Chief of Staff Andrew Card. 
105 It should be noted that the Woodward account firstly relies on the memory of the events that took place, 
and also that Woodward does have a propensity to summarise what was said throughout his work rather 
than give exact copies of his transcripts.  This note should serve as a precaution to accepting Woodward’s 
account as ‘fact’.  Rather Woodward’s account should be seen as a secondary interpretation.   
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With the discursive deployment of ‘war’ as a response, the events were unsurprisingly 
constructed as a ‘crisis’.  More explicitly, the ‘brute facts’ of the events had been 
interpreted as needing a decisive intervention.  President Bush became the key strategic 
interpreter in this decision, essentially making a judgement that set a new trajectory for 
US foreign and security policy.  Accordingly, this marked an abrupt systemic 
transformation, caused by the perceived failure of past policy to provide security on 
American soil.  From destruction came the need for construction, as ‘war’ became the 
perceived method of dealing with the ‘uncertainty’ and ‘complexity’ that 9/11 presented.  
Undoubtedly, following the events of 9/11, President Bush laid discursive tracks that 
would help move towards constructing a ‘war plot’.  This was done firstly at the Booker 
Elementary School, where the phrase ‘Terrorism against our nation will not stand’ was 
declared (Bush 2001_09_11a).  The importance of this phrase is its clear intertextuality 
with President G. H. W. Bush’s declaration that ‘This will not stand. This will not stand, 
this aggression against Kuwait’ made before the first Gulf War (1990_08_05).  
Moreover, in the President’s address to the nation on September 11 he asserted that: 
 
Immediately following the first attack, I implemented our government's 
emergency response plans. Our military is powerful, and it's prepared.   America 
and our friends and allies join with all those who want peace and security in the 
world, and we stand together to win the war against terrorism (Bush 
2001_09_11c). 
 
This certainly demonstrates that the Bush administration was preparing to construct a 
‘war’ plot.  However, what is apparent from multiple accounts is that the wider 
implications of a ‘war’ plot were withheld from public disclosure.  In the evening 
address, the line ‘This is not just an act of terrorism.  This is an act of war’, which 
reflected the President’s discussions with his NSC staff, was cut from the public address. 
The reason for this was that the President saw his administration’s mission as one of 
‘reassurance’ (see Woodward 2002: 30-31; Frum 2003: 124-33).  The exclusion and 
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inclusion of text within the speech is therefore highly significant.  It demonstrates 
strategic thinking on behalf of the President and members of his administration, and a 
deliberate attempt to ‘shape a message’.  To the extent that this was done by the 
administration, it reveals a deliberate attempt to frame the events in a manner that 
resonated with the American public and would allow further action to be taken.  As such, 
the president saw his role as allowing the Dionysian aspect of a tragedy to unfold, and 
therefore not to make apparent the nature of his conceived decisive intervention in the 
immediate aftermath of the events.  Constructing the national tragedy plot and moral play 
was to take precedence over an abrupt assertion of how to directly respond.  However, by 
constructing a moral play as a specific understanding of the events, the Bush 
administration was also laying the foundations for its eventual decisive intervention being 
widely accepted.  The administration was describing the paradise lost through tragedy, 
before asserting how it would be regained. 
 
To the extent that the President did begin scripting a direct response, it was muted.  The 
President asserted that: 
The search is underway for those who are behind these evil acts. I've directed the 
full resources of our intelligence and law enforcement communities to find those 
responsible and to bring them to justice (Bush 2001_09_11c).  
 
Such a response clearly left alternative policies to ‘war’ as possible options.  This point 
was not lost on certain members of the Bush administration that wanted to forge ahead 
and make the decision to go to war public.  For David Frum ‘the speech Bush had 
delivered was not a war speech. It was a hastily revised compassionate conservatism 
speech’ (2003: 128).  Relatedly, the decision to construct the acts as a ‘declaration of 
war’ was initially an area of political contestation.  Rather than a ‘war construction’ being 
inevitable, it is important to note that early objections to it were voiced.  On September 
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12, 2001, Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle cautioned the president to take care with 
his rhetoric saying ‘war is a powerful word’ (Woodward 2002: 45).  Moreover, whilst 
some commentators, such as Lawrence Freedman, have argued that ‘whether or not to go 
to war was not an American choice’, this is a deeply problematic assessment (2002: 37).  
This position not only writes out notions of strategic agency, but under international law 
the events did not constitute an ‘act of war’, because they were not carried out by a 
sovereign state (Lawler 2002: 154-5).  As Roy Stager Jacques has argued, 
 
technically I might quibble that an act of war can be made only by an entity 
capable of conducting a war.  Countries start wars; people commit crimes.  What I 
am decorated for doing under my country’s flag in war, I am imprisoned or 
executed for doing under my own volition in crime (2002: 26). 
 
Despite such objections, on September 12, 2001 President Bush deployed the line he had 
formerly suppressed: 
 
The deliberate and deadly attacks which were carried out yesterday against our 
country were more than acts of terror.  They were acts of war. This will require 
our country to unite in steadfast determination and resolve.  Freedom and 
democracy are under attack (2001_09_12a). 
 
This marked the first public construction of a war plot, and signified the nature of the 
Bush administration’s decisive intervention.   
 
Significantly, historical analogy played an important role in constructing the events as an 
act of war.  In particular, the manner in which the events were compared to the bombing 
of Pearl Harbor should not be underestimated.  Such sentiments reflect the president’s 
diary entry made on September 11, ‘The Pearl Harbour of the 21st century took place 
today’ (in Woodward 2002: 37).  This became a commonly deployed strategic analogy 
throughout the Bush administration’s tenure, with assertions such as:  
We've had oceans which have protected us over our history.  Except for Pearl 
Harbor, we've never really been hit before.  And yet, on September 11th, this 
great land came under attack (Bush 2001_10_24).  
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I joined the men and women of the USS Enterprise to mark the 60th anniversary 
of Pearl Harbor. December 7th, 1941 was a decisive day that changed our nation 
forever. In a single moment, America's "splendid isolation" was ended … 
September 11th, 2001 … set another dividing line in our lives and in the life of 
our nation … A faraway evil became a present danger (Bush 2001_12_11). 
For my country, the events of September the 11th were as decisive as the attack 
on Pearl Harbor ... And the lesson of all those events is the same: aggression and 
evil intent must not be ignored or appeased; they must be opposed early and 
decisively (Bush 2003_05_31). 
The use of this historical analogy is important.  Firstly, it rendered the attacks 
comprehensible by not allowing the meaning of the events to remain in flux, and 
secondly, it framed the events within a particular interpretation; this was an undeserved 
attack on an innocent nation, which necessitated America fight a ‘just’ war.  Such a 
comparison allowed a seamless elicitation of American’s collective understanding of 
World War II.  This dimension is especially pronounced in the last quote that informs the 
audience that not only are the two events comparable, but the lessons of World War II 
were directly transferable to the ‘war on terror’.  Such a construction established a very 
specific rule structure; America should not appease the perpetrators and America must 
confront the perpetrators through violent means.   
 
This rule structure was heavily reinforced in and through assertions such as, 
[W]e have seen their kind before. They are the heirs of all the murderous 
ideologies of the twentieth century. By sacrificing human life to serve their 
radical visions -- by abandoning every value except the will to power -- they 
follow in the path of fascism, and Nazism, and totalitarianism. And they will 
follow that path all the way, to where it ends: in history's unmarked grave of 
discarded lies (Bush 2001_09_20). 
 
In a second world war, we learned there is no isolation from evil. We affirmed 
that some crimes are so terrible they offend humanity, itself. And we resolved that 
the aggressions and ambitions of the wicked must be opposed early, decisively, 
and collectively, before they threaten us all. That evil has returned, and that cause 
is renewed (Bush 2001_11_10). 
 
The rule structure, derived from the Pearl Harbor and World War II analogy, remade and 
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reinforced the notion that the events of September 11, 2001 were an ‘act of war’, and 
provided guidance on how America should proceed.  Yet, the Bush administration, via 
the World War II analogy, was also assimilating the events into a wider historical 
narrative.  The discursive link to World War II tied the framing of September 11, 2001 to 
the same plot, and popularly held beliefs over why America went to war in 1941.  It 
created a sense of American innocence as a peaceful nation reluctant to engage in 
international affairs, but when attacked had no choice but to respond against this evil 
enemy.  Just as the Nazis embodied ‘evil’ and could not be appeased, the same must be 
true of these new ‘enemies of liberty’.  The parallels between Hitler’s Germany were 
encoded in the ‘9/11 crisis’ narrative, and once decoded by the interpellator suggest the 
need for a decisive intervention to stop the enemy at all costs.  This framing rendered 
appeasement an illegitimate action; appeasement was not a solution to this threat derived 
from ‘evil’ just as it was not a solution to dealing with Hitler’s Germany. 
 
Simultaneously, the analogy informs the audience about what action must be taken in the 
future; just as the former ‘evil’ regimes with totalitarian ideologies were strategically 
engaged and defeated in the past, the same must be done to defeat terrorism and its state 
sponsors.  This opened the door for terrorists to be assimilated into contemporary 
understandings of the Nazis, with expansionist intentions driven by an evil ideology, 
therefore constituting a global threat to liberty and freedom: 
 
I believe this war is more akin to World War II ... This is a war in which we fight 
for the liberties and freedom of our country (Bush 2002_03_13). 
 
Intertextual appeals to World War II further supported the notion that the attackers 
carried out their attack because they were ‘evil’.  Thus, it was through an interpretation of 
the past, once applied to the events of September 11, that ‘going to war’ was cast as a 
legitimate and rational response; it was how America had responded in the past and so 
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represented how America should respond again.  Simply put, the construction of a war 
plot, analogous to World War II, turned a tragedy and moral play into a moralistic 
crusade.   
 
To use the term ‘moralistic crusade’ is provocative, as it conjures historical images of a 
religiously driven military campaign particularly targeted against Muslims.  Yet, using 
this term is unavoidable given the President’s assertions that: 
 
We need to be alert to the fact that these evil-doers still exist.  We haven't seen 
this kind of barbarism in a long period of time…This crusade, this war on 
terrorism is going to take a while (Bush 2001_09_16). 
 
Moreover, the term ‘moralistic crusade’ captures a specific dimension of American 
exceptionalism.  This has been best elucidated and empirically accounted for by Seymour 
Martin Lipset, who argued that, 
 
Americans are utopian moralists who press hard to institutionalise virtue, to 
destroy evil people, and eliminate wicked institutions and practices.  A majority 
even tell pollsters that God is the moral guiding force of American democracy.  
They tend to view social and political dramas as morality plays, as a battle 
between God and the Devil, so that compromise is virtually unthinkable … A 
sense of moral absolutism is, of course, part of what some people see as 
problematic about American foreign policy (1996: 63). 
 
A significant aspect of the moral absolutist subsidiary of the American exceptionalist 
discourse, is that, whilst national identity constructs an ‘us’ and ‘them’, moral absolutism 
inscribes characterisations to this dyad.  It posits the ‘insider status’ of the imagined 
community as morally ‘good’ with God on America’s side, whilst the binary opposite 
‘outsider status’, as a logical corollary, is evil and demonic.  This particular feature was 
highly evident in the Bush administration’s narrative, as tragedy was transformed to 
moralistic crusade, God supposedly took America’s side in this meta-conflict: 
The course of this conflict is not known, yet its outcome is certain. Freedom and 
fear, justice and cruelty, have always been at war, and we know that God is not 
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neutral between them (Bush 2001_09_20). 
 
Once an expression of difference has been turned into ‘Otherness’, bifurcated along 
religious conceptions of good and evil, it becomes coherently possible for Americans to 
define wars as moralistic crusades106.  The result of such moralistic crusades is to insist 
on ‘unconditional surrender’ of the enemy in war, the reason of which is the ascribed 
relationship between going to war and the moral righteousness that motivates it.  Thus, as 
Lipset argues,  
we [Americans] set moral goals, such as ‘to make the world safe for democracy’, 
as reasons to go to war.  We have always fought the ‘Evil Empire’.  Ronald 
Reagan was as American as apple pie when he spoke of the evil empire as the 
enemy. But if we fight the evil empire, if we fight Satan, then he must not be 
allowed to survive (1996: 65). 
 
Once again, the Bush administration appropriated and reconstructed this tradition.  It 
presented a moralistic crusade as the solution to the perceived crisis.  Consequently, 
arguing that the nature of its decisive intervention was clear: 
Our responsibility to history is already clear: to answer these attacks and rid the 
world of evil (Bush 2001_09_14). 
 
In every generation, the world has produced enemies of human freedom. They 
have attacked America, because we are freedom's home and defender. And the 
commitment of our fathers is now the calling of our time (Bush 2001_09_14). 
 
This will not be an age of terror; this will be an age of liberty, here and across the 
world … In our grief and anger we have found our mission and our moment. 
Freedom and fear are at war. The advance of human freedom - the great 
achievement of our time, and the great hope of every time - now depends on us 
(Bush 2001_09_20). 
 
Several elements require elucidation to generate a greater understanding of this discursive 
framing.  Firstly, what is strikingly clear about this formulation of the initial policy 
response, was that the accompanying narrative was ‘utopian, transformative, [and] 
derived from a perspective that sees history as a contest of ideas and minds more than of 
                                              
106 To eliminate monarchical rule (the War of 1812), to defeat the Catholic forces of superstition (the 
Mexican War), to eliminate slavery (the Civil War), to end colonialism in the Americas (the Spanish-
American War), to make the world safe for democracy (World War One), and to resist totalitarian 
expansion (World War Two and Korea) (Lipset 1996: 65). 
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battalions and budgets’ (Mazarr 2003: 513).  Out of the crisis brought on by the 
September 11, 2001 attacks, emerged a dogmatic liberal idealism embodied in the 
language deployed by the Bush administration.  In effect, the ideological-discursive 
formation set out in the 2000 presidential campaign became reinvigorated, and the ‘war 
on terror’ was now seen as the overarching rationale in US foreign policy.  In this 
context, the phrase ‘the commitment of our fathers is now the calling of our time’ is 
important because it has two interrelated purposes, the first is the manner in which it 
establishes a sense of America’s liberal tradition, and the second is a direct appeal to 
America’s foundational myth.  Thus, as Hughes argues, ‘Every schoolchild learns that the 
Puritans settled America for the sake of freedom’ (2004: 28).  It therefore has impact by 
appealing to the American cultural terrain and creating a discursive relationship between 
America’s mission and liberal beliefs (see Hughes 2004: 2).  It resonates with, and re-
constructs, American identity, consequently rendering American exceptionalism as 
inextricably linked to how American’s identify themselves ideologically in liberal terms 
(Wittkopf et al. 2002: 246).   
 
The second element that requires elucidation is the manner in which the discursive 
framing allowed a policy response to emerge that was remarkably simplistic in its 
prescription.  To construct a policy based around ‘ridding the world of evil’, at first 
glance appears absurd, not least because of the statement’s metaphysical nature and sheer 
scale.  This is especially true as the president would later assert that ‘anybody who tries to 
affect the lives of our good citizens is evil’ (Bush 2001_10_24).  However upon closer 
analysis it is clear that the Bush administration was constructing the national interest 
focused upon a broad counter-terrorism strategy that targeted a ‘tactic’ rather than a 
specific enemy; a verb, not a noun. 
Nations all across the globe have bound with the United States to send a clear 
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message that we'll fight terrorism wherever it may exist (Bush 2001_10_24). 
The men and women aboard Flight 93 … if they could see how our country is 
united to preserve freedom from terror, they'd be proud.   Proud of our unity, 
proud of our strength, and proud of the determination to find, root out and deal 
with the evil of terrorism and those who seek to terrorize (Rumsfeld 
2001_12_11). 
The strategy that the Bush administration was adopting was embedded in the very title 
‘war against terrorism’ (Bush 2001_09_11c).  Thus, as David H. Dunn argues,  
 
there was no apparent attempt to address the underlying causes [of terrorism] - it 
was a policy which acted as if there were a finite number of terrorists and all that 
was needed was for them to be tracked down and eliminated (2005: 17).   
 
This is an approach that many commentators have referred to, because throughout the 
Bush tenure the President would constantly require statistical figures asking ‘how many 
did we kill?’ and ‘they killed three of ours.  How many did we kill of them?’ as a sign of 
‘progress’ (see Woodward 2006: 319-20; 482-3).  This ‘scorecard’ approach is a direct 
consequence of moral realism being embedded within the Bush administration’s 
ideological-discursive formation.  Indeed, to ‘rid the world of evil’ implies an ontological 
status; evil is used as a noun and not an adjective.  Yet, what is absolutely fundamental to 
understanding the Bush administration’s discourse is that it had conflated destroying 
‘evil’ with producing and advancing ‘freedom’, and this was now America’s ‘mission’. 
 
Laying Discursive Tracks for the Freedom Agenda to Evolve 
Before proceeding to the next phase of this process-tracing narrative analysis, it is 
worthwhile summarising this last chapter and making its findings explicit.  Thus far it has 
been shown how the events of September 11, 2001 were initially constructed as a 
‘tragedy’, which gave birth to a reinvigorated patriotism in America.  Moreover, in 
conferring meaning to the events, the Bush administration cast God as an actor in what 
they strategically selected to construct as a moral play.  In turn, this moral play was 
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seamlessly transformed into a war plot, in which moral realism and American 
exceptionalism were foregrounded as defining parts of the Bush administration’s 
ideological-discursive formation.  In all three analytically divisible plots, 
characterisations of the enemy consisted of inscribing their identities and motivations for 
the attacks as ‘evil’.  Moreover, a logic of equivalence was made between those that 
perpetrated the attacks and the states that harboured them.   
 
The construction of a war plot, aided by analogies with Pearl Harbor and World War II, 
laid the foundations for the Bush administration’s decisive intervention into the 
constructed crisis.  In doing so, it sought to restrict the uncertainty condition faced by 
strategic actors in the state system, but also provided the content of political change that 
was to follow.  Accordingly, as explained by the constructivist institutionalist 
methodology, 9/11 represented an abrupt systemic transformation in political time; it was 
a moment of punctuation from which crisis resolutions evolve.  However, the narrative 
that emerged from this moment is crucial, as it was the narrative that provided answers to 
questions such as ‘what has gone wrong?’, and ‘what is to be done?’  Consequently, the 
context of post-crisis action cannot be divorced from an understanding of the crisis.  In 
defining the events as an ‘act of war’, the Bush administration was reacting to the events, 
but also prescribing the form of political change that was to follow.  Crucially, as Richard 
Jackson has argued,  
 
[T]he important point is that this construction of the attacks as ‘war’ … was 
probably the most significant and far reaching aspect of the entire official 
discourse.  It set the foundations for almost everything that followed … it was in 
no sense inevitable and the use of different words would have given an entirely 
different understanding to September 11, 2001 - which in turn would have altered 
the entire response to the attacks (2005: 40).   
 
This is certainly the case for the emergence of the Freedom Agenda.  The declaration that 
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America was attacked because of its status as a ‘beacon for freedom and opportunity’ is 
not a neutral discursive act - it is a (re)construction of American identity.  Yet, by 
declaring this, discursive tracks were laid that gave rise to the notion that America must 
defeat ‘evil’ and ‘advance freedom’.  This was an idealist vision of history and of 
America’s role in the world, which was increasingly giving rise to a utopian orientation 
and moralistic crusade.  Accordingly, whilst it was highly evident that US foreign policy 
radically changed following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the idealist 
narrative that emerged as part of the ‘9/11 crisis’ narrative assimilated the events into a 
longer historical understanding of US foreign policy.  This was done by directly 
appealing to the international idealism of the Wilsonian legacy, and its transformational 
vision that became popular in America after World War II (see Nye 2007).  Moreover, in 
a world of triumphant exhilarance and Fukuyama’s ‘end of history’, the Bush 
administration presented the need to bring others into the so-called ‘post-historical 
phase’.   
 
That an attack on ‘freedom’, meaning ‘America’, required spreading ‘freedom’ was 
certainly a contestable proposition.  However, by deploying the concept of freedom as the 
utopian goal of the war on terrorism, the President had invited contestation within the 
administration itself.  Thus, before the Freedom Agenda was officially sanctioned, 
individuals within the Bush administration, such as Paula J. Dobriansky, the Under 
Secretary of State for Global Affairs, declared that,  
[O]ur overall goal is not just fighting against terrorism; it is fighting for 
civilization and democracy … the advancement of human rights and democracy is 
important in its own right.  At the same time, these efforts are the bedrock of our 
war on terrorism.  The violation of human rights by repressive regimes provides 
fertile ground for popular discontent. In turn, this discontent is cynically exploited 
by terrorist organisations and their supporters. By contrast, a stable government 
that responds to the legitimate desires of its people and respects their rights, 
shares power, respects diversity, and seeks to unleash the creative potential of all 
elements of society is a powerful antidote to extremism (Dobriansky 
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2001_12_21). 
 
The ideas expressed by Secretary Dobriansky were not widely espoused within the 
administration, but would soon gather momentum and become institutionalised as the 
rationale for the Freedom Agenda.  Equally, a competing view of how to combat 
terrorism and promote freedom began to emerge from the Office of the United States 
Trade Representative.  Just nine days after the terrorist attacks, Robert B. Zoellick wrote 
an op-ed in the Washington Post arguing that, 
Our enemy’s selection of targets – the White House, the Pentagon and the World 
Trade Towers – recognises that America’s might and light emanate from our 
political, military and economic vitality.  Our counteroffensive must advance U.S. 
leadership across all these fronts … America is the economic engine for freedom, 
opportunity and development … Trade is about more than economic efficiency.  
It promotes the values at the heart of this protracted struggle … Congress needs to 
complete action on the U.S. free trade agreement with Jordan, our first such 
commitment in the Arab world … The terrorists deliberately chose the World 
Trade towers as their target.  While their blow toppled the towers, it cannot and 
will not shake the foundation of world trade and freedom (Zoellick 2001_11_20). 
 
In effect, Zoellick was espousing the neoliberal definition of freedom set out during the 
2000 presidential campaign; in which freedom and free trade were indivisible.  Yet, 
under the banner of ‘raising the flag of economic leadership’, Zoellick was asking 
Congress to pass “Fast Track” legislation, that would allow the administration to bypass 
committee deliberations and full congressional debate.  Articulating the need for ‘free 
trade’ under the proviso of combating terrorism and spreading freedom was largely 
derided by Congress.  Consequently, Charlie Rangel, the Democratic Congressman form 
New York, asserted that,  
 
to appeal to patriotism in an effort to force Congress to move on Fast Track by 
claiming it is needed to fight terrorism would be laughable if it weren’t so serious 
(in Juhasz 2006: 18).  
 
Yet, this was the first articulation by a prominent member of the Bush administration, 
that free trade was needed to fight terror and spread ‘freedom’.  This is an idea that would 
lead the Bush administration to declare the Middle East Free Trade Area initiative on 
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May 9, 2003.  As such, the construction of crisis resulting from 9/11 clearly has 
implications on the construction of the Freedom Agenda.  It opened up a political space 
for contestation within the administration over what exactly ‘the calling of our fathers’ 
entails, albeit with the prevailing narrative inscribing the need for a ‘war on terrorism’ to 
achieve it.  What is notable about this political space, is that it was bound by a binary 
between those that believed the response should be to focus on the ‘eradication’ of 
terrorism and those, such as Zoellick and Dobriansky, that saw the need for a wider 
response that addressed the ‘causes’ of terrorism.  In the initial aftermath of the attacks, 
the official narrative presented by the President focused on eradication.  The situation 
was one in which the President was constructing the plot of a moral crusade, whilst other 
parts of his administration were developing the initial ideas that would shape the nature 
of that moral crusade into the evolution of the Freedom Agenda.  Given this situation, the 
war in Afghanistan, and then the formulation of the war in Iraq, would play a crucial role 
in tipping the balance between these two schools of thought.  Consequently, it is crucial 
to analyse the part they played in the post-crisis evolution of the Freedom Agenda.   
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9. The Post-Crisis Evolution of the Freedom Agenda: The 
Unfolding of War, Lessons Learned and Rules Made 
 
In the immediate aftermath of September 11, 2001 Presidential approval ratings soared, 
going from 51% in a poll conducted from September 7-10, to 90% by September 22, 
2001 (Gallup 2009).  This was just one empirical expression of patriotism that emerged 
in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks, in which patriotism began to mean ‘uncritical 
support of whatever actions the President deems appropriate’ (Foner 2002: 51).  This 
factor was not lost upon members of the Bush administration.  Karl Rove saw his job as 
making sure broad support was used effectively, as head of the Office of Strategic 
Initiatives his objective was to ‘shape and manipulate sources of public opinion, much as 
in a political campaign, to help advance the Bush agenda and policies’ (McClellan 2008: 
77; 117).  The events of September 11 provided the perfect milieu for this, because as 
Bob Woodward explains, Rove calculated that, ‘in the past, when the public rallied 
around the president in times of crisis, the boost in popularity lasted seven to ten months’ 
(in Woodward 2006: 81, 2002: 206).  For Donald Rumsfeld, September 11 provided ‘the 
kind of opportunities that World War II offered, to refashion the world’ (in Bacevich 
2002: 227).  Further still, on  September 11 itself President Bush remarked that ‘This is 
an opportunity … we have to think of this as an opportunity’ (in Woodward 2002: 32). 
 
However, the nature of the new strategically selective context, provided by September 
11, 2001, and how the Bush administration would seize upon it, was not made 
immediately clear to the public. In the previous chapter, it has been shown that in the 
immediate aftermath of the attacks the Bush administration was targeting the tactic of 
terrorism and harbouring states.  It had established a war plot that was seamlessly 
transformed into a moralistic crusade.  Moreover, by defining the events as a product of 
evil and an ongoing war between freedom and tyranny, it was clear that the Bush 
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administration had laid the discursive tracks towards the Freedom Agenda.  However, 
between this period and the official declaration of a forward strategy of freedom in the 
Middle East on November 11, 2003, lies a great vista of time in which the Bush 
administration expanded, enhanced, refined, and even contradicted its initial construction 
of the war on terror.  This fact is unsurprising given that within the two years that 
followed September 11, 2001, the US would undertake two foreign wars, re-engage in the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict and begin to define a strategy that would ‘democratise’ the 
Middle East.  The birth of the Freedom Agenda is not separate from these developments; 
it is a product of them.  It is the result of strategically selective agents arguing, 
diagnosing, proselytising, and imposing various notions of what caused the crisis in the 
first place, and how to deal with such a threat to provide ‘security’.  The Freedom 
Agenda is the institutionalisation of such processes.  Consequently, this historical period 
requires serious scrutiny because it reveals how and why the Freedom Agenda developed.  
This dynamic has not been well documented within current literature on the Freedom 
Agenda.  As David H. Dunn has argued, 
 
while it is widely recognised that American foreign policy changed quite radically 
following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, what is less obvious in the commentaries of 
these events is how much the foreign policy strategies adopted by the United 
States have continued to evolve and change since that time.  This is the case in 
part because America’s responses are often presented, especially by the Bush 
administration, as part of one relatively continuous or seamless approach (2005: 
1). 
 
All too often the decision to ‘democratise’ the MENA has been described as a direct 
result of September 11, 2001, but the nature of its development as the war on terror 
unfolded has been ignored.  Such a gap in the literature is deeply problematic, because it 
is only by analysing the creeping insurrection of the policy, that it is possible to 
understand how it is constituted and why it was done in this way.  Thus, to generate a 
greater understanding of the policy, it is necessary to look at its pre-formative 
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institutional development before leaping to its moment of institutional birth.  Such an 
approach provides a more holistic understanding and allows post-institutional changes to 
be rendered evident.  It is to this task that this chapter now turns.   
 
In what follows it will be argued that following the construction of a moralistic crusade, 
the Bush administration set itself upon a ‘first things first’ strategy.  Within this time 
frame the administration began developing a ‘three pronged response’, firstly, to deal 
with Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan, secondly, to deal decisively with Saddam 
Hussein’s regime in Iraq, and thirdly, to reform the Middle East.  Whilst these three 
prongs are analytically separate, it will be shown that they were in fact strongly related 
through the ideological-discursive formation that the Bush administration presented.   
 
Prong One of this Moral Crusade: A Just New War in Afghanistan 
A considerable amount of literature has covered, and will continue to cover, the US 
involvement in Afghanistan after September 11, 2001.  As such the aim of this section is 
not to go over well trodden ground, but rather to render apparent the elements of this war 
that pertain to the construction of the Freedom Agenda.  This will be done by focusing on 
how this war was narrated, and how the narrative that emerged from September 11, 2001 
was modified by this war as it began to unfold towards constructing the Freedom 
Agenda.  In particular it is necessary to demonstrate how the war with Afghanistan was 
constructed as a ‘Just War’ and led the Bush administration into nation-building. 
 
As outlined previously, in President Bush’s address to the nation on September 11, 2001, 
the President personally included the statement: 
We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and 
those who harbor them (Bush 2001_09_11c). 
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This was a significant discursive move that fundamentally changed the characterisation 
of the perceived enemy in the narrative.  This move allowed the Bush administration to 
proceed as if this was a ‘traditional war’ between sovereign states, rather than dealing 
with a much more amorphous transnational terrorist network.  In essence, this move 
allowed geographical boundaries to be drawn and provided the initial target for a 
moralistic crusade; Afghanistan.  As Richard Falk has argued, ‘it provided the American 
people with a tangible battlefield on which their right to self-defense could be exercised 
in a vivid and reassuring manner’ (2003: 62; also see Dunn 2005).   
 
By providing a geographical location it was evident that this moralistic crusade ‘to rid the 
world of evil’ and ‘advance human freedom’ was to begin with Afghanistan, in what was 
deemed to be a ‘Just War’.  Consequently, the concept of ‘justice’ was widely invoked: 
 
This is a day when all Americans from every walk of life unite in our resolve for 
justice and peace … we go forward to defend freedom and all that is good and just 
in our world (Bush 2001_09_11c).   
 
Whether we bring our enemies to justice, or bring justice to our enemies, justice 
will be done … Freedom and fear, justice and cruelty, have always been at war, 
and we know that God is not neutral between them …. Fellow citizens, we will 
meet violence with patient justice - assured of the rightness of our cause (Bush 
2001_09_20). 
 
[W]e're making good progress in a just cause … It may take a long time, but no 
matter how long it takes, those who killed thousands of Americans and citizens 
from over 80 other nations will be brought to justice, and the misuse of 
Afghanistan as a training ground for terror will end (Bush 2001_11_06). 
 
We are deliberately and systematically hunting down these murderers, and we 
will bring them to justice (Bush 2001_11_08). 
 
What is particularly interesting about this range of quotes is the manner in which there 
are three different types of ‘justice’ being appealed to.  Firstly, retributive justice in 
which members of the Bush administration invoked the need to hold individuals 
accountable and punish the perpetrators of the attacks and the Taliban regime: 
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All I can tell you is that Osama bin Laden is a prime suspect, and the people who 
house him, encourage him, provide food, comfort or money are on notice…we're 
going to find those who - those evil-doers, those barbaric people who attacked our 
country and we're going to hold them accountable, and we're going to hold the 
people who house them accountable; the people who think they can provide them 
safe havens will be held accountable; the people who feed them will be held 
accountable (Bush 2001_09_17). 
The Bush administration’s espoused narrative asserted that an injustice had been done, 
and that there was therefore a need to exact a just punishment.   Yet, because the concept 
of justice was embedded within the plot of a moralistic crusade, it is evident that this 
retributive dimension was not litigious.  For example, the term justice, used by the 
administration, did not invoke Emmanuel Kant’s notion of retributive justice as a legal 
concept, in which punishment is imposed on the guilty party, and not used as a means to 
promote some other good107.  The moralistic crusade plot contradicts this, as the war on 
terror was not just about punishment per se, but described as being motivated for the 
greater good of ‘ridding the world of evil’ and ‘advancing human freedom’.  The 
terrorists had not merely committed a ‘crime’, but rather ‘declared war’.  Within the 
narrative presented by the Bush administration the notion of a criminal trial was 
irrevocably written out as a possible option; there was not to be any cross-examinations 
or study of forensic evidence in a courtroom prior to punishment108.  This logic was 
certainly presented by President Bush, 
I also had a responsibility to show resolve … No yielding.  No equivocation.  No, 
you know, lawyering this thing to death, that we’re after ‘em.  And that was not 
only for domestic, for the people at home to see.  It was also vitally important for 
the rest of the world to watch (in Woodward 2002: 96). 
 
This corresponds with Richard A. Clarke’s account in which he asserts that the President 
                                              
107 Indeed Kant makes this point rather poignantly when he argued that’ Judicial punishment can never be 
used merely as a means to promote some other good for the criminal himself or for civil society, but instead 
it must in all cases be imposed on him only on the ground that he has committed a crime; for a human 
being can never be manipulated merely as a means to the purposes of someone else and never be included 
among objects of the Law of things’ (Kant 1999 [1797]: 331). 
108 For a legal argument supporting the case for war see Geoffrey Robertson QC (2006) Crimes Against 
Humanity, pp.511-21. 
 - 179 -
declared that, 
I want you all to understand that we are at war and we will stay at war until this is 
done.  Nothing else matters.  Everything is available for the pursuit of this war.  
Any barriers in your way, they’re gone. 
 
Moreover, when Donald Rumsfeld informed the President that international law did not 
allow retribution109, only the prevention of further attacks, he averred that ‘I don’t care 
what the international lawyers say, we’re going to kick some ass’ (in Clarke 2004: 24).  
Such a statement is revealing, because it articulates retributive justice with “frontier 
justice” (McCarthy 2002: 128-9).  This is justice taken into an individual or groups’ own 
hands irrespective of the legal ramifications.  It represents a lawless state of nature where 
justice is swift as it is exacted by “Judge Lynch’s Court”.  This romantic Wild West 
image was certainly evoked by the administration: 
 
I want justice.  There's an old poster out west, as I recall, that said, “Wanted: 
Dead or Alive” … All I want and America wants him brought to justice (Bush 
2001_09_17). 
 
Well, the president's policy is dead or alive. And, you know, I have my 
preference but that's not a government position … We'll have to keep, as the 
president said, closing the noose (Rumsfeld 2001_11_21). 
 
In this context the Bush administration had deemed itself judge and jury, and would 
‘bring our enemies to justice, or bring justice to our enemies’.  This image was reinforced 
by the President’s repeated assertions that the US would ‘hunt down’ those responsible: 
 
The United States will hunt down and punish those responsible for these cowardly 
acts (Bush 2001_09_11b). 
 
We hunt an enemy that hides in shadows and caves (Bush 2001_11_06). 
 
Our military is pursuing its mission … We are deliberately and systematically 
hunting down these murderers, and we will bring them to justice … Our 
government has a responsibility to hunt down our enemies - and we will (Bush 
2001_11_08). 
 
                                              
109 This presumably refers to General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV) (1970) (Declaration on Principles 
of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations among States).  
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The manner in which the term hunting was used is deeply provocative as it helps 
reinforce the characterisation of the enemy as sub-human.  As Erin McCarthy argues, ‘the 
repeated use of the word “hunting” cannot be meant but to evoke images of hunting 
animals and shooting to kill’ (2002: 131).  When the terms justice and hunting are 
articulated together, the two terms seek to legitimise coercion; it is acceptable to kill as it 
is just, and justice is deliverable through killing. 
 
Problematically, the notion that it is possible to ‘hunt’ your enemy and deliver ‘justice’ 
raises a possible contradiction in the Bush administration’s ideological-discursive 
formation.  The manner in which the President deployed the concept of retributive 
justice, looked past the events of September 11, 2001 as violent acts which were 
offensive in-and-of-themselves, and instantly identified the attackers as ‘evil’.  In this 
scheme it was deemed acceptable to violently ‘hunt’ the attackers down, because it was 
not murder itself that was intrinsically wrong, but rather the fact that the acts had been 
perpetrated against ‘good America’.  However, because ‘America’ was being 
characterised as ‘good’, the Bush administration’s actions were described as justified, and 
obfuscated the notion that murder was intrinsically wrong; how else could it be seen as a 
just act to murder someone as a punishment? (see Hewitt 2002: 448). 
 
This is a significant point because the Bush administration posited moral realism as a 
philosophical tenet, suggesting that moral values have an ontologically-objective status.  
Yet, at the same time, the administration sought to legitimise the use of violence as a 
means to bringing about justice.  As such, there is a tension in the narrative presented by 
the administration between the subscribed philosophical tenets and the recommended 
practice.  To square this circle, the Bush administration utilised a third conception of 
justice to legitimise the war, by construing it as a ‘Just War’.  This was certainly the 
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implication intended when the Department of Defense originally titled the Afghanistan 
campaign Operation Infinite Justice110.  This title was changed because of deeply 
religious connotations it has in some branches of  Islam; in which only Allah can deliver 
such finality (see BBC 2001).  However, this did not prevent members of the Bush 
administration from claiming that: 
 
Our military action is also designed to … drive them out and bring them to justice 
… To all the men and women in our military … I say this: Your mission is 
defined; your objectives are clear; your goal is just (Bush 2001_10_07). 
 
Our cause is necessary. Our cause is just (Bush 2001_12_11). 
 
I assure you and all who have lost a loved one that our cause is just … Our cause 
is just, and it continues … We seek a just and peaceful world beyond the war on 
terror (Bush 2002_01_29). 
 
The history of Just War theory has deeply religious roots in the Judeo-Christian history.  
Thus, although Just War theory dates back to Ancient Greece, and philosophers such as 
Cicero, it was also closely associated with Christianity from the early Christians in the 
Roman Empire through to the Late Medieval period.  Just War represented the attempt to 
reconcile Jesus’ preaching’s of pacifism with inconsistencies between the Gospels and 
the Old Testament (see Bellamy 2006: 15-29).  Yet, it was in the Medieval period that the 
concept of Just War became fused with the notions of a crusade and holy war (Russell 
1975; also see Morris 2002: 152-3).  The implication of invoking such a concept clearly 
adds to the moralistic crusade plot constructed by the Bush administration, and reinforces 
the characterisation of the US as a moral actor. 
 
For many political commentators launching a war against both al Qaeda and the Taliban 
was seen as a Just War, along the lines presented by the Bush administration.  Even long 
term critic of US foreign policy Richard Falk argued that, 
                                              
110 This title Operation Infinite Justice has a clear intertextualtiy with Operation Infinite Reach, which was 
President Clinton’s response to the US Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania.   
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I have never since my childhood supported a shooting war in which the United 
States was involved … The war in Afghanistan against apocalyptic terrorism 
qualifies in my understanding as the first truly just war since World War II (Falk 
2001). 
 
It should however be noted that Falk argues that for this to be a Just War, the means of 
war also need to be just.  This has been a long standing distinction in Just War theory, 
which makes a distinction between jus as bellum and jus in bello; the justice of war and 
justice in war (Walzer 2006: 21-2).  The Bush administration acknowledged this 
distinction and presented the military conduct of the war as equally just.  This was done 
though assertions such as: 
 
The United States respects the people of Afghanistan -- after all, we are currently 
its largest source of humanitarian aid -- but we condemn the Taliban regime 
(Bush 2001_09_20). 
 
The oppressed people of Afghanistan will know the generosity of America and 
our allies. As we strike military targets, we'll also drop food, medicine and 
supplies to the starving and suffering men and women and children of 
Afghanistan (Bush 2001_10_07). 
 
Our efforts are directed at terrorist and military targets because - unlike our 
enemies - we value human life.  We do not target innocent people, and we grieve 
for the difficult times the Taliban have brought to the people of their own country 
(Bush 2001_11_06). 
 
By presenting the war with Afghanistan as just, both in deed and through deeds, Just War 
theory was presented both adjectivally and adverbially.  Yet, serious questions remain 
about the ‘justness’ of the war.  For some proponents war was the just response because, 
 
When a wound as grievous as that of September 11 has been inflicted on a body 
politic, it would be the height of irresponsibility - a derelict of duty, a flight from 
the serious vocation of politics – to fail to respond (Elshtain 2002: 264). 
 
Such a statement is particularly disturbing as it casts war as the only option.  Failure to go 
to war is simply cast as ‘doing nothing’ (see McCarthy 2002: 134-5).  Yet, ‘doing 
nothing’ was not the only response available besides war.  This point is particularly 
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pertinent because one of the key tenets of Just War theory is that all non-violent 
alternatives should be exhausted before initiating the war111.  This is deeply problematic 
given that a decisive intervention in the form of a war was selected by the Bush 
administration within moments of hearing about the attacks, and the events were framed 
as a declaration of war publicly as early as September 12, 2001; War was the first choice, 
and not the last.  The narrative presented by the Bush administration was deliberately 
strategic, and sought to write out alternatives to war within days of the ‘crisis’ taking 
place. Moreover, as Neta C. Crawford argues, 
 
It has long been the official U.S. policy not to make concessions to, or strike deals 
with, terrorists.  But when we define the world in either/or terms - you are either 
with us or with the terrorists- last resort is truncated.  We never know whether 
force was really necessary, because it was the only way to deal with the 
problem112  (2003: 15). 
 
Recourse to dialogue and legalism were marginalised as possible responses to the crisis 
by the narrative presented by the Bush administration.  The war plot established the 
direction of action and was reinforced by both a depoliticised conception of why the 
attacks occurred and the characterisation of the enemy.  If you cannot negotiate with evil, 
nor change its ontological status, then the solution is to destroy it.  This logic was not just 
presented by the Bush administration’s narrative, but supported by political 
commentators and academics, in sentiments such as, 
 
                                              
111 My aim here is not to detail and explore all the tenets of Just War theory.  For such an analysis see 
Crawford (2003), Singer (2004: 147-53) and McCarthy (2002). 
112 It should be noted that the notion of dialogue with al Qaeda has been met with ridicule and often 
presented as an idea prescribed to by the left of the political spectrum.  However it is important to note that 
the idea of dialogue has also been presented by Jonathan Powell, Tony Blair's former Chief of Staff, and 
Security minister Lord West (see BBC 2008; O'Neill 2008).  It is notable that in Britain this is a product of 
experiences with the IRA. Similar sentiments were expressed by Bhikhu Parekh who argued that ‘We 
should not put terrorists outside the pale of rationale discourse but engage in a dialogue with them … 
although such a dialogue is not easy against the background of spectacular terrorist acts, it is absolutely 
essential’ (Parekh 2002).  A note of caution however should be expressed as to how such a position could 
be achieved practically.  Questions concerning how such negotiations would take place, and about the 
specifics of the discussion have not been answered.    
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The aim of terrorism is terror.  The terrorists did not issue a set of demands.  They 
did not demand negotiation or else.  They simply murdered.  That is why one does 
not negotiate.  There is nothing to negotiate about.  Thus the talking ends and the 
call to responsible action begins (Elshtain 2002: 267). 
 
Yet, even if one was sympathetic to this position, it did not necessarily extend to not 
negotiating with the Taliban.  Instead, President Bush made ultimatums, explicitly setting 
out a very rigid rule structure: 
 
The United States of America makes the following demands on the Taliban: 
Deliver to United States authorities all the leaders of al-Qaida who hide in your 
land.  Release all foreign nationals - including American citizens - you have 
unjustly imprisoned, and protect foreign journalists, diplomats, and aid workers in 
your country.  Close immediately and permanently every terrorist training camp 
in Afghanistan and hand over every terrorist, and every person in their support 
structure, to appropriate authorities.  Give the United States full access to terrorist 
training camps, so we can make sure they are no longer operating.  These 
demands are not open to negotiation or discussion. The Taliban must act and act 
immediately. They will hand over the terrorists, or they will share in their fate 
(Bush 2001_09_20). 
 
This was met with Mullah Omar, the Taliban leader, asking the US government to 
provide evidence of Osama bin Laden’s involvement in the events of 9/11.  If such a 
condition was met, then it was claimed that the Taliban would hand over bin Laden to an 
Islamic court in another Muslim country. Similarly, after Operation Enduring Freedom 
was launched, the Taliban ambassador to Pakistan, Mullah Abdul Salam Zaeef offered to 
hand over Osama bin Laden if the US presented them with evidence and stopped the 
bombing (Singer 2004: 151; Crenshaw 2003: 336-46; Robertson 2006: 526; Frantz 2001; 
Sharp 2003).  Whether one believes the sincerity of these claims or not, it is clear that a 
non-violent opportunity to solve the conflict did present itself, but was not explored 
before or during the conflict.  Under such circumstances it is clear that war was not the 
last resort, contradicting the administration’s claims that this was a just war.  Instead, 
President Bush forcefully asserted that, 
 
There is no need to negotiate. There's no discussions. I've told them exactly what 
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they need to do. And there is no need to discuss innocence or guilt. We know he's 
guilty … I said no negotiations … There's nothing to negotiate about. They're 
harboring a terrorist. And they need to turn him over, and not only turn him over, 
turn the Al Qaeda organisation over, destroy all of the terrorist camps - actually, 
we're doing a pretty good job of that right now (Bush 2001_10_14). 
 
The rule structure presented by the Bush administration was therefore essentially a choice 
between ‘comply or die’.  As Peter Singer has argued, 
The intention behind the ultimatum was not to find a satisfactory solution to the 
problem, but to provide an excuse for going to war.  War was not the last resort 
… It was the most aggressive choice amongst a range of options that had never 
been adequately explored  (2004: 151-2). 
 
Moreover, the articulation of retributive justice, frontier justice and Just War theory 
embedded in the Bush administration’s ideological-discursive formation, reduced the 
concept of justice to the raw exercise of coercive power.  It mirrors the definition of 
justice presented by Thrasymachus in Plato’s Republic; ‘Justice is nothing other than the 
advantage of the stronger’ (Plato 1997: 338c).  The Bush administration’s narrative 
embedded within it a deeply shallow definition of justice.  Despite the moralistic crusade 
plot and grandiose use of moral terms, ultimately justice became a legitimising concept 
for the projection of American power in an attempt to establish a system of rule.  This 
was certainly echoed in the manner in which the US responded to the attacks unilaterally, 
turning down UN Secretary General Kofi Annan’s proposal for Security Council 
authorisation and only bringing NATO forces into the conflict after the campaign had 
ended and peacekeeping was necessary (Gurtov 2006: 59).  This reflected the Bush 
administration’s pre-9/11 preference for unilateralism as an approach to international 
affairs, but also demonstrated a reluctance to engage in alliance politics with partners that 
would not simply submit to US will in full.  This was especially the case because the 
Bush administration wanted to use Afghanistan as an example to other regimes that 
opposed American power.  The notion that the Bush administration wanted to make an 
example of al Qaeda and the Taliban was evident in assertions such as: 
 - 186 -
Let’s hit them hard.  We want to signal this is a change from the past.  We want to 
cause other countries like Syria and Iran to change their views. We want to hit as 
soon as possible (in Woodward 2002: 98). 
 
At the start of the campaign, President George W. Bush said, "We are at the 
beginning of our efforts in Afghanistan, but Afghanistan is only the beginning of 
our efforts in the world. This war will not end until terrorists with global reach 
have been found and stopped and defeated."  You are the men and women who 
will hand-carry that message to America's enemies, sealed with the muscle and 
might of the greatest warrior force on Earth (Rumsfeld 2001_11_21). 
 
Our military has a new and essential mission. For states that support terror, it's not 
enough that the consequences be costly - they must be devastating. The more 
credible this reality, the more likely that regimes will change their behavior - 
making it less likely that America and our friends will need to use overwhelming 
force against them (Bush 2001_12_11). 
 
Instructively, this introduces the notion of deterrence into the Bush administration’s 
approach.  Moreover, it demonstrates in practise what candidate Bush meant by ‘peace 
through strength’.  Afghanistan presented an opportunity to enforce, and reinforce, a rule 
structure Bush established in the run up to the 2000 Presidential election: 
 
My second goal is to build America’s defenses on the troubled frontiers of 
technology and terror … Let me be clear. Our first line of defence is a simple 
message: Every group or nation must know, if they sponsor such [terrorist] 
attacks, our response will be devastating (Bush 1999_09_23). 
 
The events of 9/11 provided a situation where Afghanistan and its Taliban regime were to 
be made an example of, and Operation Enduring Freedom was to demonstrate to the 
world the consequences of challenging US power and failing to follow instructions given 
from Washington.  It was in essence candidate Bush’s ‘Distinctly American 
Internationalism’ put in practice.  An attack on America had been carried out, and it was 
now time to demonstrate the consequences of invoking American preponderance so that 
others would not dare to attack or challenge American power.  That this mission was 
carried out under the banner of ‘Freedom’, clearly demonstrates the extent to which 
preponderance and freedom became intertwined concepts.   
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 The conduct of the Bush administration reflected a new rule structure that members of the 
administration sought to put in place.  Similar to the sentiments of Elliot A. Cohen’s 
‘9/11 rules’, the Bush administration’s declaration that you are either ‘with us or against 
us’ created a dichotomy in which the US promised to ‘help our friends, punish those who 
impede us, and annihilate those who attack us’ (2001: 16).  Once again this resembles 
Plato’s Republic, but this time reflecting Polemarchus’ notion that justice is ‘to treat 
friends well and enemies badly’ (Plato 1997: 332d).  This language was not just for 
public consumption, it was used at the highest diplomatic levels.  In General Pervez 
Musharraf’s account, the President of Pakistan brought to power by a coup d’etat  in 
1999, recalls Colin Powell telling him that ‘you are either with us or against us’.  Yet the 
nature of this threat became all the more evident when Richard Armitage added that if 
Pakistan chose to be on the side of terrorists, then they should be ‘prepared to be bombed 
back to the Stone Age’ (Musharraf 2006: 201).   
 
In addition to dividing the world into a simplistic dichotomy and therefore establishing a 
rather simplistic rule structure for the other states to follow, the Bush administration 
sought to disembed itself from long established legal norms.  This created a situation 
where the US was creating a rule structure that it alone was permitted to follow; a do as 
we say, not a do as we do, rule structure.  This was certainly the logic presented by the 
Bush administration as it began to bypass laws and principles of legality.  In the months 
after September 11, 2001, the US increasingly began to appeal to friendly regimes in the 
Middle East to cooperate with the CIA, in particular Egypt, Morocco, Syria and Jordan 
(Williams 2006: 124).  The result of this was an expansion of America’s willingness to 
pursue a policy of ‘extraordinary rendition’.  This extrajudicial practice, which started 
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under President Clinton113, was intensified as a result of the war on terror with J Cofer 
Black, the former head of the CIA’s counter-terrorism centre, testifying that by late 2002 
‘there were at least 3,000 terrorist prisoners being held worldwide’ (see Gray 2004).  The 
procedure of ‘rendering’ terrorist suspects to third countries allowed US officials to 
bypass American laws prohibiting torture and the right of habeas corpus (see Mani 2003: 
101).  This established a policy of ‘torture-by-proxy’, in spite of US legislation passed in 
1998, which codified that: 
 
The policy of the United States not to expel, extradite, or otherwise effect the 
involuntary return of any person to a country in which there are substantial 
grounds for believing the person would be in danger of being subjected to torture, 
regardless of whether the person is physically present in the United States (in 
Williams 2006: 125). 
 
However, in a recalled conversation with Bob Woodward, the President recollects telling 
Saudi Prince Bandar on the 13 September, 2001 that ‘if we [the US] get somebody and 
we can’t get them to cooperate, we’ll hand them over to you’ (Woodward 2006: 80).  The 
logic of such a statement was clearly set out by former CIA agent Bob Baer’s comments: 
 
If you want a serious interrogation, you send a prisoner to Jordan. If you want 
them to be tortured, you send them to Syria. If you want someone to disappear - 
never to see them again - you send them to Egypt (in Gray 2004). 
 
Clearly, within the articulation of justice presented by the Bush administration, and under 
the lexicon of security, domestic and international laws were seen to work against the sort 
of justice that the Bush administration wanted to deliver.  Once again this action 
demonstrates the Bush administration’s willingness to send a message to those that 
oppose American power, 
the White House and the Department of Defense had adopted a policy of fighting 
terror with terror … More so than other modes of torture, this type of contract 
crime may be ordered mainly for reasons of deterrence — i.e., to teach an object 
lesson to all people who fall afoul of the U.S., regardless of their national origin 
(Bix 2005). 
                                              
113 See PDD39, Point Two: Deterring Terrorism (Clinton 1995). 
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The war in Afghanistan, in combination with the greatly expanded use of ‘extraordinary 
rendition’, therefore marked a point of acceleration in the Bush administration’s desire to 
disembed itself from international institutions and international law.  This created a 
situation where ‘the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what 
they have to accept’ (Thucydides 1972: 401-2).  This manifested itself with the Bush 
administration introducing new characters into the narrative, labelled ‘unlawful enemy 
combatants’ and ‘battlefield detainees’.  The introduction of these characterisations 
caused a deep public split within the administration, between the State Department on 
one side and the Defense Department and Vice President’s office on another.  Notably 
this divide concerned whether the Geneva Conventions applied to these characters.  
Despite this divide in the administration, it became clear that official policy favoured the 
Vice President’s view that ‘They don't meet the requirement of the laws of war’ (Cheney 
2002_01_27).  The Vice President summed up the situation concisely when he argued 
that, 
the legal question is, is there a category under the Geneva Convention for 
unlawful combatants, and one argument, the State Department argument, is, they 
ought to be treated within the Geneva Convention … The other argument is, the 
Geneva Convention doesn't apply in the case of terrorism, and that leads you 
down a different track from a legal standpoint … The ultimate result is, they will 
be treated humanely, but they are not going to be accorded the treatment you 
would accord, for example, the Iraqis that we captured in the Gulf War … These 
are bad people. I mean, they've already been screened before they get to 
Guantanamo. They may well have information about future terrorist attacks 
against the United States. We need that information, we need to be able to 
interrogate them and extract from them whatever information they have (Cheney 
2002_01_27). 
 
Legal opinion on this issue has been divided.  Indeed Geoffrey Roberts QC has argued 
that, 
From the moment that America and its allies intervened on the side of the 
Northern Alliance in its civil war with the Taliban, the Geneva Conventions of 
1949 applied, requiring treatment for all combatants who surrender and no 
punishment without some form of fair process (2006: 532). 
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 However, what is interesting about the Vice President’s statement, is that it sought to 
construct the US as a moral actor, by claiming that detainees will ‘be treated humanely’, 
and cast the US as working within legal boundaries, albeit ‘down a different track from a 
legal standpoint’.  What is clear from the statement is that habeas corpus had been 
suspended, as ‘these are bad people’, and that the US was now working with rule by law 
‘constructed by Bush lawyers’ and not rule of law (see Robertson 2006: 537).  In effect, 
the Bush administration had created a ‘legal limbo’ that it sought to legitimise around a 
specific characterisation of the enemy and a specific definition of justice articulated 
within its narrative. 
 
In addition to the establishment of these ‘new rules of the game’, the war in Afghanistan 
also provided the Bush administration with important lessons on its path to the eventual 
institutionalisation of the Freedom Agenda.  Primarily these lessons related to the use of 
the US military.  As President Bush argued, 
 
These past two months have shown that an innovative doctrine and high-tech 
weaponry can shape then dominate an unconventional conflict … our military are 
rewriting the rules of war … The conflict in Afghanistan has taught us more 
about the future of our military than a decade of blue ribbon panels and think-tank 
symposiums (Bush 2001_12_11). 
 
In essence the President was arguing that the US had developed military supremacy 
through technological innovation, which was powerful, swift and effective enough to be 
projected across the world and achieve a desirable outcome.  This certainly appeared to 
be the case as the Northern Alliance, with US support, was able to take the city of Mazar-
e-Sharif by November 9, 2001, and then capture Kabul by November 12, 2001 (Katzman 
2005: 9; Struck 2001).  The rapid collapse of the Taliban regime vindicated the 
Rumsfeld-Franks strategy of combining the indigenous Northern Alliance with American 
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Special Forces and airpower (Call 2007: 25-41).  This not only silenced critics, but 
fundamentally altered how the Bush administration viewed the strategically selective 
context; it altered what was seen as politically feasible, practical and desirable.  No 
longer was the military seen as ‘declining’, which had been the position put forward in 
the 2000 presidential campaign.  Rather, a military strategy had supposedly been 
constructed by the Pentagon and the CIA, which made fears of military overstretch 
redundant.  The pessimistic declinism embedded in the administration’s espoused 
ideological-discursive formation had been vanquished by swift military success.  As a 
consequence, the triumphant exhilarance born out of the end of the Cold War became 
dominant.  Afghanistan facilitated this roll, because the rapid success of the operation 
offered a low cost option of regime change, and provided a model for future military 
action (Woodward 2004: 5; 30; Dunn 2005: 18).  In effect, the Afghanistan campaign, 
and subsequent rapid regime change, facilitated the conditions for the US to foster and 
narrate a new hubris, which helped the Bush administration dispel the myth of American 
weakness established as a result of the Vietnam War (Monten 2005: 153).  The war in 
Afghanistan represented an anagnorisis moment in the narrative presented by the Bush 
administration: 
 
When I committed U.S. forces to this battle, I had every confidence that they 
would be up to the task. And they have proven me right. The Taliban and the 
terrorists set out to dominate a country and intimidate the world. Today, from 
their caves, it's all looking a little different. And no cave is deep enough to escape 
the patient justice of the United States of America. We are also beginning to see 
the possibilities of a world beyond the war on terror. We have a chance, if we take 
it, to write a hopeful chapter in human history (Bush 2001_12_11). 
 
Furthermore, this turning point was assimilated into the American exceptionalist 
narrative.  Having removed the Taliban regime, the Bush administration now narrated the 
reasons for removing them as ‘liberation’, and defining the mission objectives as nation-
building.  It thus began to alter its narrative, assimilating the events into a privileged 
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genealogical past; for the Bush administration the war represented a continuation of 
America’s democracy promotion tradition: 
 
None of us would ever wish the evil that has been done to our country, yet we 
have learned that out of evil can come great good (Bush 2001_11_08). 
 
There’s jubilation in the cities that we have liberated.  And the sooner al Qaeda is 
brought to justice, the sooner Afghanistan will return to normal114 (Bush 
2001_11_19). 
 
Part of that cause was to liberate the Afghan people from terrorist occupation, and 
we did so. Next week, the schools reopen in Afghanistan. They will be open to all 
- and many young girls will go to school for the first time in their young lives … 
In Kabul, a friendly government is now an essential member of the coalition 
against terror (Bush 2002_03_11). 
 
The first phase of our military operation was in Afghanistan … You've got to 
understand that as we routed out the Taliban, they weren't sent in to conquer; 
they were sent in to liberate … America seeks hope and opportunity for all people 
in all cultures. And that is why we're helping to rebuild Afghanistan … The 
Marshall Plan, rebuilding Europe and lifting up former enemies, showed that 
America is not content with military victory alone. Americans always see a 
greater hope and a better day. And America sees a just and hopeful world beyond 
the war on terror … by your effort and example, you will advance the cause of 
freedom around the world (Bush 2002_04_17).   
 
That the war in Afghanistan was now being constructed as a “war of liberation”, is 
instructive.  It demonstrates how the projection of American power, which in part had the 
objective of deterrence, could be assimilated into the rubric of democracy promotion and 
liberation.  That is to say, the two discourses, and objectives, could coexist within an 
ideological-discursive formation.  The concept of justice consequently came to legitimise 
a nation-building project under the banner of “freedom”, whilst also legitimising anti-
democratic practices, such as indefinite detention, torture and targeted assassinations, as 
the Bush administration travelled down the path of rule by law.  This proved to be a 
critical dynamic in the evolution of the Freedom Agenda, which posited both American 
primacy and the democratisation of the Middle East.   
                                              
114 That the President used the term “normal” is indicative of his stance that democracy is the natural 
structure any state would adopt once tyranny was removed.  Yet given Afghanistan’s history “normal” was 
certainly not a democratic system.   
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Moreover, with the removal of the Taliban regime, under the banner of justice and peace, 
the Bush administration was now characterising US military intervention as strong, 
resolute, credible, anti-imperialistic and able to deliver a nation to freedom.  Yet, by 
dispelling the myth of American weakness a fundamental shift in the power structure of 
the United States corporate bureaucracy occurred.  No longer was Colin Powell’s State 
Department seen as the key institution with regard to foreign policy in the MENA region, 
the door had been opened for other strategically selective actors in the state system to 
reassert themselves.  The military success created a shift in power from the State 
Department, and was increasingly being accrued by Pentagon officials and the Vice 
President’s Office, which laid the foundations for ‘phase two’ of the administration’s 
moralistic crusade in Iraq and the institutionalisation of the Freedom Agenda.  America 
was now unbound and dominated by officials inclined to use military power to reshape 
the Middle East in its image.   
 
Prong Two of this Moral Crusade: Iraq and the Birth of the Freedom Agenda 
The decision to launch Operation Iraqi Freedom in March 2003 has generated a 
considerable level of debate and confusion around the world.  Moreover, events in Iraq 
have done little to relieve the original sense of puzzlement concerning why the Bush 
administration included Iraq as a target in the war on terrorism.  This was most 
instructively demonstrated when Richard N. Haass, the former director of the Policy-
Planning Staff at the State Department and President of the Council on Foreign 
Relations, was asked why President Bush had decided to go to war?  He replied, 
 
I will go to my grave not knowing that … I can’t answer it. I can’t explain the 
strategic obsession with Iraq — why it rose to the top of people’s priority list. I 
just can’t explain why so many people thought this was so important to do (in 
Lemann 2004: 157). 
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This is a sentiment Haass would repeat in his memoir of both the Iraq wars in 1991 and 
2003, entitled War of Necessity; War of Choice.  Haass points out that the decision to 
invade Iraq in 2003 was not the product of a definitive moment in which principles met to 
discuss the pros and cons of the invasion before a final decision was made.  Rather, the 
decision was the product of a cumulative process (Haass 2009: 234).  To the extent that 
Haass does offer a modicum of an explanation, he argues that, 
[A]fter 9/11, the president and those closest to him wanted to send a message to 
the world that the United States was willing and able to act decisively.  Liberating 
Afghanistan was a start, but in the end it didn’t scratch the itch.  Americans had 
no long standing history of feud with Afghanistan … Iraq was fundamentally 
different.  The President wanted to destroy an established nemesis of the United 
States.  And he wanted to change the course of history, transforming not just a 
country but the region of the world that had produced the lion’s share of the 
world’s terrorists and had resisted much of modernity (2009: 234-5). 
 
This explanation is one that many academics and political commentators have put 
forward (Bacevich 2008: 59-60; Lieven and Hulsman 2006; Traub 2008: 118-9; Monten 
2005; Jervis 2003).  Embedded in this explanation is an answer as to why the Freedom 
Agenda emerged; it was, in conjunction with the Iraq war, an attempt to transform the 
Middle East with the aim of countering terrorism and delivering ‘modernity’.  However, 
such a position is not without its critics.  Tamara Cofman Wittes, in her sustained and 
highly detailed account of the Freedom Agenda, Freedom’s Unsteady March: America’s 
Role in Building Arab Democracy, excludes any analysis of Iraq arguing that, 
 
[I]n the public discourse both in the United States and abroad, the Bush 
administration’s policy of advancing Middle Eastern democracy is inextricably 
linked to the war in Iraq.  Yet this conflation misunderstands both the Iraq war 
and Bush’s policy of democracy promotion.  Humanitarian intervention to topple 
a brutal dictatorship was a distant third among rationales put forward by the Bush 
administration and its allies for the invasion; the primary arguments had to do 
with Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, both past and presumed, and its alleged 
links to terrorist groups.  Hope that Saddam’s fall would produce a democratic 
“domino effect” in the region was expressed by the president and other senior 
officials as a hope, and not as a war aim.  The United States would not have gone 
to war simply to create a democracy in Iraq, absent what was then viewed as a 
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compelling security rationale115 (2008b: 8-9). 
 
In a personal interview with Wittes at the Brookings Institute, she expanded this 
argument by asserting that, 
there is a difference between what was going on in his [President Bush’s] mind, 
what was motivating his policy preferences, and what was being marketed to the 
American public, what was being marketed to the world community and what this 
war was about … I have no idea what was going on in the man’s mind … But the 
marketing of the war was number one WMD, number two links to terrorism, 
number three humanitarian intervention.  And you know I think you have to look 
at it again in terms of practice … If the core motivation of Iraq was to set up a 
democracy and create this domino effect then the military implementaion would 
have looked very different, because, you don’t create a democracy with that kind 
of post-invasion force structure.  And so if the President were whole-heartedly 
committed to setting up a democracy in Iraq that would create this domino impact 
throughout the region, he would have; we shouldn’t assume.  One would presume 
that at some point during the process when he and his advisers were being briefed 
on the military planning for the war, [President Bush] would have said how are 
we going to create a democracy afterwards?  There is no evidence in anything that 
has been written so far about the planning for the war that that question was ever 
asked (Wittes 2008c).   
 
Evidently, there is a clear divergence of opinion between proponents that view the 
relationship between the Iraq War and the Freedom Agenda as constituting a logic of 
equivalence, and those that articulate a logic of difference.  Moreover, it is clear from the 
two positions that the relationship between the Iraq war and the Freedom Agenda 
requires an analysis of the period leading up to the Iraq war.  Instructively, the 
constructivist institutionalist methodology driving this research can shed light on this 
issue by continuing with a process-tracing narrative analysis.  However, before doing so 
it is fruitful to analyse Wittes’ objections to viewing the Iraq war as part of the Freedom 
Agenda, because a considerable amount hinges on understanding their relationship. 
 
Notably Wittes’ argument rests on a distinction between ‘the president’s mind’, 
                                              
115 It is interesting to note that Wittes’ assertion is contradicted by Strobe Talbott’s Foreword in the very 
same book, in which he argues that ‘Bush’s Freedom Agenda faltered in the Arab world because of the 
instability unleashed by the invasion in Iraq.  But the administration also failed to take account of risks to 
American interests and let itself be lulled into believing that the toppling of a tyrant in Baghdad would 
vindicate a benign version of the domino theory throughout the region’ (2008: x). 
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‘motivating the policy’ and what was ‘being marketed to the American public’.  In 
essence, there is a distinction being made between the psychological motivation of the 
Iraq policy and the public presentaion justifying the invasion.  Indeed, Wittes’ argument 
asserts that the latter takes priority, and therefore the Iraq policy and the Freedom Agenda 
can be deemed exclusive from one another.  To conflate the two policies is to 
‘misunderstand’ them.  At a theoretical level, this argument is problematic;  not least 
because it suggests that ideas providing the reason for strategically selective agents to act, 
are analytically subserviant to a policy analysis based on the list of motives provided in 
the political game [notably absent of an analysis of any larger plot they are framed 
within].  This is a peculiar assertion, not least because if it was accepted that there is a 
distinction between why agents say they act over the ideas that guide them, Wittes 
prioritises the former over the latter.  Moreover, even when ‘humanitarian’ reasons are 
asserted as a reason for action, because they are ‘a distant third’, they are disregarded.  
Not only is such a position logically suspicious, as it is not entirely obvious that 
humanitarian intervention and democracy promotion are the same thing, but there appears 
to be a considerable amount of gerrymandering to construct a logic of difference between 
the Iraq war and the Freedom Agenda. 
 
Wittes’ argument is also deeply problematic at an empirical level.  The Bush 
administration made it very clear before the invasion of Iraq, that the first step towards 
democracy would be the removal of Saddam Hussein.  As Marina Ottaway argues, 
‘President Bush and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice … stated on more than 
one occasion that change in Iraq would lead to a far-reaching transformation of the entire 
region’ (2005: 178).  In an interview with the Financial Times on September 23, 2002, 
Rice explicitly claimed that the US would be ‘completely devoted’ to democratising Iraq 
in the event of an invasion and that democratisation would not ‘stop at the edge of Islam’.  
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Further still, Rice asserted that the US had a commitment to the ‘democratisation or the 
march of freedom in the Muslim world’ (Harding, Wolffe, and Blitz 2002).  Rice’s 
assertion was echoed by the President, when he asserted that,  
If we meet our responsibilities, if we overcome this danger, we can arrive at a 
very different future. The people of Iraq can shake off their captivity … inspiring 
reforms throughout the Muslim world. These nations can show by their example 
that honest government, and respect for women, and the great Islamic tradition of 
learning can triumph in the Middle East and beyond (Bush 2002_09_12). 
 
The current Iraqi regime has shown the power of tyranny to spread discord and 
violence in the Middle East. A liberated Iraq can show the power of freedom to 
transform that vital region, by bringing hope and progress into the lives of 
millions. America's interests in security, and America's belief in liberty, both lead 
in the same direction: to a free and peaceful Iraq … A new regime in Iraq would 
serve as a dramatic and inspiring example of freedom for other nations in the 
region (Bush 2003_02_26). 
 
This demonstrates that within the narrative presented by the Bush administration there 
was a vision of the future that made a commitment to democracy in Iraq, and that this 
would act as an exemplar for the rest of the region.  Far from being a ‘hope’, as Wittes 
argues, it was portrayed definitively as a ‘very different future’; the utopian ending of the 
moral crusade plot that was juxtaposed with a possible dystopia resulting from terrorists 
possessing weapons of mass destruction (WMD).  It was with this utopian ending of the 
moral crusade in mind, that the President met with Iraqi exiles to discuss post-invasion 
democratisation on January 10, 2003.  Similarly, in a NSC meeting on February 14, 2003, 
when considering what would happen if a coup to replace Saddam with another 
dictatorship occurred, the President made it clear that he would insist on authority being 
turned over to a publicly supported Iraqi authority to ensure some movement towards 
democracy (in Woodward 2004: 258; 315; also see Bush 2003_02_26).  Such 
occurrences provide evidence that explicitly contradicts Wittes’ insistence that 
democracy was an afterthought.  As Dick Cheney said of the president, ‘Democracy in 
the Middle East is just a big deal for him. It’s what’s driving him’  (in Woodward 2004: 
412).   
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Consequently, far from viewing the Freedom Agenda and the Iraq war as distinct entities, 
the Bush administration itself portrayed these two policies as part of the same vision, as a 
combined strategy for delivering ‘freedom’ throughout the entire MENA region.  Given 
that the Iraq war and the Freedom Agenda were part of the same narrative presented by 
the Bush administration, and indeed articulated together as part of a broader goal, it 
would appear that under Wittes’ criteria the Bush administration ‘misunderstood’ its own 
policy.  Given the absurdity of this situation, it is more fruitful to focus on the narrative 
presented by the Bush administration.  By doing so it is evident that the centrepiece of the 
Bush administration’s ideological vision of the Middle East began with attacking Iraq.  In 
the belief that America had unprecedented power to wield, Iraq was seen as the route 
through which to transform the entire region.  Unlike the Clinton administration that 
believed peace was achievable through solving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the Bush 
administration viewed regional transformation achievable through the removal of 
Saddam Hussein (see Indyk 2002).  This was evident in the decoupling strategy outlined 
in the first NSC meeting in February 2001116, and became all the more prominent after 
the September 2001 terrorist attacks. 
 
This is not to suggest that Wittes is incorrect about there being a ‘security rationale’ for 
the war.  Many commentators have argued that had the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001 not occurred, ‘Iraq would likely have remained a secondary issue in American 
foreign policy’ (Daalder and Lindsay 2003: 129).  This certainly appears to be the case, 
as it was in the days and months after the crisis of September 11, 2001 that the Bush 
administration turned its attention to Iraq and a military invasion to force regime change.  
Following what appeared to be a swift military success in Afghanistan, the President 
asked Donald Rumsfeld to turn his attention to Iraq for an assessment of possible military 
                                              
116 See chapter eight and table five. 
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options on November 21, 2001 (Woodward 2004: 30).  For many commentators this was 
seen as a product of Dick Cheney adopting the role of ‘examiner of worst case scenarios’ 
in which he had to ‘think about the unthinkable’ (Woodward 2004: 29).   
 
Cheney’s new role within the administration was to focus on WMD being used by 
terrorists against the United States.  The fear of such an occurrence was compounded by 
intelligence gathered before September 11, 2001, which appeared to show Osama bin 
Laden meeting with Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood in Kandahar.  This meeting was of 
great significance, as Mahmood was the former chairman of Pakistan’s Atomic Energy 
Commission and an expert in uranium enrichment (Suskind 2006: 27; Overbye and Glanz 
2001).  In light of the events of September 11, 2001, this meeting was interpreted as a 
‘nightmare’ by George Tenet and consequently presented to Dick Cheney and other 
principals of the US intelligence community.  The result of this meeting was dramatic, as 
it provided the first articulation of what Pulitzer Prize winner Ron Suskind termed The 
One Percent Doctrine. Suskind quotes the Vice President’s assertion that, 
 
If there’s a one percent chance that Pakistani scientists are helping al Qaeda build 
or develop a nuclear weapon, we have to treat it as a certainty in terms of our 
response…It’s not about analysis, or finding a preponderance of evidence … It’s 
about our response (2006: 62). 
 
This was an extraordinary assertion, which fundamentally altered the rules of the game.  
No longer was policy to be evidence led, but rather a dichotomy had been constructed 
between analysis and action.  This disarticulation created a scenario where the possible 
was to be deemed more important to strategic policy action than the probable.  Within 
such a context the causes for action fundamentally changed, as the strategically selective 
actors viewed the strategically selective context differently.  Ultimately, policy became 
heavily reliant on the productive imagination, which in turn became embedded in the 
Bush administration’s narrative through semantic innovation.  The consequences of this 
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were highly apparent to Sir Richard Dearlove, head of the UK intelligence agency MI6, 
who briefed Prime Minister Blair nine months before the invasion commenced in Iraq.  In 
his assessment he argued that war was ‘inevitable’ and that ‘the facts and intelligence’ 
were being ‘fixed round the policy’ by the Bush administration (Rycroft 2005; Fielding 
2005). 
 
Instructively, the Bush administration was concerned about possible links between WMD 
and ‘terrorism’ before September 11, 2001.  The administration framed its argument for 
withdrawing from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, by arguing that it was 
concerned about the link between ‘missiles and terror’ and the possibility of ‘attack and 
blackmail’(Bush 1999_09_23).  The need for a Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) shield 
was marketed as necessary in maintaining US primacy and preventing the perceived 
threat from ‘rogue nations’ willing to ‘blackmail’, ‘threaten’ or ‘attack’.  The importance 
of this discursive structure is that it was a readily available discourse that was iteratively, 
yet cumulatively expanded after the September 11, 2001 attacks.  In particular this 
discourse was assimilated into the Bush administration’s moralistic crusade plot in light 
of the anthrax attacks that followed September 11: 
 
We have faced unprecedented bioterrorist attacks delivered in our mail … And 
tonight, we join in thanking a whole new group of public servants who never 
enlisted to fight a war, but find themselves on the front lines of a battle 
nonetheless: Those who deliver the mail - America's postal workers. We also 
thank those whose quick response provided preventive treatment that has no 
doubt saved thousands of lives - our health care workers … The first attack 
against America came by plane … The second attack against America came in the 
mail (Bush 2001_11_08). 
 
America's next priority to prevent mass terror is to protect against the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them …One 
former al Qaida member has testified in court that he was involved in an effort 10 
years ago to obtain nuclear materials. And the leader of al Qaida calls that effort 
"a religious duty." Abandoned al Qaida houses in Kabul contained diagrams for 
crude weapons of mass destruction. And as we all know, terrorists have put 
anthrax into the U.S. mail … And almost every state that actively sponsors terror 
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is known to be seeking weapons of mass destruction and the missiles to deliver 
them at longer and longer ranges. Their hope is to blackmail the United States 
into abandoning our war on terror (Bush 2001_12_11).  
 
The anthrax attacks provided a physical incarnation of ‘terrorists’ using WMD on 
American soil.  Thus, although the origin of the attacks was unknown117, they were 
articulated as a ‘second wave’, a phrase which alludes to causality on the basis of 
succession in time.  This created a post hoc, ergo propter hoc fallacy rooted in a 
conflation between the ‘terrorists’ that carried out the September 11, 2001 attacks and the 
‘terrorists’ that sent anthrax in the postal system (see Egan 2002; Vulliamy 2002).  
Through doing this, the Bush administration was able to reify an association of ideas 
between WMD and terrorism, and sell this as an immediate threat to the American 
populous.  This was an audience that no longer thought in the abstract of such attacks, but 
rather through collective fear had ‘experienced’ the attacks and readily interpellated.   As 
a direct consequence, US counter-terrorism and counter-proliferation policies were 
increasingly portrayed in synergy as the Bush administration’s narrative amalgamated 
them together. 
 
The linguistic embodiment of such an amalgamation was delivered through phrases such 
as ‘mass terror’, ‘catastrophic harm’, ‘catastrophic terrorist violence’, ‘turn their hatred 
into holocaust’, ‘technologies to kill on a massive scale’, ‘massive and sudden horror’, 
‘maximum death and destruction’,  and ‘unprecedented dangers’.  This list is by no 
means complete, but rather provides a sample of the language used to represent the 
alleged danger facing the US.  This tendency to inflate danger was evident during the 
anthrax attacks, when the Bush administration portrayed them as threatening ‘thousands 
of lives’, rather than the five deaths and fifteen sicknesses that actually resulted from the 
                                              
117 It was not until August 2008 that these attacks were attributed to the US Army biological researcher 
Bruce Ivins (Bohn, Mears, and Fiegel 2008). 
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attacks (Bohn, Mears, and Fiegel 2008).  The propensity to inflate threat was increasingly 
utilised and assimilated within the Bush administration’s ‘war on terror’ narrative.  As a 
consequence the characterisation of the ‘enemy’ began to undergo a process of 
metamorphosis.  Claims were increasingly made concerning terrorism and the use of 
WMD: 
 
These same terrorists are searching for weapons of mass destruction, the tools to 
turn their hatred into holocaust. They can be expected to use chemical, biological 
and nuclear weapons the moment they are capable of doing so … We face 
enemies that hate not our policies, but our existence (Bush 2001_11_10). 
 
[S]ome states that sponsor terror are seeking or already possess weapons of mass 
destruction; terrorist groups are hungry for these weapons, and would use them 
without a hint of conscience. And we know that these weapons, in the hands of 
terrorists, would unleash blackmail and genocide and chaos. These facts cannot be 
denied, and must be confronted (Bush 2002_03_11). 
 
Our adversaries have now shown their willingness to slaughter thousands of 
innocent civilians in a devastating strike.  If they had the capacity to kill millions 
of innocent civilians, do any of us believe they would hesitate to do so? 
(Wolfowitz 2002_10_04). 
 
We don't want the smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud … The single most 
important lesson that I've learned is that … that you will be surprised, particularly 
in this world, with terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, at how much 
damage can be done by a few people; and that you should not wait to be surprised 
by evil people who may wish you real harm with weapons of mass destruction 
that would make September 11 look small in comparison … We're in a new 
world. We're in a world in which the possibility of terrorism, married up with 
technology, could make us very, very sorry that we didn't act (Rice 2002_09_08). 
 
Highly observable in these quotes is the manner in which the characterisation of the 
enemy changed from merely ‘evil terrorists’ to a triad of ‘terrorists, WMD and rogue 
states’ (see Dunn 2005).  This was accompanied by a narration of a possible future which 
was not only apocalyptic, but a dystopia where the ‘American way of life’, ‘civilization’ 
and ‘freedom’ were destroyed and ‘fear’, ‘evil’ and ‘tyranny’ replaced them.  This 
imagined future was seen as a possibility because, as the Bush administration argued, 
there were ‘evil states’ and ‘evil terrorists’ working together to challenge and destroy the 
United States with WMD.  The triad constructed by the Bush administration conflated an 
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essentialised nature in the moral realist term of ‘evil’: 
 
Our second goal is to prevent regimes that sponsor terror from threatening 
America or our friends and allies with weapons of mass destruction. Some of 
these regimes have been pretty quiet since September the 11th. But we know their 
true nature. North Korea … [and] Iran aggressively pursues these weapons and 
exports terror ... Iraq continues to flaunt its hostility toward America and to 
support terror. The Iraqi regime has plotted to develop anthrax, and nerve gas, and 
nuclear weapons for over a decade … States like these, and their terrorist allies, 
constitute an axis of evil (Bush 2002_01_29). 
 
Terror cells and outlaw regimes building weapons of mass destruction are 
different faces of the same evil. Our security requires that we confront both. 
(Bush 2002_10_07). 
 
Evidently, the Bush administration’s narrative continued along the plot of a moralistic 
crusade.  However, by expanding the characterisation of the enemy to an essentialised 
‘evil’ triad, the Bush administration began reforming the boundaries of what constituted 
the national interest and how to pursue it.  The original response to the war on terror was 
abstractly defined as ‘ridding the world of evil’ and defeating ‘every terrorist group of 
global reach’ (Bush 2001_09_20).  However, by late 2001 this had changed, and now the 
national interest was expanded to dealing with terrorism and proliferation, through ‘pre-
emptive’ force, to ‘prevent mass terror’ and the ‘proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction and the means to deliver them’ (Bush 2001_12_11).  Problematically, this 
distinction would be written out of the official narrative as the President began claiming 
that the objective was ‘always the same’ (Bush 2002_04_17). 
 
This shift in the construction of the national interest is fundamentally important to 
understanding the evolution of the Freedom Agenda.  Where as the moralistic crusade in 
Afghanistan was conducted under the banner of Just War theory, the build-up to the Iraq 
war was constructed as a prudent measure, given the possibility of ‘mass terror’.  
However, whilst the administration was focusing on ‘mass terror’, it also began to focus 
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on the MENA region more broadly.  On November 29, 2001, the issue of Iraq and the 
idea of democratising the Middle East began to be developed as two distinct, but 
conjunctive, ideas.  This was the result of Donald Rumsfeld asking Paul Wolfowitz to 
bring together scholars from the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) and John Hopkins 
School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) (Rumsfeld 2006_07_06).  This meeting, 
which Wolfowitz and Rumsfeld’s consultant Steve Herbits termed “Bletchley II”118, was 
called together to answer broader questions that the Pentagon was unable to answer, such 
as ‘Who are the terrorists? Where did this come from? How does it relate to Islamic 
history, the history of the Middle East, and contemporary Middle East tensions? What are 
we up against here?’ (Woodward 2006: 83).   
 
The goal of this meeting was to construct post-9/11 policy towards the Middle East119, 
which would be drawn up as a memo and circulated around the Bush administration (see 
Bosman 2006). Although this memo remains classified, what little information is 
available is highly revealing.  The title of the memo was Delta of Terrorism.  
Significantly, the metaphor of a delta was chosen to conjure images of the mouth of a 
river from which terrorism flows from the entire MENA region.  According to 
Christopher DeMuth, an instrumental actor in the meeting,  
the general analysis was that Egypt and Saudi Arabia, where most of the hijackers 
came from, were the key, but the problems there are intractable.  Iran is more 
important, where they were confident and successful in setting up a radical 
                                              
118 The name ‘Bletchley II’ was chosen because Wolfowitz wanted to create something akin to the 
Bletchley Park meeting in World War II, where a team of mathematicians and cryptologists was set up to 
try and break German communication codes.   
119 Attending on the proviso that the meeting be kept secret, a group of academics assembled in a secured 
conference centre in Virginia.  The attendees included Christopher DeMuth, President of the AEI; Bernard 
Lewis, a close friend of Dick Cheney and scholar on Islam; Mark Palmer, the former US ambassador to 
Hungary who would later be instrumental in authoring the ADVANCE Democracy Act of 2007; Fareed 
Zakaria, editor of Newsweek International and author of The Future of Freedom, that sets out the case for the 
US supporting the democratization of the Middle East (2004: 150-9); Fouad Ajami, friend of Condoleezza 
Rice, director of the Middle East Center at SAIS and author of The Arab Predicament; James Q. Wilson, 
former President of the American Political Science Association, specialising in morality and crime; and Reuel 
Marc Gerecht, senior fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, former CIA Middle East 
expert and former director of the Project for the New American Century’s Middle East initiative. 
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government ... We concluded that a confrontation with Saddam was inevitable.  
He was a gathering threat - the most menacing, active and unavoidable threat.  We 
agreed that Saddam would have to leave the scene before the problem would be 
addressed (in Woodward 2006: 84-5). 
 
DeMuth’s description of the meeting’s conclusion is instructive as it put forward a wide 
ranging plan for US-MENA relations.  Countries that were deemed important to long 
term national interests, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt ,were highlighted as important to 
transforming the region, but as part of a gradual process resulting from the removal of 
Saddam Hussein.  Iran was believed to be a threat, but too difficult to deal with.  
Consequently, Saddam Hussein was seen as an easier, more vulnerable target that could 
be removed.  At the meeting Baathism was seen as ‘an Arab form of fascism transplanted 
to Iraq’ and that the Bush administration should consider itself ‘facing a two-generation 
war’ starting ‘with Iraq’.  This, it was believed, would be ‘the only way to transform the 
region’ (Woodward 2006: 83-5). 
 
This memo certainly proved to be a tipping point for many in the administration, as it 
provided a broad vision for how to deal with the MENA region.  When the memo was 
hand delivered to members of Bush’s war cabinet, Rice said that the memo was ‘very, 
very persuasive’, Cheney was ‘pleased with the memo’ and the President was now 
focused on the ‘malignancy’ of the Middle East (Woodward 2006: 85).  Moreover, the 
memo reveals an important chain of events.  Firstly, that the notion of invading Iraq was 
set in motion before any conception of its wider impact on transforming the region.  
However, within less than a fortnight after the President asked Donald Rumsfeld to look 
into invading Iraq, a much wider plan was being established that would transform the 
region starting with an invasion of Iraq. This was the ideational birth of a liberal grand 
strategy for democratising the MENA region.  Consequently, it is possible to concur with 
Andrew Bacevich’s assessment of the situation, 
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[T]hrough a war of liberation, the United States intended to convert Iraq into what 
Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz termed “the first Arab democracy”.  
Yet, as they prepared for a final showdown with Saddam, Wolfowitz and others in 
the administration were already looking beyond Baghdad … The ultimate aim of 
the strategy was nothing less than “to remake the world” or at least what the 
administration referred to as the Greater Middle East.  Here was an imperial 
vision on a truly colossal scale, a worthy successor to older claims of “manifest 
destiny” … President Bush’s “freedom agenda” updated and expanded upon this 
tradition (2008: 59-60; Also see Lieven and Hulsman 2006; Traub 2008: 118-9; 
Monten 2005; Jervis 2003). 
 
Understanding the relationship between the Freedom Agenda and the Iraq war as two 
separate but reinforcing policies, which were guided by the same grand vision for the 
MENA, allows a more cogent appreciation of why the President’s narrative asserted the 
importance of Iraq for transforming the region.  Evident in the Bush administration’s 
appeals that Iraq would become an exemplar for the region, was an appeal to ‘domino 
theory’.  As a dominant metaphor throughout the Cold War, the theory resonates with the 
American public and is widely understood; the fall of one country to an ideology would 
stimulate the fall of those adjacent to it.  However, in the post-Cold War era where the 
exuberance of victory has led to claims of the ‘end of history’ in which the United States 
stands vindicated as the sole remaining superpower, the Bush administration sought to 
deploy the metaphor for inspirational purposes; push Baghdad and ‘unfriendly tyrannies’ 
in the MENA will fall with it.   
 
From the view of those within the higher echelons of the Bush administration there 
appeared only one direction that the dominos would fall.  As Paul Wolfowitz explained 
‘‘Export of democracy’ isn’t really a good phrase … we’re trying to remove the shackles 
on democracy’ (in Smith 2007).  This was coupled with Dick Cheney’s claims that ‘after 
liberation, the streets in Basra and Baghdad are sure to erupt in joy in the same way 
throngs in Kabul greeted the Americans’ (in Lockman 2004: 251).  In the Bush 
administration’s espoused narrative, it was highly evident that democracy was seen as the 
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‘natural’ order a society would adopt; if tyranny was removed democracy would surely 
follow.  At the ‘end of history’ where liberal democracy is the ‘final form of human 
government’ and the teleological ‘end point of mankind’s [sic] ideological evolution’, 
what other way could Iraq and the rest of the MENA region fall?  This established one of 
the most ideological premises of the Bush administration’s vision for the future of the 
Middle East; if Iraq could be emancipated from Saddam Hussein it would become a pro-
American bastion of freedom in the region.  As such, it was believed that it would 
provide a ‘model’ for pro-American forces in the region to rise up and demand similar 
levels of democracy and freedom.  This was, as John Lewis Gaddis declared, a formula of 
‘Fukuyama plus force’ (2004: 90).  However, as events in Iraq began to challenge the 
Bush administration’s teleological understanding of history, demonstrating problems 
within the administration’s ideological-discursive formation, the Freedom Agenda policy 
would come to evolve as a distinct policy in and of itself.   
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10. The Failing Plot and the Evolution of the Freedom Agenda; 
Ideological Struggle and an Overarching Rationale 
 
By understanding the Iraq war and the Freedom Agenda as part of a grand vision for the 
MENA region, articulated together by the vision set out at “Bletchley II”, it is possible to 
trace the gradual evolution of the Freedom Agenda.  Yet, just as the Iraq war was a point 
of origin for the implementation of the Freedom Agenda, it would also serve as a point of 
departure, as the policy evolved into a distinctive policy in and of itself.  This chapter 
underscores this point by detailing how the Freedom Agenda began to be institutionalised 
and defined by its own security imperatives and rationale.  This chapter details how ideas 
came to be reified and institutionalised throughout 2002 until the end of the Bush 
administration’s tenure in office.  The initiation of the Freedom Agenda was therefore a 
considerable amount of time before being formally declared the main leitmotif of Bush’s 
second term in office, and before the 2003 Iraq war.  Unlike previous accounts of the 
Freedom Agenda, which fail to trace the evolution of the policy or simply asserted that 
the policy was a post-hoc justification for the Iraq war, this analysis demonstrates that 
this is not the case.  Rather, a more scrupulous interpretation of events demonstrates that 
the Freedom Agenda came into fruition through a slow gestation of ideas.  This became 
all the more apparent throughout the end of 2002 when long term MENA allies, such as 
Egypt, began facing increasing pressure from the administration to reform.  However, 
what distinguishes this period is the manner in which, firstly, the Bush administration 
began to shift the definition of the national interest from ‘eradicating terrorism’ and using 
‘pre-emptive’ force, to ‘prevent mass terror’ by addressing wider social conditions in the 
MENA.  What emerged in its place was a definition of the national interest that sought to 
deal with what the administration saw to be the causes of terrorism.  The Freedom 
Agenda in its final evolutionary form is the product of this shift.   
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Reifying the Freedom Agenda: Universal Values and a Single Sustainable Model 
The initial signs that the Bush administration’s post-crisis narrative was evolving to 
include a more prescriptive approach to dealing with the causes of terrorism came before 
the Iraq war.  It is important to recognise that, before the Iraq war, the President declared 
to West Point candidates, that  
the 20th century ended with a single surviving model of human progress, based on 
non-negotiable demands of human dignity, the rule of law, limits on the power of 
the state, respect for women and private property and free speech and equal 
justice and religious tolerance. America cannot impose this vision - yet we can 
support and reward governments that make the right choices for their own people 
… A truly strong nation will permit legal avenues of dissent for all groups that 
pursue their aspirations without violence. An advancing nation will pursue 
economic reform, to unleash the great entrepreneurial energy of its people. A 
thriving nation will respect the rights of women, because no society can prosper 
while denying opportunity to half its citizens. Mothers and fathers and children 
across the Islamic world, and all the world, share the same fears and aspirations. 
In poverty, they struggle. In tyranny, they suffer. And as we saw in Afghanistan, 
in liberation they celebrate (Bush 2002_06_01). 
 
These sentiments were repeated in the National Security Strategy published in September 
2002.  Such assertions represented an evolutionary step in the moral crusade plot 
presented by the administration.  In narrating a future utopian vision ‘beyond the war on 
terror’, the President asserted the need to confront ‘poverty’ and ‘tyranny’ by supporting 
and rewarding ‘governments that make the right choices for their own people’.  This was 
to be done by countries adopting the ‘single surviving model of human progress’.  Such a 
statement is notable for its teleological understanding of ‘progress’ towards a single 
vision, and the prescription of democratisation as a solution to terrorism.  This added a 
much more complex understanding of how to ‘fight’ the ‘war on terror’ than had been 
initially constructed. 
 
The implications of this statement became all the more evident in US-MENA relations.  
Chiefly, US-Egyptian relations were symptomatic of the coming problems that would 
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prove highly problematic for the Freedom Agenda when formally institutionalised.  On 
June 8, 2002, President Bush held a joint press conference with President Mubarak in 
which he would thank Egypt for its ‘strong support in our war against terror’, claiming 
that ‘we've got a good friend, Americans have a good friend, when it comes to this war 
on terror, in Egypt’ (Bush 2002_06_08).  However, by August 2002 the White House 
refused to honour an Egyptian request for $130 million in supplementary aid.  This was a 
direct protest against the July sentencing of prominent Egyptian-American democracy 
activist Saad Eddin Ibrahim and his colleagues for apparent fraud and defamation.  This 
was the first time the US had linked the provision of aid to a human rights case in the 
Arab world (Hawthorne 2003a: 23).  As the Bush administration became increasingly 
concerned by the internal politics of regimes it regarded as allies, tensions began to rise to 
the surface.  This saw the creeping insurrection of the ‘conflict of interests’ problem 
which slowly began to ferment in US-MENA relations. 
 
Within the early evolutionary phase of the Freedom Agenda, it became abundantly clear 
that the Bush administration was asserting the need to promote ‘freedom’ in the region, 
but that the narrative failed to provide a robust and consistent understanding of why this 
applied to the entire region.  Consequently, it failed to set out a strategy other than 
deploying the ‘domino’ metaphor.  This became all the more evident when the Bush 
administration began re-engaging in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, seeking an end to the 
second Intifada.  Indeed, President Bush argued that, 
if liberty can blossom in the rocky soil of the West Bank and Gaza, it will inspire 
millions of men and women around the globe who are equally weary of poverty 
and oppression, equally entitled to the benefits of democratic government (Bush 
2002_06_24). 
 
This vision was narrated as the end point of the President’s proposed two-state solution, 
which would be supported if ‘a new and different Palestinian leadership’ was elected.  
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Evidently, Washington wanted ‘regime change’ in the Palestinian Authority, and argued 
that this would allow ‘democratic reforms’ to move forward (Bush 2002_06_24).   
 
Removing Arafat had now become US policy in an effort to restart negotiations between 
the Palestinians and Israelis; later culminating in the ‘Road Map’ (see Mearsheimer and 
Walt 2007: 199-228; Hudson 2005).  In addition to the ‘domino effect’ however, Flynt 
Leverett describes a more parsimonious reason for the Bush administration wanting to 
create a democratic Palestinian state.  In what he calls the ‘garbage-collection model’, he 
argues that supporters of a democratic Palestine within the administration, assumed that  
 
Palestinians and their sympathizers in the Arab and Muslim worlds don’t really 
care that much about Palestinians living under occupation, that Palestinian and 
other Arab leaders use Israel as a convenient way to deflect popular attention 
from their own performance. I myself heard President Bush argue in the White 
House Situation Room, that a democratically-elected Palestinian government 
would be more focused on collecting garbage, and less, quote unquote, “hung up” 
on territory and the status of Jerusalem (IQ2 2007). 
 
Such stark terms were not used publicly as part of the war on terror narrative.  However, 
this mode of thought was alluded to when the Bush administration increasingly began to 
refer to ‘Freedom’ as a ‘universal value’.   
 
Prosperity and freedom and dignity are not just American hopes, or Western 
hopes. They are universal, human hopes. And even in the violence and turmoil of 
the Middle East, America believes those hopes have the power to transform lives 
and nations (Bush 2002_06_24). 
 
Such claims have strong American exceptionalist resonance.  No clearer statement of this 
can be made than the President’s assertion that, 
 
Americans are a free people, who know that freedom is the right of every person 
and the future of every nation. The liberty we prize is not America's gift to the 
world, it is God's gift to humanity (Bush 2003_01_28). 
 
That ‘freedom’ was ‘God’s gift to humanity’ was an articulation that was often deployed 
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to legitimise the Freedom Agenda.  Without a coherent rational or strategy in place, the 
phrasing legitimises the Freedom Agenda by implying that God demands such a policy.  
Not only does it provide a sense of moral mission, but it places god on America’s side in 
that mission.  To promote freedom is to do God’s altruistic work, and consequently, 
human actions imitate God’s will whilst building a utopia on earth.  Evidently, through 
rationalising the policy in these transcendental terms the Bush administration was 
attempting to maintain the overall plot of the war on terror as a moral crusade, whilst 
silencing critics120. 
   
This transcendental argument, derived from an American exceptionalist discourse, 
underpinned the Freedom Agenda’s social engineering project.  This was social 
utopianism par excellence.  As Donald Rumsfeld had explained,  
 
we have a choice, either to change the way we live, which is unacceptable, or to 
change the way that they live … we chose the latter (Rumsfeld 2001_09_18). 
 
Yet, failure to assert a coherent rationale proved highly problematic for the Freedom 
Agenda throughout the early phase of its evolution.  At the launch of MEPI in December 
2002, Colin Powell argued that focusing on development would fill the ‘hope gap’ in the 
region and that, 
 
[U]ntil the countries of the Middle East unleash the abilities and potential of their 
women, they will not build a future of hope.  Any approach to the Middle East 
that ignores its political, economic, and educational underdevelopment will be 
built on sand (Powell 2002_12_12). 
 
But, with only an initial budget of $29 million, this was derided in the region as tokenism 
(Sharp 2005b: 3).  That the cumulative total of MEPI funding was $497.7 million by 
FY2008 was symptomatic of the fact that the monumental goal of transforming the 
                                              
120 Indeed this was certainly the sentiment behind Donald Rumsfeld quoting the Bible on the front of his 
briefing papers for the President.  Pertinent to this point was quoting the First Epistle of Peter ‘It is God's 
will that by doing good you should silence the ignorant talk of foolish men’ (BBC 2009). 
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conditions in the region were never met with a sufficient proportion of means121 (see 
Hawthorne 2003b).  For example, if the cumulative total of MEPI funding by FY2008 
was divided equally between the sixteen countries it targeted, it amounted to only $31.1 
million for each country over seven years.  With only $4.4 million per annum for each 
country, MEPI can hardly be seen as a ‘revolutionary’ or a ‘tectonic shift’ in US foreign 
policy122.  This fact was not lost on US officials that increasingly argued that MEPI 
represented a ‘philosophical commitment’ towards reforming the region (Sharp 2005b: 
3).  Accordingly, as the administration tried to justify its position, claiming that this was a 
strategy of ‘partnerships’ and ‘principle’ (Powell 2004), it became all the more evident 
that the Freedom Agenda was not a direct challenge to MENA allies.  Rather, the 
Freedom Agenda’s intended purpose was to work with regional allies, in ‘partnerships’, 
to try and alleviate the social conditions that were undermining their legitimacy. 
 
The Freedom Agenda as the Overarching Rationale: The Impact of the Iraq War 
and the Rise of the Freedom Agenda 
 
Whilst the Iraq war was being fought, the Bush administration toned down the 
prominence of the Freedom Agenda in its espoused narrative.  Instead, the Bush 
administration concentrated on explaining its operational doctrine and focused on the 
particulars of the conflict rather than the wider regional strategy.  However, after the 
swift collapse of the Iraqi regime, the Freedom Agenda began to be increasingly seen as 
the overarching rationale for US policy.  Thus, whilst the Iraq war was a point of origin 
                                              
121 My point here is not to suggest that the level of democratisation is correlated with the proportion of 
finance allocated, but rather to suggest that the meagre financial allocation is an indicator of the policy’s 
low prioritisation.  Given that it was the Bush administration’s premise that democracy is a universal value, 
which could be produced by a modernisation process, these sums were insufficient for attaining that 
intended objective.  By contrast, the 1992 Freedom Support Act, established to support the transition away 
from Communism in the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union, received $400 million in its 
first year alone (see Hawthorne 2003b). 
122 This is a hypothetical scenario as MEPI funding for each country is not available.  However this 
hypothetical scenario further illustrates the point that the administration never matched means with its 
rhetoric. 
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for the Freedom Agenda, it also served as a point of departure that ultimately led to the 
Freedom Agenda becoming deemed the central doctrine of the Bush administration’s 
tenure in office. 
 
The rise in the Freedom Agenda’s prominence was directly linked to failures in Iraq.  The 
celebration of the liberated masses, which the administration had promised prior to the 
invasion, failed to materialise.  In its place came a growing insurgency and increasing 
instability in the country.  This fundamentally challenged the simplicity of the war on 
terror narrative, far from removing the ‘shackles on democracy’, the removal of Saddam 
Hussein brought with it sectarian violence and the possibility of the territorial integrity of 
the country being split along Shia, Sunni and Kurdish lines.  As a result, the Bush 
administration faced increasing problems securing its war on terror narrative.  The facts 
on the ground directly contradicted its parsimonious assertions that an invasion of Iraq 
would increase the security of the US.  On the contrary, reports from the country were 
showing that supporters of Al Qaeda were increasingly infiltrating the country and 
seeking to set up a ‘kind of safe haven for jihad against the West that Afghanistan was 
before September 11’ (Diamond 2005: 320).   
 
This represented a crisis of its own in the post-crisis narrative, which opened up space to 
criticise the Bush administration’s foreign policy, and the narrative it espoused.  It is 
important to recognise that, as Stuart Croft argues, 
 
Any new policy programme prescribed in and through this new discourse [the war 
on terror] would inevitably be challenged over time.  Policy programmes decay in 
the normal course of debate as issues and attitudes change over time; and new 
crises are constructed, ones that produce different discourses that take different 
directions (2006: 2). 
 
The growing unease about the moral crusade plot the Bush administration had put 
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forward was evident in speeches the President began to make.  In an attempt to defend 
the war on terror as an overarching rationale he began arguing that,  
 
[A]s democracy takes hold in Iraq, the enemies of freedom will do all in their 
power to spread violence and fear. They are trying to shake the will of our country 
and our friends, but the United States of America will never be intimidated by 
thugs and assassins. The killers will fail, and the Iraqi people will live in freedom 
(Bush 2004_01_20). 
 
This, and many other statements to the same effect, attempted to assimilate the growing 
insurgency into the original narrative in an attempt to salvage the original construction of 
the war on terror.  Those that opposed the US occupation were deemed the ‘enemies of 
freedom’, masking a divergent set of political objectives.  Similarly, the original decision 
to cast the terrorist attacks as an ‘act of war’ began to be challenged in a manner that had 
not been done in 2001, leading the President to assert in his 2004 State of the Union 
address,  
 
I know that some people question if America is really in a war at all. They view 
terrorism more as a crime, a problem to be solved mainly with law enforcement 
and indictments. After the World Trade Center was first attacked in 1993, some of 
the guilty were indicted and tried and convicted, and sent to prison. But the matter 
was not settled. The terrorists were still training and plotting in other nations, and 
drawing up more ambitious plans. After the chaos and carnage of September the 
11th, it is not enough to serve our enemies with legal papers. The terrorists and 
their supporters declared war on the United States, and war is what they got (Bush 
2004_01_20). 
 
The strength of the counter-narrative however was too persuasive in the face of evidence 
throughout 2004.  This lead to active and retired military leaders charging that the war on 
terror was too simplistic in its prescriptions, and that the term conveyed the impression 
that military power alone could address the threat (see Chollet and Goldgeier 2008: 314).  
The result of this pressure gave the President cause to assert that, 
We actually misnamed the war on terror. It ought to be the struggle against 
ideological extremists who do not believe in free societies who happen to use 
terror as a weapon to try to shake the conscience of the free world.  And, you 
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know, that's what they do. They use terror, and they use it effectively (Bush 
2004_08_06). 
Similarly, as Donald Rumsfeld was leaving office he argued that, 
 
I don't think I would have called it the war on terror … I don't mean to be critical 
of those who have or did or - and certainly I've used the phrase frequently … it's 
not a war on terror.  Terror is a weapon of choice for extremists who are trying to 
destabilise regimes and impose their … dark vision on all the people that they can 
control.  So "war on terror" has a problem for me (Rumsfeld 2006_12_07). 
 
Such statements marked a significant alteration in the Bush administration’s espoused 
narrative.  When faced with increasing challenges to the simplicity of the narrative, the 
Bush administration chose not to abandon it, but rather modify it to become more 
accommodating to the challenges.  No longer was the enemy defined by their ‘evil’ 
nature alone, but rather by an ‘ideology’.  The logical conclusion of this alteration was 
delivered by President Bush when he asserted that  
 
While the killers choose their victims indiscriminately, their attacks serve a clear 
and focused ideology, a set of beliefs and goals that are evil, but not insane.  
Some call this evil Islamic radicalism; others, militant Jihadism; still others, 
Islamo-fascism. Whatever it's called, this ideology is very different from the 
religion of Islam. This form of radicalism exploits Islam to serve a violent, 
political vision: the establishment, by terrorism and subversion and insurgency, of 
a totalitarian empire that denies all political and religious freedom … Islamic 
radicalism is more like a loose network with many branches than an army under a 
single command123 (Bush 2006_10_06). 
 
The change in the characterisation of the enemy had a profound impact on the manner in 
which the Freedom Agenda evolved.  No longer was it portrayed as a policy to prevent 
terrorists being recruited, but rather as a ‘foreign policy based on liberty’ motivated by 
‘hopeful ideology called freedom’.  It was no longer just a strategy to transform the 
                                              
123 What is particularly noteworthy about this passage is that the characterisation of the enemy remains 
defined as “evil”.  Yet the concept of evil was articulated with conceptions of rationality and a political 
vision.  That is to say, no longer were the terrorists being defined by their ‘apolitical madness’ (see chapter 
eight), but rather were being attributed rationality and motivation towards an alternative political vision.  
By making this discursive move the notion that the war on terror was an ideological battle could be put 
forward, and the official narrative added complexity to maintain its legitimacy in the face of criticism.   
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Middle East, but rather a challenge to a ‘hateful ideology’ (Bush 2006_07_28).  The shift 
in focus to an ideological struggle reinvented the importance of the Freedom Agenda.  It 
built on the original narrative, presented after September 11, 2001, to include more than 
just military means, therefore answering critics of the war on terror.  Yet, in doing so the 
Freedom Agenda was presented as the overarching rationale for US foreign policy.  
Accordingly, the President argued that, 
 
The war we fight today is more than a military conflict; it is the decisive 
ideological struggle of the 21st century. On one side are those who believe in the 
values of freedom and moderation ... And on the other side are those driven by the 
values of tyranny and extremism (Bush 2006_08_31). 
 
We are engaged in the defining ideological struggle of the 21st century. The 
terrorists oppose every principle of humanity and decency that we hold dear. Yet 
in this war on terror, there is one thing we and our enemies agree on: In the long 
run, men and women who are free to determine their own destinies will reject 
terror and refuse to live in tyranny. And that is why the terrorists are fighting to 
deny this choice to the people in Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the 
Palestinian Territories. And that is why, for the security of America and the peace 
of the world, we are spreading the hope of freedom (Bush 2008_01_28). 
 
Within this iteration of the war on terror narrative, ideological struggle was seen to be the 
central plot and the Freedom Agenda as America’s method of victory.  This was an 
implicit recognition of the limitations of the previous narrative; the narrative was 
cumulatively yet iteratively adapted so that the Freedom Agenda transformed into the 
central paradigm in what remain a moral crusade.  
 
Making the spread of liberty central to US foreign policy was explicitly the goal of 
President Bush’s second term in office.  When informing Michael Gerson, the president’s 
chief speech writer, of what he wanted to be included in his upcoming second inaugural 
address, President Bush explicitly told him that he needed to get across a single idea: 
‘The future of America and the security of America depends on the spread of liberty’ (see 
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Woodward 2006: 371).  This was to be as central to the war on terror as containment had 
been in the Cold War.  The President was explicitly trying to modify the war on terror 
narrative so that the Freedom Agenda would become the single overarching rationale for 
US foreign policy.  Via claims that the regional status quo had not provided security, 
evident on September 11, 2001, the President increasingly asserted that, 
 
As long as the Middle East remains a place of tyranny and despair and anger, it 
will continue to produce men and movements that threaten the safety of America 
and our friends. So America is pursuing a forward strategy of freedom in the 
greater Middle East. We will challenge the enemies of reform, confront the allies 
of terror, and expect a higher standard from our friends  (Bush 2004_01_20). 
 
Given the centrality of the Freedom Agenda, it was no longer sufficient to argue that it 
was a product of transcendental values or based on principle alone.  Rather, a more 
complex security rationale was endowed upon the policy.  Throughout 2004 until the end 
of Bush’s tenure in office, the Bush administration increasingly began to narrate the 
Freedom Agenda as a method of securing a global democratic peace.  To substantiate 
these claims the Bush administration increasingly justified the pursuit of the Freedom 
Agenda by appropriating the logic of democratic peace theory.  In the President’s own 
words:  
 
The freedom agenda is based upon our deepest ideals and our vital interests … 
We [Americans] believe that freedom is a gift from an almighty God … And we 
also know, by history and by logic, that promoting democracy is the surest way to 
build security. Democracies don't attack each other or threaten the peace. 
Governments accountable to the voters focus on building roads and schools - not 
weapons of mass destruction. Young people who have a say in their future are 
less likely to search for meaning in extremism. Citizens who can join a peaceful 
political party are less likely to join a terrorist organisation. Dissidents with the 
freedom to protest around the clock are less likely to blow themselves up during 
rush hour. And nations that commit to freedom for their people will not support 
terrorists - they will join us in defeating them (Bush 2006_07_28). 
 
 
 
This was coupled with continuous assertions such as ‘in Europe, as in Asia, as in every 
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region of the world, the advance of freedom leads to peace’ and ‘we believe democracy 
yields peace’ (Bush 2003_11_06, 2006).  Such calls appeared to give Washington’s 
national security liberalism the guise of a scientific imperative, because of the empirical 
strength of the thesis.  Indeed, many academic studies have demonstrated that the number 
of wars between democracies during the past two centuries has been low, ranging from 
‘zero to less than a handful depending on precisely how democracy is defined’ (Levy 
1988: 661-2).  Consequently, as Jack Levy argues, the ‘absence of war between 
democracies comes as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international 
relations’ (1988: 661-2). 
 
Significantly, the appeal to democratic peace theory is not new to American foreign 
policy, as similar sentiments have been expressed by successive administrations since the 
end the Cold War124.  However, the G. W. Bush administration was the first to suggest 
that this could be done in the Middle East and created institutions in the foreign policy 
bureaucracy to pursue this end.  The vision that the President increasingly espoused was 
one in which the national interest is satisfied by creating a ‘zone of peace’ in the Middle 
East, in which the nature of democracy creates a reluctance to go to war with other states 
in the region, whilst also undermining the appeal of terrorism.  This created a cocktail in 
which democratic peace theory was not only the route to peace but had universal 
applicability, and democracy promotion was seen as the silver bullet to the problems of 
terrorism through to proliferation.  Democratic peace theory therefore played a significant 
role in justifying the direction of US strategy.  It provided part of the administration’s 
                                              
124 Accordingly, President G. H. W. Bush Senior argued ‘In a world where we are the only remaining 
superpower, it is the role of the United States to marshal its moral and material resources to promote a 
democratic peace.  It is our responsibility - it is our opportunity - to lead’ (Bush 1993_01_11).  Moreover 
the notion of democratic peace theory was carried through to the Clinton administration and had a 
significant impact on its foreign policy.  Thus as Michael Cox notes ‘possibly no other academic idea 
emanating from the academic community exercised as much influence as this one on the White House’ 
(2000: 326). 
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ideological-discursive formation that motivated and legitimised a liberal grand strategy 
for the MENA region.  
 
The Ideological Discursive Formation Underpinning the Moral Crusade Narrative 
As the Bush administration increasingly declared that democracy promotion was in the 
national interest, and that it should be at the heart of US-MENA relations, one of the most 
persistent critiques to emerge was that the administration failed to set out a rationalisation 
for what was being constructed as a radical change in emphasis.  As Amy Hawthorne 
declared, ‘no coherent rationale has been set forth to explain why the United States 
should advance democracy in the region’ (2003a: 22).  Contrary to this notion this 
research has demonstrated that the Bush administration did in fact construct an 
increasingly ideological justification embedded in the post-crisis narrative it put forward.  
Moreover, a distinguishable feature of the narrative was the manner in which it 
appropriated academic theories slowly and accumulatively as the Freedom Agenda 
evolved.  Ultimately, the Freedom Agenda can therefore be seen as the 
institutionalisation of a complex set of ideas, which were articulated together and 
imbricated throughout the Bush administration’s tenure in office.  To clarify this point it 
is productive to recall the defining parts of the ideological-discursive formation at the 
heart of the Freedom Agenda. 
1. Primacy 
2. Hegemonic Stability Theory 
3. Unilateralism 
4. Neoliberalism 
5. Modernisation thesis 
6. Teleological understanding of history 
7. American Exceptionalism 
8. Moral Realism 
9. Transcendentalism 
10. Domino theory 
11. Democratic Peace theory 
These ideas, once articulated together provided the framework for the Freedom Agenda 
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and were embedded in the narrative put forward by the Bush administration to legitimise 
its policy on the Middle East.  Notably, this narrative did not appear from nowhere, but 
rather was constructed as a response to the events of September 11, 2001.  From the 
initial post-crisis response, the Freedom Agenda emerged through a series of iterative and 
cumulative steps.  Candidate Bush began his quest for office by asserting a ‘Distinctly 
American Internationalism’ as his answer to the lack of a coherent rationale which 
characterised the post-Cold War milieu.  However, once in office this proved to be 
insufficient.  However, the events of September 11, 2001, provided a moment of 
punctuation in political time.  The initial response from the Bush administration was to 
construct a plot in which the events were represented as a national tragedy.  This plot 
then evolved to become a moral play in which the concept of ‘freedom’ became 
foregrounded.  This laid the discursive tracks for the eventual evolution of the Freedom 
Agenda to appear a legitimate response to the attacks.  This moral play was then 
seamlessly transformed into the plot of a moral crusade, in which the enemy was 
characterised as evil and the policy was a counter terrorism policy based on eradication.  
The characterisation of the enemy did not remain static.  Rather, from “evil terrorists”, it 
transformed into “evil terrorists and the states that harbor them”, then into “evil terrorists, 
states that harbor them and rouge regimes seeking or possessing WMD”.  As the war on 
terror narrative began to be challenged, the Bush administration increasingly put forward 
its transformational vision, characterising the enemy as an ‘ideology’ that could be 
defeated with ‘freedom’.  The Freedom Agenda was developed as a result of the events of 
September 11, 2001.  Whilst the events themselves represented a moment of punctuation, 
the post-crisis narrative presented by the Bush administration shaped the content of 
change, culminating in the Freedom Agenda being developed. 
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Section Four:  
Constituting the Freedom Agenda; Between 
Democracy and Domination 
 
 
The world has never had a good definition of the word liberty, and the American people, just now, are 
much in want of one.  We all declare for liberty; but in using the same word we do not all mean the same 
thing.  With some the word liberty may mean for each man to do as he pleases with himself, and the 
product of his labor; while with others the same word may mean for some men to do as they please with 
other men, and the product of other men’s labor.  Here are two, not only different, but incompatible things, 
called by the same name - liberty.  And it follows that each of the things is, by the respective parties, called 
by two different and incompatible names - liberty and tyranny. 
Abraham Lincoln 
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11. A Divided Ad Hoc Strategy; the Rise of a Neoliberal 
Agenda 
 
Section three of this research explicitly addressed how the Freedom Agenda evolved as a 
direct consequence of the ‘9/11 crisis’.  It set out the construction of a particular 
ideological-discursive formation embedded within the Bush administration’s espoused 
narrative.  This combined various theories in the form of primacy, hegemonic stability 
theory, neoliberalism, modernisation thesis, universalism, domino theory and democratic 
peace theory.  Moreover, in section two of this research the constructivist institutionalist 
methodology asserted that this ideological-discursive formation would shape the path that 
the Freedom Agenda would take and its institutionalisation.  This section of the research 
unequivocally addresses this assertion.  It brings these two strands of the research 
together, and answers the question of ‘how the Freedom Agenda was constituted and why 
it was done in this way?’  As a consequence it builds on, and provides an analysis of the 
Freedom Agenda institutions that were set out in chapter one of this thesis.  It also 
provides a more critical response to the literature, and in doing so undermines assertions 
made by both the Freedom Agenda’s critics and advocates.  This is done by firstly 
demonstrating that whilst the Freedom Agenda was asserted as the overarching rationale 
for President Bush’s foreign policy, the term itself masked considerable disagreement 
within the administration.  The Freedom Agenda was met with considerable hostility in 
some quarters of the Bush administration itself.  Secondly, the notion of a Freedom 
Agenda disguises the extent to which the Bush administration found itself lacking the 
ability to promote democracy in the region.  As a direct consequence of both of these 
factors, the Bush administration found itself adopting a policy of conservative radicalism.   
 
The approach was radical to the extent that it insisted on political democracy, yet 
conservative in its desire to safeguard the socio-economic privileges and power of the 
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established order to secure regional stability.  Such a strategy was caught between free 
trade liberalisation as the positive route to liberty, and domination to the extent that it 
increasingly favoured regional stability, the continuation of long-term security interests, 
and the undermining of regimes that challenged its hegemony of the region.  As the Bush 
administration oscillated between emphasising both of these elements it enabled a double 
standard in the Freedom Agenda to emerge.  For MENA allies, the Bush administration 
relied on the definition of freedom it set out on the 2000 campaign trail and proposing a 
gradualist sequential policy with neoliberal-modernisation thesis at its core.  However, 
for regimes that opposed US power in the region a more hostile approach was taken that 
led to MEPI funding being diverted to support regime change by internal dissidents and 
exiled groups.  Ultimately, this led to the Freedom Agenda lacking coherence and 
emancipatory potential. 
 
The Challenge from Within: The Foreign Policy Bureaucracy’s Resistance and the 
‘Conflict of Interests’ Problematic 
 
The notion that democracy should be promoted in the MENA was the driving factor 
behind the Freedom Agenda.  Yet, the umbrella term ‘Freedom Agenda’ implies a much 
more coherent policy than was actually the case.  There was in fact considerable 
divergence within the Bush administration as to why democracy should be promoted and 
if it should be promoted at all.  The official narrative asserted that it was out of 
‘principle’, in the ‘national interest’ and would create a ‘democratic peace’ between the 
MENA region and the West.  However, three distinct groups existed within the 
administration.  Firstly, there were those that believed September 11, 2001, demonstrated 
the need to transform the MENA into a zone of pro-American democracies, and were 
willing to use force if necessary.  Secondly, there was a group that believed that 
democracy promotion could be used as a method of winning “hearts and minds” in the 
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region, and therefore called for public diplomacy programmes and democracy assistance 
funding.  Thirdly, there was a group that believed undemocratic governance was the 
cause of terrorism, but recommended engaging existing governments to promote reform 
(Hawthorne 2003a: 22). 
 
Accordingly, the Freedom Agenda was not held together by a coherent rationale, but 
rather as an agreement between varies strategic actors within the state bureaucracy.  
These strategic actors saw the strategically selective context differently, but largely 
subscribed to the Freedom Agenda because it satisfied notions of what they believed 
were in the national interest.  Contrastingly, there were strategic actors within the state 
bureaucracy that viewed the selective context differently.  They saw the Freedom Agenda 
as damaging to long term interests and resisted its implementation.  This set the stage for 
a significant power struggle between MEPI, the State Department and the Defense 
Department. 
 
Many members of MEPI, led by Elizabeth Cheney, were pushing for the democratisation 
strategy for the Middle East.  In late 2002, they established their offices in the State 
Department’s Bureau of Near East Affairs (NEA).  However, a defining feature of this 
group was that they were drawn from the National Endowment for Democracy, and its 
‘children’, the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the International Republican 
Institute (IRI).  They had developed their expertise in democracy assistance from their 
experiences in Eastern Europe after the fall of the Soviet Union.  Herein, upon coming 
into the MEPI offices, their main understanding of democracy promotion was through the 
Freedom Support Act that had been applied to former Soviet Satellite states.  
Consequently, they had expertise in the form of a template of programmes, such as 
improving the rule of law, strengthening parliaments and political parties, and training 
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political candidates.  This was strongly reflected in the MEPI programmes.  However, 
this group lacked expertise in the Middle East, and sought to acquire this with the aid of 
other members of the Bureau of Near East Affairs.  This proved highly problematic.  
Rather than providing help to MEPI, many long term officials in the NEA sought to 
undermine it.  Indeed, Tamara Coffman Wittes described them as ‘pushing back really 
hard against this policy’, and portrayed the situation as one in which, 
 
they [NEA Staff] didn’t like it and so you have a bunch of people going in who 
need regional information and expertise, and the people who are giving it to them 
are trying to undermine them at the same time … [Also] you had a bunch of 
ambassadors who when MEPI was first announced, saying well what the heck is 
this and why am I now responsible for doing this. This is going to screw up my 
relations with the host government, why am I being forced to create tension in this 
relationship.  That’s not my job.  And we’re just trying to ignore it or do the 
minimum (Wittes 2008c). 
 
Moreover, resistance to the Freedom Agenda was not only the preserve of the State 
Department.  Similar opposition came from the Department of Defense, as the Freedom 
Agenda began to conflict with other long term regional interests.  This was especially the 
case with Egypt and Morocco, but applied to other regional allies with significant 
military relationships with the US.  Thus, 
 
the Defense Department was very important in pushing back.  And so whether it 
was a question of a mid-level official Defense Department official making a trip 
to a country abroad, what was he going to say, what was in his talking points on 
human rights and democracy.  A lot of times they just didn’t have those talking 
points, or if it was a bigger issue like what’s the future of US aid to Egypt … 
There was a big interagency process that went on over the course of a year and the 
Defense Department sits at the table, and Commerce is at the table, and State is at 
the table … and Defense is saying excuse me don’t mess with this aid, this is too 
important to them providing logistical support to our operations in Afghanistan, 
and their giving the spare material to the Lebanese army to fight Fatah al-Islam. 
Don’t screw with this, its too important.  So that was also a source of push back 
against the policy, and an important one because it gets to the substantive policy 
conflicts in democracy promotion (Wittes 2008c).   
 
Given such insights it is difficult to agree with both critics and proponents of the 
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Freedom Agenda who allege that the Bush administration put democracy promotion at 
the forefront of its policy (see chapter three).  Yet, within the US foreign policy 
bureaucracy there was considerable resistance, which ultimately led to the actual 
institutionalisation and implementation of the Freedom Agenda reflecting a strong 
awareness of the ‘conflict of interests’ problem.  As J. Scott Carpenter125 has argued, the 
Freedom Agenda was a ‘tertiary concern’.  This was behind regional security and by 
2007 a renewed interest in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict (Carpenter 2008).  A more 
accurate analysis of the situation is that America’s core objective in the Middle East 
remained regional stability to secure its long term interests, because the Bush 
administration  
  
[W]as never able to delineate how it would handle perceived trade-offs between 
the long-term project of democracy promotion and the shorter term imperatives 
such as counter-terrorism, assistance in stabilising Iraq, and support for the 
Middle East peace process (Wittes 2008b: 79). 
 
This point was reinforced by the policy of extraordinary rendition (set out in chapter 
nine).  The Bush administration was willing to send contradictory messages to MENA 
regimes in order to secure more immediate goals in the war on terror.  This raised serious 
credibility issues regarding the sincerity of its Freedom Agenda to observers in the 
Middle East and beyond.  The starkness of this contradiction was evident as members of 
the CIA such as Michael F. Scheuer, the former Chief of the CIA’s Bin Laden Unit, were 
asserting that,  
 
there were no qualms at all about sending people to Cairo and kind of joking up 
our [the CIA] sleeves about what would happen to those people in Cairo in 
Egyptian prisons … I don’t care what happens to the people who are targeted and 
rendered … Mistakes are made …They are not Americans. I really don’t care … I 
never got paid, sir, to be a citizen of the world (see H.C.F.A.  2007). 
 
                                              
125 J. Scott Carpenter served in the Bush administration as assistant secretary of state in the NEA, and 
oversaw MEPI form 2004 until becoming coordinator of the BMENA in 2006. 
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The contradiction between claims of promoting freedom in the Middle East and using 
Middle Eastern prisons for ‘torture, indefinite detentions, and disappearances’ did not go 
unnoticed.  As Representative Bill Delahunt, Chairman of the Subcommittee on 
International Organizations, Human Rights and Oversight, pointed out:  
 
These extraordinary renditions are utterly inconsistent with our broader foreign 
policy goals of promoting democracy and the rule of law, the very foundations of 
civil society.  These practices have brought us universal condemnation and have 
frustrated our efforts to work in a concerted way with our allies in fighting 
terrorism (H.C.F.A.  2007). 
 
Moreover, extraordinary rendition demonstrated a dependency on the very regimes the 
Bush administration claimed to want to reform by offering an ‘ideology of freedom’.  
More problematic than this, however, was that, under the rubric of security demands, the 
Bush administration sought to utilise for its own purposes the very conditions it claimed 
were the cause of terrorism.  This demonstrated that when long term interests or 
immediate security concerns challenged the Freedom Agenda, it became highly apparent 
that they would win over calls for democracy promotion.  The Freedom Agenda was far 
from the overarching rationale the Bush administration claimed it to be.  Not only did this 
demonstrate that the prominence of the Freedom Agenda was being considerably 
overstated by the administration, but that the Bush administration failed to pursue the 
policy with a modicum of coherence. Placing a sign on the entrance gate of Guantanamo 
Bay detention facility, which read ‘Honour bound to defend freedom’, strongly illustrates 
this point; if not an acute sense of irony. 
 
Strategic Actors in the Strategically Selective Context: Push for Elections and 
Retreat 
 
Whilst regional stability remained the overriding goal of US foreign policy towards the 
MENA, within the first few years of the Freedom Agenda being launched the Bush 
administration was particularly vocal about pushing for elections.  Secretary of State 
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Condoleezza Rice publicly confronted close allies Egypt and Saudi Arabia to hold fair 
elections, release political prisoners, and allow free expression and rights for women (see 
Weisman 2005).  Moreover, with the death of Yasir Arafat in late 2004, the Bush 
administration supported swift elections for a new president of the Palestinian Authority 
and goaded new parliamentary elections in the West Bank and Gaza.  Within the 
Freedom Agenda narrative, the Bush administration had put forward a vision of the future 
in which democracy would be the cure to the Palestinian plight, and that open and free 
elections would give cause for the US to support a viable Palestinian state.  With the 
electoral victory of Mahmoud Abbas in January 2005, Washington’s preferred candidate, 
it appeared that the Bush administration had a new more “moderate” President of the 
Palestinian Authority to work with in the peace process.   
 
The period between 2004-06 looked promising for regional reform, indeed the Bush 
administration was keen to point out that an ‘Arab spring’ was taking place in which 
there were broad elections in Afghanistan and Iraq; limited elections in Egypt and Saudi 
Arabia; the ‘Cedar’ revolution in Lebanon which removed Syrian occupational forces; 
political reforms in Morocco and Jordan; and women’s suffrage introduced in Kuwait.  
For the Bush administration such acts constituted ‘extraordinary progress in the 
expansion of freedom’ (NSC 2006: 2).  This was supported by Freedom House in 2005 
that measured ‘modest positive trends’ taking place throughout the region (see Abrams 
2005).  What were by any measure moderate successes, were being trumpeted by the 
Bush administration and some members of the political commentariat, as vindication for 
the Iraq war and the Freedom Agenda more generally.  The New York Times had articles 
expounding an ‘Unexpected whiff of freedom proves bracing for the Mideast’ and ‘For 
Bush, a taste of vindication in Mideast’ (MacFarquhar 2005; Purdum 2005).  Whilst 
Charles Krauthammer boldly asserted that, 
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[H]istory has begun to speak, and it says that America made the right decision to 
invade Iraq … Right on what? That America, using power harnessed to 
democratic ideals, could begin to transform the Arab world from endless tyranny 
and intolerance to decent governance and democratisation (Krauthammer 2005). 
 
The naivety of such statements became all the more apparent in early 2006.  By placing 
open elections centre stage of the Freedom Agenda’s mechanism for democratic 
advancement, the Bush administration proved to have considerable blind-spots in its 
ideological-discursive formation.  Imbibing the belief that democracy and freedom were 
the natural state of human affairs, and that the universal appeal of ‘God’s gift to 
humanity’ would trump all, senior members of the administration did not consider the 
possibility of the ‘Islamist dilemma’.  That is to say that they fundamentally 
misunderstood the strategically selective context in which they were operating.  Thus, 
when Hamas won the parliamentary elections on January 25, 2006 with a ‘landslide’ the 
result was one of shock within the administration.  Before the election, when Paul 
Wolfowitz was asked about the likelihood of elections in ‘friendly regimes’ empowering 
Islamists his response was highly revealing:  
 
Look fifty per cent of the Arab world are women.  Most of these women do not 
want to live in a theocratic state.  The other fifty percent are men.  I know a lot of 
them.  I don’t think they want to live in a theocratic state … it’s absurdly 
unrealistic, demonstrably unrealistic, to ignore how strong the desire for freedom 
is (in Smith 2007: 146). 
 
Such a statement is revealing as it demonstrates that because of an unquestioned belief in 
the power of ‘freedom’ the Bush administration had lowered the bar on its conception of 
how difficult democratising the Middle East would be.  It is little wonder therefore that 
when Condoleezza Rice heard that Hamas had won, her initial response was ‘well, that’s 
not right’, followed by ‘oh my goodness, Hamas won?’ (in Bumiller 2007).  That the 
Secretary of State could be caught off guard compounds the fact that the administration 
had a poor understanding of the challenges faced in democratising the region, and was 
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receiving poor intelligence from its embassies in the MENA.   
 
Pushing for elections was not just limited to the Palestinian territories.  With the 
assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in February 2005, there 
appeared to be a ‘Beirut Spring’, with large crowds marching in the streets and 
sympathetic police aiding them in avoiding police blockades.  The response from 
Washington was that this marked a milestone in the Freedom Agenda, as the President 
argued that  
 
anyone who doubts the appeal of freedom in the Middle East can look to 
Lebanon, where the Lebanese people are demanding a free and independent 
nation.  In the words of one Lebanese observer, "Democracy is knocking at the 
door of this country and, if it's successful in Lebanon, it is going to ring the doors 
of every Arab regime." (Bush 2005_03_08). 
 
This was accompanied by pressure on Syria to withdraw its military occupation, as the 
Bush administration imposed an array of sanctions on Syria’s government and banks, and 
froze the assets of Syrian officials implicated in Mr. Hariri’s killing (Cooper and Sanger 
2006).  Moreover, in this milieu, the Bush administration also pushed for swift 
parliamentary elections, in the hope of securing the apparent national consensus 
demonstrated by the ‘Beirut Spring’.  The result of these elections however gave 
Hezbollah increased political power, in the form of cabinet slots in a new coalition 
government (see Pressman 2009: 161).  Once again the Islamist dilemma, dismissed by 
the Bush administration, proved to be problematic for the aspiration of creating a 
democratic peace with the West.   
 
The pattern of Islamic groups hostile to Washington was repeated throughout the ‘Arab 
Spring’, which included the Muslim brotherhood in Egypt and Shiites backed by militias 
in Iraq (Weisman 2006a).  This was coupled with the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war in 
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Lebanon and increasing civil violence in Iraq despite hopes that the elections would calm 
the insurgency (Kurth 2006).  Thus, in 2006, Freedom House measured a fall in the 
previous year’s gains as many autocrats in the region began to withdraw what little 
political and civil openings they had made available; with Egypt delaying municipal 
elections by two years, Yemen cracking down on the news media and Jordan abandoning 
many reform plans (Noland and Pack 2007: 273; Fattah 2006).  By placing a procedural 
understanding of democracy, namely elections, at the forefront of the Freedom Agenda 
the Bush administration proved that its ideological-discursive formation was woefully 
inadequate in understanding the strategically selective context. Although the 
administration had established an ideological justification for why reforming the Middle 
East was in the national interest, it had failed to appreciate how the original strategically 
selective context that led to previous administrations supporting friendly regimes 
remained.     
 
These setbacks led to growing dissent in the Republican Party, with Representative 
Henry Hyde, the Chairman of the International Relations Committee, condemning the 
Bush strategy because of its emphasis on democracy as a ‘magic bullet’.  Moreover, the 
electoral success of Islamists gave ‘realists’ in the Republican Party cause to challenge 
the Bush administration’s approach and condemn the emphasis on democracy promotion 
at the expense of other American interests (Weisman 2006b).  The results of this 
challenge were stark.  Where Condoleezza Rice had once pronounced the need to move 
towards democracy, by 2007 there was near silence on pressuring for domestic reform 
and the void was filled with appreciative comments about Egypt’s support in the region 
and Saudi Arabia was now referred to as “moderate” (Diehl 2007: 15; Slackman 2007).  
From 2007, many members of the Freedom Agenda institutions were increasingly 
sidelined within a State Department that had not wanted to pursue the idea of democracy 
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promotion and now appeared to have their hostility vindicated.  As the Bush 
administration lowered the level of pressure it applied to MENA regimes, it became 
evident that members of the Freedom Agenda institutions were not getting the support 
from the higher echelons of the administration, resulting in some high profile advocates 
leaving their posts (see Rozen 2008).   
 
A Two-Path Agenda: Conservative Radicalism 
Although the Bush administration increasingly outlined a more complex understanding of 
why pursuing the Freedom Agenda was in the national interest, the narrative that was 
espoused was too vague and relied on ideological convictions rather than detailed 
empirical subscriptions.  This led to the Bush administration failing to deal with the 
structural challenges that the policy faced.  Overwhelmingly, the Bush administration 
faced the spectre of the “Islamist dilemma” that haunts US-MENA relations, which 
ultimately damaged the Bush administration’s willingness to challenge friendly MENA 
regimes (Ibrahim 2006: 15).  Given such circumstances the Freedom Agenda was able to 
do little to fund projects that authoritarian governments would not like, such as push for 
more open political systems, radically support opposition parties or provide robust 
election observation.  This was highly evident in US-Egyptian relations.  The US 
Congress specified in the FY2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act [P.L. 108-447] that, 
 
[D]emocracy and governance activities shall not be subject to the prior approval 
of the GoE [government of Egypt]. The managers intend this language to include 
NGOs and other segments of civil society that may not be registered with, or 
officially recognized by, the GoE. However, the managers understand that the 
GoE should be kept informed of funding provided pursuant to these activities. 
 
This was the first time that the US had decided to give independent funding to Non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) in Egypt, therefore bypassing the Egyptian 
government’s highly restrictive legislation on funding civil society groups (Sharp 2007: 
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13; see Elbayar 2005).  This was a direct challenge to the Mubarak regime as the US was 
advocating a change in policy that favoured opposition movements.  However, by June 
2006, the Egyptian government responded by ordering the International Republican 
Institute (IRI) and the National Democratic Institute (NDI), [“children” of the NED], to 
cease all activities in Egypt until they formally registered with the government and 
obtained a licence. Under the rubric of ‘national security’ concerns the Egyptian 
government forced all programmatic activity to a halt.  As Bahieddin Hassan, director of 
the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, noted at the time, 
 
the decision to halt the activities of the two institutes has to do with the regime's 
new agenda to curb public dissent and is not in any way linked to press claims 
that they are threatening national security (in Shahine 2006). 
 
This crackdown was part of a larger approach adopted by the Mubarak regime, in which 
judges were intimidated, bloggers arrested, local elections were postponed, and 
emergency laws were renewed (see Wittes 2008b: 78).  The response from the White 
House was muted at best, with the President and Vice President meeting with Mubarak’s 
son, Gamal Mubarak, but refusing to comment on what was said (NYT 2006).  By July 
2006 events in the region began to require Egyptian help in trying to diffuse a war 
between Israel in Lebanon.  As a result Condoleezza Rice poured praise on the Egyptian 
regime for its ‘very positive role … in trying to diffuse the crisis’ (Rice 2006_07_13).  
Ultimately it appeared that the Freedom Agenda’s credibilty was being challenged, and 
the Bush administration had retreated into placing more immediate security concerns 
first. 
 
The example of what happened in Egypt, is however telling of a much wider quality 
possessed by the Freedom Agenda.  Notably, with a lack of strategic guidance, the 
Freedom Agenda institutions funded democratisation projects in a ‘hodgepodge’ manner 
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(Hawthorne 2005).  As J. Scott Carpenter confessed in his role of overseeing MEPI,  
 
We don't know yet how best to promote democracy in the Arab Middle East. I 
mean we just don't know. It's the early days … I think there are times when you 
throw spaghetti against the wall and see if it sticks (in Finkel 2005). 
 
By 2006, through to the end of the Bush administration’s tenure in office, it became 
highly evident of what exactly had ‘stuck’ as an approach to US-MENA relations.  
Namely, the Bush administration had adopted a policy of conservative radicalism.  The 
approach was radical to the extent that it insisted on political democracy, yet 
conservative in its desire to safeguard the socio-economic privileges and power of the 
established order to secure regional stability (see Smith 1994: 180).  However, what was 
noticeable about such a strategy, was that the radical side was being targeted at regimes 
that opposed US influence in the region, whilst the conservative side was the approach 
adopted for friendly allies in the MENA.  As the Bush administration oscillated between 
emphasising both of these elements it enabled a double standard in the Freedom Agenda 
to emerge. 
 
For regimes that challenged pax-Americana in the region, such as Iran and Saddam 
Hussein’s Iraq, they had become labelled “Axis of Evil” states.  The price of such 
opposition was the Freedom Agenda’s radical side, which insisted on regime change and 
political democracy.  In Iraq this had been forcibly brought about by military coercion, 
followed by J. Scott Carpenter’s idea, at the time working in the America’s Coalition 
Provisional Authority in Iraq, that sovereignty should be transferred quickly and 
unexpectedly to catch insurgents off guard.  Subsequently, the Bush administration would 
try to ‘shape’ the outcome of elections, rather than ‘dictate’ them (Woodward 2006: 313-
4; 436).  However, in Iran and Syria, strong diplomatic pressure was coupled with the 
Iran Democracy Program and the Syria Democracy Program, which sought to utilise 
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MEPI funds and personnel to bolster internal dissidents and exile groups wanting US-
supported regime change (see DOS 2006b; Ganji 2006; Sharp 2009).  Accordingly, 
without a credible military solution for preventing Iran developing its nuclear weapons 
capability, the State Department in conjunction with the Defense Department setup a new 
Iran-Syria Operations Group that reported to Elizabeth Cheney (Dinmore 2006; Baxter 
2006).   
 
The radical side of the Freedom Agenda demonstrated the prominence of primacy as a 
node in the Bush administration’s ideological-discursive formation.  Challenging 
American power in the region was met with attempts at regime change.  No clear 
example of this can be demonstrated than in the Palestinian territories.  Having been 
surprised by the electoral success of Hamas in 2006, the Bush administration speedily 
overturned its dedication to democracy promotion and set about its archetypal response to 
the rise of such a regime.  Despite being democratically elected, the United States along 
with the European Union responded swiftly by cutting off aid to the Palestinian Authority 
and refused to work with the Hamas-led government (see Turner 2006).  More 
problematic however was the covert initiative from within the Bush administration to 
supply new weapons and training to Fatah, designed to remove the democratically elected 
Hamas-led government from power (see Rose 2008; Greenway 2007).  Whilst such an 
attempt failed, leading to a civil war in the Palestinian territories, it demonstrates a 
guiding rule underpinning the Freedom Agenda.  The United States would aspire to 
promote democracy in the Middle East if and only if the results of this did not challenge 
its influence and other interests in the region.  Thus demonstrating how ‘making other 
people free is said to be the goal of US foreign policy; but the natives are expected not 
only to accept the offer of freedom but also to show their gratitude’ (Ingram 2007: 3). 
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For regimes that helped maintain pax-Americana and secure America’s historical 
interests, the conservative approach was put forward and the Freedom Agenda was 
designed to generate stability through liberalisation, with democratisation being a 
secondary long-term goal.  This distinction is crucial because, whilst “democratisation” 
signifies a move toward greater degrees of political participation in existing 
governmental systems, “liberalisation” can mean any reform that enhances the individual 
freedom enjoyed by a citizen.  Thus, unlike Iraq, Iran and Syria, when it came to regimes 
such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco and Yemen, the Bush 
administration never advocated regime change through either military action, democratic 
populism or civil disobedience.  This was reflected in the Freedom Agenda programmes, 
which showed an overwhelming emphasis on low risk gradualist policies that emphasised 
promoting evolutionary reform of existing status quo regimes.  This was not democratic 
reform as much as it was the promotion of the conditions for eventual democratic reform, 
highlighting that the Freedom Agenda was a policy that construed democracy as a long 
term project emerging out of a ‘social and economic context that should be prepared’ 
(Wittes and Yerkes 2006b: 17).   
 
The grand liberal strategy that the Bush administration espoused, rejecting the status quo 
in favour of freedom, came with some strong caveats.  President Bush consistently made 
clear that the war on terror and the Freedom Agenda were a ‘generational commitment’, 
and that the promotion of ‘working democracies always need time to develop … and this 
makes us patient and understanding as other nations are at different stages of this 
journey’ (Bush 2003_11_06).  Moreover, as a senior Bush administration official 
hastened to add after the launch of the MEPI, the US was not planning ‘to abandon long-
term allies such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt because of their lack of democracy’ but 
would offer ‘positive reinforcement for emerging reform trends’ (in Ottaway 2005: 182).  
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A factor that was consistently reinforced by the use of the term ‘partnerships’.  As 
Thomas Carothers and Marina Ottaway argued, 
 
the softer, long-term side of the US push for democracy in the Middle East is, at 
best a work in progress.  Its slow advance is in part due to the unfamiliar territory 
to be traversed and uncertainty about how to proceed.  But it is also due to the fact 
that, as urgent and serious as the pro-democracy imperative appears to many in 
the US policy community, the stubborn reality remains that the United States has 
other important security related and economic interests, such as cooperation on 
antiterrorism enforcement actions and ensuring secure access to oil.  Such 
interests impel it to maintain close ties with many of the authoritarian regimes in 
the Middle East and be wary of the possibility of rapid or unpredictable political 
change (2005: 5). 
 
Conspicuously, when the radical side of the agenda was emphasised, the Bush 
administration was portraying ‘freedom’ as something that could be engineered from the 
outside, and in the case of Iraq brought to the country by coercion.  Emphasis was placed 
on the universality of freedom, which merely required tyrannical regimes to be removed 
and the natural aspirations of the ‘human spirit’ to come forth.  Yet, with the conservative 
side of the approach it was argued that the inherent nature of democracy meant that it 
could not be imposed from the outside and that America simply didn’t have the power to 
decree that MENA regimes obey its demands to reform.  As Richard Haass argued before 
the launch of the MEPI ‘while it can be encouraged from outside, democracy is best built 
from within’ (in Ottaway 2005: 182).  Given this juxtaposition, it became highly evident 
that the Bush administration was legitimising its gradualist approach through appealing to 
the neoliberal conception of freedom, and the modernisation process it would inspire.  
This remained a defining feature of the Bush administration’s strategy to global affairs 
from the aspirations set out in the 2000 Presidential campaign, through to Robert B. 
Zoelick’s proposal that democracy could be brought about by free trade just days after 
9/11, and the eventual institutionalisation of MEFTA. 
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The ‘Neoliberal’ Freedom Agenda: Freedom as Markets and Modernisation 
Although the conservative radicalism approach to the MENA demonstrated two divergent 
approaches to dealing with the region, as the Freedom Agenda progressed it became 
highly evident that they had a common core.  Notably both approaches utilised the same 
neoliberal conception of ‘freedom’ embedded within the Bush administration’s 
ideological-discursive formation (as set out in chapter seven).  The first signs of the 
practical application of neoliberalism in the Freedom Agenda manifested themselves in 
Iraq.  Whilst insurgency was rife and personal security was largely absent throughout 
most of the cities in Iraq, Paul Bremer, the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority, 
decided that it was time to ‘teach influential Iraqis the basics of a free-market economy’ 
(Bremer and McConnell 2006: 63).  On September 19, 2003 Bremer ordered, 
 
The full privatisation of public enterprises, full ownership rights by foreign firms 
of Iraqi businesses, full repatriation of foreign profits … the opening of Iraq’s 
banks to foreign control, national treatment for foreign companies, and the 
elimination of nearly all trade barriers (in Harvey 2005: 6). 
These orders were to apply to all areas of the economy, including public services, the 
media, manufacturing, transportation, finance, and construction.  Whilst the labour 
market was to be strictly regulated, strikes were effectively outlawed in key sectors and 
the right to unionise restricted (see Juhasz 2006).  Notably, this neoliberal agenda ignored 
the advise of Milton Freidman, who in 2001 admitted that a decade earlier he would have 
advised that any economy moving from a socialist economy, much like Iraq’s, should 
follow three words ‘privatise, privatise, privatise’.  However, he then conceded that ‘I 
was wrong … It turns out that the rule of law is probably more basic than privatisation’ 
(in Fukuyama 2004: 25).  This advice had not reached the higher echelons of the Bush 
administration and the Coalition Provisional Authority, which placed marketisation 
before securing the cities in Iraq.  As Donald Rumsfeld declared at a tribute to Milton 
Friedman, ‘Milton is the embodiment of the truth that “ideas have consequences.” … So, 
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yes, he has changed the course of history’ (Rumsfeld 2002_05_09).  Iraq had become a 
test case for American style free market capitalism in the Middle East (see Looney 2003).  
Whilst Thomas Friedman (2005) of the New York Times was keen to point out, ‘we are 
not doing nation-building in Iraq. We are doing nation-creating’, Naomi Klein asserted 
that  
Overnight, Iraq went from being one of the most isolated countries in the world, 
sealed off from the most basic trade by strict UN sanctions, to becoming the 
widest-open market anywhere (2007: 339). 
With the Bush administration espousing domino theory it became clear exactly what type 
of exemplar ‘model’ Iraq was supposed to set for the rest of the region.  This was a far 
cry from President Bush’s assertion that,  
as we watch and encourage reforms in the region, we are mindful that 
modernisation is not the same as Westernisation. Representative governments in 
the Middle East will reflect their own cultures. They will not, and should not, look 
like us (Bush 2003_11_06). 
 
With full scale neoliberalisation taking place in Iraq, it was evident that the Iraqi people 
had not decided to take their economy down this path.  Consequently, Iraq’s interim trade 
minister, Ali Abdul-Amir Allawi, argued that, 
 
We suffered through the economic theories of socialism, Marxism and then 
cronyism … Now we face the prospect of free-market fundamentalism … This 
push to sell everything is the political stance of economic fundamentalism … A 
plan based on ideology, not economics is, of course, naturally wrong … By no 
means should we preserve all state-owned enterprises … But there are some 
sectors that are more natural for government involvement or rehabilitation … We 
understand the need for foreign investment … But we worry that, too, many 
people will be driven out of business before they have a chance to organise … 
[The Iraqi people are] sick and tired of being the subjects of experiments. There 
have been enough shocks to the system, so we don't need this shock therapy in the 
economy (in Crampton 2003). 
 
Condemnation of adopting this neoliberal strategy in Iraq came from diverse corners.  
Paul Krugman, the of the New York Times and winner of the Nobel Prize for economics, 
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argued that by introducing free-trade, supply-side tax policy and privatisation into Iraq, 
the Coalition Provisional Authority ‘undermined the chances for a successful transition to 
democracy’ and reinforced ‘the sense of many Iraqis that we [America] came as 
occupiers, not liberators’ (Krugman 2004a).  Krugman later added that by turning Iraq 
into ‘a playground for right-wing economic theorists … the administration did terrorist 
recruiters a very big favor’ (Krugman 2004b).  Similar discord was echoed by Newt 
Gingrich, the former speaker of the House of Representatives, who told Vice President 
Cheney that ‘Bremer’s [economic] model was totally wrong.  Totally.’ and added that 
‘Bremer is the largest single disaster in American foreign policy in modern times’ (in 
Woodward 2006: 252). 
 
What the Iraq experiment showed however was that the Bush administration was trying 
to establish its ‘single sustainable model’ in Iraq.  Such sentiments had been codified in 
the 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) which argued that,  
 
[T]he great struggles of the twentieth century between liberty and totalitarianism 
ended with a decisive victory for the forces of freedom - and a single sustainable 
model for national success: freedom, democracy, and free enterprise (NSC, 2002). 
 
Consequently, it was through the appropriation of academic theories, articulated with the 
constant repetition of the word “freedom”, that the administration legitimised both its 
intervention and strategy in the region.  Importantly, this essentially contested concept 
was rarely utilised alone.  It was part of a collocation that became defined by the 
‘company’ that it kept, and habitually and predictably being articulated with terms such 
as “peace”, “democracy”, “free trade” and “free markets”.   Thus, as the NSS 2002 set 
out, 
 
[T]he U.S. will use this moment of opportunity to extend the benefits of freedom 
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across the globe … We will actively work to bring the hope of democracy, 
development, free markets, and free trade to every corner of the world (emphasis 
added NSC 2002). 
 
As a result the abstract boundaries of the term “freedom”  were reified and conditioned 
by ideologically framing the debate around a triumvirate of widely understood American 
values; “freedom, democracy and free enterprise” (see Reus-Smit 2004: 34-38; Steger 
2005).  By articulating the triumvirate together what appear to be pluralistic concepts 
were sutured together in an attempt to close their political contestability.  Such an act 
legitimised the notion that they combine into ‘a single sustainable model for national 
success’ (NSC 2002: 1).  This created a paradox in which ‘freedom’ became the choice of 
a single ethnocentric pre-configuration of both the political and economic realms, and not 
the desire on the part of individuals and groups for autonomy.  As Eric Foner points out, 
‘There is no sense that other people may have given thought to the question of freedom 
and arrived at their own conclusions’ (2003: 21).  The utopianism inscribed in the Bush 
administration’s post-crisis narrative embedded a teleological vision of the world 
resulting in a ‘single model’.  This was a ‘hard’ form of Hegelianism, rather than a 
‘softer’ form which would have promoted a move away from tyranny to a destination 
established by the strategically selective agents within the political process being 
transformed; a move towards a utopian vision and not away from tyranny. 
 
Within this scenario, ‘freedom’ implied the existence of intervention from the United 
States to help Middle Eastern regimes achieve the “single sustainable model”.  This was a 
defining feature of the post-crisis narrative presented by the Bush administration, and 
applied as much to the conservative strategy it adopted, as it did to the radical strategy it 
had pursued in Iraq.  Despite the diverse nature of programmes initiated by MEPI and the 
BMENA it was economic reform, exemplified in MEFTA, that provided the Freedom 
Agenda’s nucleus (see table 6).  This was seen as a method of reforming the region and 
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delivering ‘good governance’, whilst ultimately providing a means to combat terrorism.  
Thus, as President Bush declared,  
 
Across the globe, free markets and trade have helped defeat poverty, and taught 
men and women the habits of liberty. So I propose the establishment of a U.S.-
Middle East Free Trade Area within a decade, to bring the Middle East into an 
expanding circle of opportunity, to provide hope for the people who live in that 
region (Bush 2003_05_09). 
 
The argument put forward by the Bush administration was that a lack of economic 
opportunities in the Middle East helped foster resentment towards Western affluence and 
generated conditions that favoured Islamist extremism.  As a logical corollary, it was 
argued that,  
 
The advance of freedom and peace in the Middle East would drain this bitterness 
and increase our own security … The Arab world has a great cultural tradition, 
but is largely missing out on the economic progress of our time. Across the globe, 
free markets and trade have helped defeat poverty, and taught men and women 
the habits of liberty (Bush 2003_05_09). 
 
Instructively, embedded within this vision was a notion that free trade and free markets 
would provide a mechanism for modernisation and ultimately the democratisation of the 
MENA126.  The President was setting out the lessons he had learned at the ‘West Point of 
capitalism’, but articulating them through the prism of counter-terrorism: ‘We fight 
against poverty because hope is an answer to terror’ (Bush 2002_03_22).  Moreover, as 
Colin Powell would declare when launching MEPI, ‘Hope begins with a paycheck’ 
(Powell 2002_12_12).  Thus, the Freedom Agenda was proposing the model of the 
                                              
126 Instructively this argument was not only put forward concerning the MENA, but was also applied to 
China in which the President argued that ‘the advance of markets and free enterprise helped to create a 
middle class that was confident enough to demand their own rights…Our commitment to democracy is 
tested in China…Yet, China's people will eventually want their liberty…China has discovered that 
economic freedom leads to national wealth. China's leaders will also discover that freedom is indivisible - 
that social and religious freedom is also essential to national greatness and national dignity. Eventually, 
men and women who are allowed to control their own wealth will insist on controlling their own lives and 
their own country’  (Bush 2003_11_06). 
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“Asian Tigers”127, to be implemented in the Middle East (see Wittes and Yerkes 2006b).  
The proposed economic strategy at the heart of the Bush administration’s conservative 
approach to the MENA consequently embodied a gradualist and sequential understanding 
of how political economy relates to democratisation in the region.  This was the same 
theory of political change that was posited by candidate Bush in the 2000 presidential 
campaign, but as a result of the “9/11 crisis” had been applied to US-MENA relations.  
Modernity was seen as a single universal model in which democratisation was reachable 
through pursuing economic growth, and integrating the MENA into global markets 
(Lockman 2004: 133-140).  Within this schema, economic freedom was being promoted 
because it was seen as a method of slowly loosening the statist grip that many 
authoritarian regimes have over their economies.   
 
The promise of such a strategy was that it would create wealth that it was assumed would 
“trickle down” and produce a well educated middle class that would demand cultural 
changes favourable to democracy, such as increased secularism and therefore weaken the 
role of Islamic identities (see Grugel 2002: 47).  This was the quintessential expression of 
modernisation thesis that lay at the heart of the Bush administration’s ideological-
discursive formation. As a result, the “ideology of freedom” that the Bush administration 
presented drew an explicit connection between the MENA’s economic stagnation, its 
failure to democratise and terrorism.  Consequently, recognition was given to the 
“demographic time bomb” MENA regimes face.  For a typical regime in the region the 
unemployment rate is often in double digits and rises to above 20 percent.  This is 
coupled with a growing number of young and fairly-well educated workers finding 
themselves without jobs (Lawrence 2006b: 13; Wittes 2008a: 30-55). 
 
                                              
127 South Korea and Taiwan. 
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From such a diagnosis it became apparent that within the conservative side of Bush’s 
Freedom Agenda, it too would adopt a neoliberal prognosis.  MEPI reinforced this 
process by promoting economic reform and private sector development, with the aim of 
enhancing the region’s competitiveness, encouraging investment, and facilitating the 
growth of private enterprise by creating a market-driven framework and private sector led 
economy 128 (USDS-BNEA 2003).  Similarly, the BMENA initiative sought to support 
such activities through several small multilateral projects designed to assist the 
development of private enterprise and promote job training and literacy in the Middle 
East (Wittes and Yerkes 2006b: 8).  Yet, ultimately it was MEFTA that personified the 
neoliberal agenda.   
 
With other areas of the Freedom Agenda being rejected by MENA regimes, it became 
highly evident that by the time the Bush administration was leaving office it was in effect 
pursuing an ‘economics-first’ strategy.  This prescribed standard market-orientated 
measures, which the US and international financial institutions have advocated around 
the world, such as increased privatisation, fiscal reform, banking reform, tax reform, and 
investment liberalisation (Carothers 2005: 198-200).  Rather than challenging the 
political power of friendly regimes, the Bush administration was working with them to 
carefully and slowly create the conditions for reforming their autocracies.  This was 
hardly the radical policy that the Bush administration described it to be, as in many ways 
it simply built on similar policies undertaken by the Clinton administration throughout 
the 1990s; such as the 1994 Gore-Mubarak Commission, the 1998 US-North Africa 
Economic Partnership (USNAEP), and in 1996 amended the 1985 US-Israel Free Trade 
Agreement to include the West Bank, Gaza and Qualified Industrial Zones in Jordan 
                                              
128 This has been implemented on the ground through programmes such as the Partnership for Financial 
Excellence, Middle East Entrepreneur training, the Commercial Law Initiative, and the Middle East 
Finance Corporation. 
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(Dunne 2005: 210).  The focus of these talks was very similar in emphasis to those being 
discussed under the MEFTA talks, with a focus on ‘dismantling and privatising statist 
economic structures, facilitating trade and foreign investment (including through 
accession to the WTO), and generating employment’ (Dunne 2005: 210; Lawrence 
2006b).  Such efforts demonstrate a notable continuity between the Clinton 
administration and G. W. Bush’s MEFTA initiative.  To this extent, it is evident that the 
Bush administration’s democracy promotion rationale, which apparently broke with the 
past, drew significantly on the “one-size fits all” logic of the “Washington Consensus” in 
which democracy (mainly meaning elections), open markets  (that follow the 
prescriptions of neoliberal economics), and free trade (within larger interdependent 
markets), all fit together and reinforce one another (Wiarda 1997: 16; Thomas 2005: 328-
34; Williamson 2004; Goldgeier 2008a).   
 
Moreover, as the Freedom Agenda became ‘watered-down’ and the Bush administration 
retreated, it became evident that what remained was an incoherent set of policies held 
together by a neoliberal core; economic reform was the order of the day and not directly 
challenging or necessitating serious political reform from friendly allies in the MENA.  
This was in effect a set of policies that friendly regimes in the MENA desired.  As Robert 
Z. Lawrence argued,  
 
[T]he US interest in MEFTA is not primarily economic.  Rather it reflects 
geopolitical and security considerations.  The MEFTA initiative reflects the 
judgement that US interests cannot be best advanced through purely military or 
political initiatives.  To be effective in the battle for hearts and minds in the region 
the policy needs an economic component.  By contrast, for Arab countries the 
interest in MEFTA is primarily economic (2006a: 2). 
 
The appeal of this approach was located in the manner in which it created the illusion of 
favouring both parties.  Middle Eastern regimes were able to accept such an agreement in 
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the belief that economic reforms would allow them to alleviate the poor social conditions 
that threaten their power.  Whilst the US was able to pursue a strategy which many 
believed would dilute the appeal of Islamist groups and move the region slowly to stable, 
liberalised democracies.  This apparently symbiotic relationship is appealing because of 
its gradualist emphasis in which the US need not directly challenge friendly regimes, 
consequently allowing cooperation to ensue on security and other economic concerns.  In 
effect, it provided the default foundations upon which the Freedom Agenda’s final 
iteration was constructed, by offering an illusionary ‘silver bullet’ to Middle East reform.  
Accordingly, it mirrors Edward Ingram’s insight about pax-Americana, which favours 
‘trade and investment without rule whenever possible, but with rule when unavoidable’ 
(2007: 7). 
 
Whilst this neoliberal agenda was being marketed as a tool to modernise the MENA and 
fight terrorism, MEFTA was regarded by Robert B Zoellick as part of his ‘competitive 
liberalisation strategy’ (Magnusson 2003: 94).  This strategy would be used to make an 
assault on protectionism, whilst countries eager for greater access to US markets would 
vie for Washington’s attention and approval (Magnusson 2003: 94; Lawrence 2006b: 4-
12).  As this suggests, the US strategy was to utilise its economic means for political 
ends, making it a form of economic statecraft, because it pursued political goals through 
the use of economic instruments (see Hill 2003: 148-52).  This strategy was highly 
significant for pursuing primacy in the Middle East because it sought to increase 
American influence in the region by creating interdependence between the US and 
Middle Eastern economies, therefore strengthening American hegemony.  However, for 
the MENA’s autocratic regimes this form of liberalisation has typically been part of a 
regime-driven survival strategy, which in the past allowed governments to avoid 
legitimation crises by diffusing popular dissatisfaction.  This apparently symbiotic 
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relationship provided the default foundations upon which the Freedom Agenda was 
constructed, demonstrating that whilst ‘democratisation’ was portrayed as being in the 
national interest, economic liberalisation inspired by modernisation thesis was seen by 
the Bush administration as the best way to achieve it.    
 
Uncomfortable Bed Fellows: Between Democracy and Domination 
The aim of this research has not been to make predictions about the future of 
democratisation in the Middle East, as much as it has not been concerned with critiquing 
the future implications that the Freedom Agenda will have on the MENA region.  Rather, 
the emphasis has been on ‘understanding’ and rendering apparent the ideological-
discursive formation underpinning the Freedom Agenda.  This in itself is seen as a 
political act, rather than having the author construct alternative definitions of ‘freedom’ 
and ‘democracy’ and juxtaposing them with those embodied within the Freedom Agenda.  
Notably, this has not been done, because it is recognised that these are essentially 
contested concepts and therefore the author is sceptical about whether this would have 
been a fruitful method of critique.  Moreover, as a logical premise of a hermeneutic 
philosophy it is seen as best practise to understand what is being proposed, and therefore 
go beyond obfuscation, before attempting any fusion of horizons.  The added value of 
this research is that it seeks to understand the Freedom Agenda from the moment of 
conception and therefore open up political dialogue for future debate.  However, as a 
consequence, this research has been guilty of particularism, in that it has not drawn wider 
historical or philosophical inferences that can be generalised.  Naturally, this is a product 
of the constructivist institutionalist approach, which instructs process-tracing of a 
particular post-crisis policy evolution and institutionalisation.  Consequently, this author 
makes no apology for this research’s narrow focus. 
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Yet, before concluding this research is would be productive to make some cautious 
tentative steps at inferences that may guide future research on the Freedom Agenda.  The 
first of which is philosophical, and which leads into the second which is historical and 
political.  Thus, one of the defining features about the Freedom Agenda and the notion of 
‘freedom’ that underpins its neoliberal emphasis, is that it falls into what Isaiah Berlin 
defined as a ‘positive’ conception of freedom.  Indeed, using Berlin’s conceptions of 
negative and positive liberty as a heuristic tool is illustrative: 
 
I am normally said to be free to the degree to which no man or body of men 
interferes with my activity … If I am prevented by others from doing what I could 
otherwise do, I am to that degree unfree; and if this area is contracted by other 
men beyond a certain minimum, I can be described as being coerced, or, it may 
be, enslaved … Coercion implies the deliberate interference of other human 
beings within the area in which I could otherwise act (Berlin 2006). 
 
The implications of this are imperative as it can be argued that to the extent that the US 
favoured stability, and through doing so supported autocratic regimes with military and 
economic aid packages over popular opposition (whatever its form), the US was 
complicit in removing that population’s negative liberty under the rubric of American 
national interests.  Consequently, the inhabitants of the MENA cannot be said to have 
negative liberty to the extent that the US intervenes in the area.  Notably, this is the form 
of freedom that is undermined by the US desire for primacy over the region to secure its 
long term interests. 
 
Yet, the US, through the Freedom Agenda, was offering the MENA a positive conception 
of liberty.  Embedded in the Freedom Agenda’s teleological vision, was a rule structure 
that bestows a pattern of action of a certain kind129.  Freedom was the name of an end-
state; the ‘single sustainable model’ of democracy, development, free enterprise and free 
trade.  The dangers of offering such a positive conception of liberty were strongly 
                                              
129 For an excellent analysis of Berlin’s conception of positive liberty see Quentin Skinner’s A Third 
Concept of Liberty (2006: 243-65). 
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pronounced by Berlin, and are worth quoting at length: 
 
The ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ notions of freedom historically developed in 
divergent directions … until, in the end, they came into direct conflict with each 
other … The perils of using organic metaphors to justify the coercion of some 
men by others in order to raise them to a ‘higher’ level of freedom have been 
pointed out … we recognise that it is possible, and at times justifiable, to coerce 
men in the name of some goal … which they would, if they were more 
enlightened, themselves pursue, but do not because they are blind or ignorant or 
corrupt.  This renders it easy for me to conceive of myself as coercing others for 
their own sake, in their, not my, interest.  I am then claiming that I know what 
they truly need better than they know it themselves … Once I take this view, I am 
in a position to ignore the actual wishes of men or societies, to bully, oppress, 
torture them in the name, and on behalf of their ‘real’ selves (2006: 44-5). 
 
This is a prophetic vision of what happened in Iraq, not only through the adoption of 
neoliberal policy, but more profoundly in events in Abu Ghraib prison and beyond.  More 
widely, what Berlin’s distinction provides is a method of understanding the Freedom 
Agenda as stuck between a policy of domination and democracy.  To accept that the US 
has a legitimate right to intervene in the region, especially to secure its own primacy, is to 
accept domination.  Indeed, if one consults the etymological roots of the term dominus 
and dominari, a lord and to be lord over, such control can legitimately be termed 
domination.  However, such a position is not contradictory if it is understood that the 
Freedom Agenda is based on a positive conception of liberty, in which freedom is not 
based on autonomy, but rather a pattern of action and an end state that is seen to be 
conducive to pax-Americana.  The grand liberal strategy the Bush administration put 
forward can therefore be seen as a policy of ensuring primacy but also as propagating a 
positive conception of liberty.  The strategy is caught between free trade as the positive 
route to liberty, and domination to the extent that negative liberty is undermined in favour 
of stability.  The problem facing the Freedom Agenda, as inherited by the Obama 
administration, is therefore the extent to which this positive conception of freedom will 
be accepted or rejected by the people in the MENA region; will it be perceived as a neo-
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colonial project, as indeed it was often asserted to be as presented by the Bush 
administration, or will some fusion of horizons occur?  Ultimately it is too soon to tell, 
but it does appear that there is a rather uncomfortable tension between asserting 
American primacy over the region at the same time as attempting to increasing 
freedom/democracy/liberalisation; domination and ‘freedom’ are surely uncomfortable 
bed fellows as a long term project? 
 
The contradiction between democracy and domination is not a new phenomenon in US 
foreign policy.  It is as old as the United States’ first democratisation project carried out 
in the Philippines in 1892, when a policy of democratisation emerged as part of a 
compromise between proponents of an American empire and anti-imperialists (LaFeber 
1994: 212-7; Schmidt 2005: 38-42).  As Tony Smith maintains about the first 
democratisation project,  
 
Imperialists could … tout the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon race, while anti-
imperialists could reassure themselves that the ideals of self-government would 
not be endangered … the democratisation of the Philippines came to be the 
principle reason the Americans were there; now the United States had a moral 
purpose to its imperialism and could rest more easily … democracy would 
become the moving faith of the forty-eight years of American control (1994: 43).   
 
These genealogical origins are revealing, not only do they highlight the less than benign 
nature in which American foreign policy originally adopted democracy promotion as a 
strategy, but additionally the manner in which “democratisation” can be utilised as a 
discourse to justify a policy of subjugation, authority and rule.   
 
This delivers us the second historical and political inference.  At the time of the Bush 
administration leaving office, the Freedom Agenda had failed to deliver a single state in 
the MENA to the status of a full blown democratic transition.  This is not to suggest that 
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this was a failure in and of itself, as the strategy was always regarded as long term 
‘generational’ project.  By its own criteria ‘reform’ was the prerogative with gradual 
modernisation the goal.  Yet, the path that the Freedom Agenda has set may prove 
problematic precisely because of the neoliberal modernisation model at the heart of the 
project.  The course that has been set strongly resembles what Barry Gills has termed 
‘low-intensity democracy’ (see Gills, Rocamora, and Wilson 1993).  Notably Gills points 
out that, 
 
there may be a deep seated antagonism between the extension of American power 
through accelerated and intensified neoliberal economic globalisation and the 
realization of social progress through meaningful democratization.  The economic 
policies pursued by the US tend to pre-configure the political, narrowing the 
range of regime type to a form called ‘low-intensity democracy’, which itself is a 
political form not necessarily conductive to real economic progress for the 
majority.  Low-intensity democracy has, however, emerged as a characteristic 
political form of the post-cold war era, in which formal electoral democracy is 
promoted, but the transformatory capacity of democracy is limited in order to 
facilitate neoliberal economic policies (Gills 2000: 326). 
 
Many authors have illustrated that low-intensity democracy has been a model adopted by 
many parts of the developing world (see Gills, Rocamora, and Wilson 1993: 127-257).  
With it, neoliberal policy has brought increased inequality, social polarisation and the 
predominant sum of the world’s wealth being held by the few.  Consequently economic 
power is concentrated, whilst labour is increasingly exploited.  The prospects of such a 
scenario in the MENA is cause for great concern, not least because whilst the Freedom 
Agenda was marketed on the premise that it would deliver greater prosperity and security 
to the region and the world, it may in fact have laid the foundations for something 
radically different.  Thus, whilst individuals such as Thomas Friedman of the New York 
Times have argued that President Bush’s ‘aggressive engagement’ should be backed as 
the best strategy for ‘leading the Arab world into globalisation’ (2003: 314-5),  it is well 
worth ruminating on the implications of this through further research. If Gills is correct, 
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and the ‘simultaneity of economic liberalisation and democratisation creates particular 
problems of transition for all these societies and generally exacerbates the problems of 
maintaining social and political stability’ (2000: 331), then it would appear that even the 
final iteration of the Freedom Agenda, with its emphasis on a neoliberal economics first 
strategy, may need radical reform, if not complete abandonment.   
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Conclusion 
 
 
On January 15, 2009, a ceremony to commemorate the foreign policy achievements of 
the G. W. Bush administration was held in the Department of State’s Benjamin Franklin 
Room.  With President Bush sitting centre stage, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice 
declared that, ‘today is a very special day. We are going to commemorate many of the 
achievements of our nation over the last eight years in furthering the Freedom Agenda’ 
(Rice 2009_01_15).  Not only was the Secretary of State highlighting the centrality of the 
Freedom Agenda to President Bush’s tenure in office, but also to his Presidential 
legacy130.  Moreover, this occasion was also used to make a series of claims about the 
Freedom Agenda policy.  It was asserted that, ‘over the past eight years’ in the ‘fog of 
events’, the Bush administration was guided by ‘principles’ and a ‘commitment to an 
unwavering belief in the power of freedom’ (Rice 2009_01_15).  As such, the Freedom 
Agenda was represented as the defining ‘mission’ of the Bush administration, which 
would endure because ‘the support of human dignity and human liberty … is as old as 
America itself’ (Rice 2009_01_15).  The Secretary of State also added that there were 
now, ‘democratically elected leaders in Kosovo, Lebanon, Liberia, Afghanistan, and 
Iraq’, and that these countries ‘have experienced a new birth of freedom … Because 
when impatient patriots looked for support in their struggle for liberation, America and 
you, Mr. President, stood with them’ (Rice 2009_01_15).  The findings of this research 
problematise and challenge this “official” representation of the Freedom Agenda. 
 
Whilst challenging the “official” representation of the Freedom Agenda is itself a 
                                              
130 January 2009 marked a significant period, in which the Bush administration sought to defend its legacy.  
A significant part of this defence was the emphasis placed on the Freedom Agenda.  Condoleezza Rice 
claimed that President Bush made the Freedom Agenda the ‘hallmark of his presidency’, adding that ‘I 
think the United States of America is extraordinary in being a powerful country that has never sought and 
will never seek empire’ (Rice 2009_01_16). 
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contribution to debate, this thesis also adds value to current literature in FPA, and has 
improved the debate concerning American democracy promotion in the MENA in three 
major areas.  Firstly, it has developed a rigorous methodology that is capable of 
theorising and analysing post-crisis policy-making.  Secondly, it has generated a greater 
understanding of how and why the Freedom Agenda was developed, by demonstrating 
the cumulative and evolutionary steps that led to its creation, following the construction 
of September 11, 2001 as a “crisis”.  Thirdly, it has created a greater understanding of 
how the Freedom Agenda was constituted, by returning to first order questions and 
addressing what the Bush administration meant by the terms ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’, 
and how these definitions translated into a policy of conservative radicalism.   
 
When this research into the Freedom Agenda began, its aim was to understand why 
members of the Bush administration were asserting the need to promote ‘freedom’ and 
‘democracy’ as both a method of engaging with the MENA, and as a counter-terrorism 
strategy.  Furthermore, this research wanted to explore what members of the Bush 
administration meant when they used such terms, and how this was being translated into 
policy.  Consequently, a robust methodology was needed, as an aid for answering these 
questions.  Such a methodology was developed, in the form of constructivist 
institutionalism, which was sensitive to the role of structure and agency, ideas and 
material, and continuity and change in Foreign Policy Analysis.  By setting out an 
explicit set of ontological and epistemological foundations, to underpin this research, an 
ordering-framework was created that posited the need to focus on moments of crises, and 
trace the processes and narratives that emerge from them.  Instructively, the constructivist 
institutionalist methodology itself represents a contribution to knowledge.  It builds on 
contemporary trends in the study of foreign policy, and adds to debates concerning 
continuity and change.  Indeed, whilst in this research the methodology was deployed in 
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the study of foreign policy, it could also be used to analyse post-crisis policy-making and 
institutional development in multiple disciplines across the social sciences131.  Its 
strength lies in the fact that it is philosophically rigorous, has an interdisciplinary focus 
and is capable of theorising the complex processes of continuity and change in human 
affairs.  Moreover, its ability to combine critical and historical analysis is a virtue, and 
with further development could prove to be an innovative method of producing 
alternative policy recommendations.  The strengths of this methodology have come to 
fruition in this research, and have proved intrinsic its empirical focus and findings. 
                                             
 
Notably, the constructivist institutionalist methodology was able to theorise the 
relationship between the events of September 11, 2001, and the development of the 
Freedom Agenda, rather than simply asserting a relationship based on their succession in 
time.  This is a meaningful contribution, as it highlights the central role of September 11, 
2001, and the manner in which it marked a moment of punctuation in US-MENA 
relations.  The implications of this assertion are evident throughout this research.  
Accordingly, section three of this research, demonstrated how the 2000 Presidential 
campaign set the stage for the future Bush administration to outline a distinctive 
ideological-discursive formation.  This appropriated and articulated primacy, hegemonic 
stability theory, neoliberalism and modernisation thesis into a distinctive formation, 
which in turn, sedimented particular definitions of concepts such as ‘power’, ‘peace’, 
‘democracy’ and ‘freedom’.  The importance of this cannot be underestimated.   
 
From January to September 2001, President Bush was asserting the need for continuity in 
US-MENA relations.  The most prominent reform in this interregional relationship was 
 
131 Having presented and discussed this methodology at multiple academic conferences, interest in this 
methodology has been registered from academics who study IR, European Studies, Development, 
Management Studies and Middle Eastern Studies. 
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Bush’s decoupling strategy; vis-à-vis the peace process and Iraq.  However, this situation 
changed as a result of the events of September 11, 2001, generating a moment of 
punctuation in political time.  This moment of punctuation created a space for Bush’s 
distinct ideological-discursive formation to be strategically embedded within a post-crisis 
narrative, which laid discursive tracks for the evolution of the Freedom Agenda.  This 
post-crisis narrative foregrounded the concept of ‘freedom’ and asserted that America 
was attacked because it was ‘free’.  What was remarkable about such a depoliticising 
conclusion was the absence of detailed expansive studies into the “causes” of terrorism to 
justify this assertion.  To deal with the uncertainty created as a result of September 11, 
2001, the Bush administration primarily utilised logics arising out of the post-Cold War 
era, the perceived need for an overarching rationale for US foreign policy, and a re-
constructed sense of America as ‘exceptional’.  That is to say, the form of change that 
followed the moment of punctuation was largely an endogenous product of how 
strategically selective actors viewed the strategically selective context.  Consequently, it 
is safe to conclude that post-Cold War identity politics proved to be a critical dynamic in 
shaping the post-crisis narrative, and played a vital role in the eventual evolution of the 
Freedom Agenda.   
 
Understanding the role of post-Cold War identity politics, allows a more generalisable 
point to be made.  September 11, 2001 was not epochal and certainly did not, as the Bush 
administration argued, ‘change everything’ (see Dunmire 2009; Dobson 2006; Cole 
2006).  Rather, the nature of political change is more akin to that of a “kaleidoscope”.  
Indeed, this is a metaphor deployed by the British Prime Minister Tony Blair in his 
response to September 11, 2001: 
 
This is a moment to seize.  The kaleidoscope has been shaken.  The pieces are in 
flux.  Soon they will settle again.  Before they do, let us reorder this world around 
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us (Blair 2001_10_02). 
 
This vignette is instructive because it captures a certain quality about political continuity 
and change that was evident in the process-tracing narrative discourse analysis carried out 
through this research.  Namely, that discourses are important in the conduct of foreign 
policy, and when moments of punctuation occur, they can be re-constructed by 
articulating them into a different formation.  This suggests that there is always a binding 
with the past, as these discourses have genealogies, but when placed in a different 
formation, through productive invention, they can lead to political change132.  The 
Freedom Agenda was a product of exactly this sort of situation, in which a new 
strategically constituted narrative grasped together multiple factors to construct a plot.  
The Freedom Agenda was, to continue the metaphor, the Bush administration’s attempt 
to reorder the MENA, as a consequence of ‘the kaleidoscope being shaken’, but the 
pieces within the kaleidoscope were there to be shaken in the first place. 
 
Moreover, to understand the Freedom Agenda required reconstructing the context from 
which it arose, and fundamentally analysing the post-crisis narrative that guided its 
institutionalisation.  From doing so, this research has demonstrated that the Freedom 
Agenda constituted a new policy paradigm in US-MENA relations, which was a product 
of a cumulative post-crisis policy-making process.  Thus, events following September 11, 
were not analysed in this research based on the notion that ‘history is just one damn thing 
after another’, but rather, because events, such as the war in Afghanistan, the Bletchely II 
meeting, and the Iraq war, all added to how strategically selective actors viewed the 
                                              
132 It is instructive here to recall the concluding words to John Maynard Keynes’ The General Theory of 
Employment, Interest and Money, in which he asserts that, ‘The ideas of economists and political 
philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly 
understood.  Indeed the world is ruled by little else.  Practical men [sic], who believe themselves to be quite 
exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist.  Madmen [sic] 
in authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few 
years back.  I am sure that the power of vested interests is vastly exaggerated compared with the gradual 
encroachment of ideas’ (1936: 383). 
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strategically selective context.  As a result, what was considered feasible, practical and 
desirable changed, and out of this reformulation, the Freedom Agenda was perceived to 
be in America’s national interest, and institutionalised as a new paradigm in US-MENA 
relations.  The historical narrative presented in this research, therefore demonstrates that 
policy evolves over time as policy-makers try to solve policy puzzles in conditions of 
uncertainty.  Consequently, they develop and deploy specific ideological-discursive 
formations (embedded within narratives) to support their strategic actions, and legitimate 
the policy directions they have constructed within institutional settings.   
 
Policy-making is not, however, a perfect “science”.  Herein, despite the Bush 
administration attempting to make democracy promotion the central objective of US-
MENA relations, both in the form of creating a domino effect after the Iraq war and 
through the Freedom Agenda institutions, it became clear that the new paradigm was 
problematic.  Whilst the administration gradually recognised that the war on terror could 
not be fought through military means alone, promoting democracy in the MENA proved 
to be more difficult than the Bush administration had originally conceived.  In the belief 
that ‘freedom’ was a universal value, and the natural political arrangement societies 
would adopt if authoritarian rule was removed, the Bush administration lowered the bar 
of how difficult promoting democracy in the MENA would be.  Indeed, with a growing 
insurgency in Iraq, and the democratic victory of Hamas in the 2006, it was clear that the 
Freedom Agenda was all but abandoned by the Bush administration.  This was the case in 
spite of the Bush administration claiming that it had pursued the agenda throughout its 
tenure in office, and that “freedom” had been the administration’s loadstar.  The Freedom 
Agenda was consequently unable to provide an overarching rationale for the war on 
terror, and was certainly not akin to containment in the Cold War era, despite President 
Bush attempting to make realise this ambition in his second term in office.     
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 As this research has demonstrated, US-MENA relations became characterised by a policy 
of conservative radicalism.  The Freedom Agenda, as a result was strongly committed to 
regional stability and the gradual reform of ally regimes, whilst seeking to challenge 
regimes hostile to the US.  This realisation adds to the existing debate about the Freedom 
Agenda, because it generates a more complex understanding of the policy, and 
consequently moves the debate forward.  Indeed, the Bush administration’s vision for the 
Middle East is made considerably clearer once it is acknowledged that the United States 
sought to promote democracy because it believed that this would tip the global “balance 
of power” in America’s favour and subsequently assure continued US preponderance and 
ascendancy.  It was not democracy in and of itself that was being advocated, but rather, 
democracy that would suit perceived American interests.  By highlighting the 
conservative radicalism dyad, this research illustrates a fundamental tension in US-
MENA relations; September 11th may have changed the manner in which the US viewed 
the Middle East, but it merely compounded the perceived need for short-term cooperation 
in the pursuit of other more immediate security goals.  Where this occurred, the Bush 
administration consistently gave priority to the latter.  Consequently, this research has 
demonstrated that the Freedom Agenda was contradictory at best, and, at worst, a 
legitimating concept for the pursuit of US preponderance over the MENA.  It was 
ultimately a policy caught between pursuing democracy and domination.  The 
implications of this clearly demonstrate that, despite the constant repetition of the word 
“freedom”, which became the trope of the war on terror, elevated to chief purveyor of 
legitimacy and idol of the tribe, it was necessary to look past this essentially contested 
term and return to first order questions about how the Freedom Agenda was constituted.  
Undertaking this task was robustly aided by the constructivist institutionalist 
methodology. 
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 Accordingly, section four of this research explicitly addressed how the Freedom Agenda 
was constituted.  Its findings clearly demonstrate that the Bush administration overstated 
the centrality of the Freedom Agenda in US-MENA relations.  The narrative presented by 
the White House, obfuscated the degree to which there were tensions in the 
administration over the institutionalisation of the Freedom Agenda.  Indeed, the “official” 
narrative wrote out the extent to which members of the Department of Defense and 
Department of State were hostile to the Freedom Agenda.  This was a particularly fecund 
finding of this research, as it reveals how the ‘conflict of interest’ problem was difficult 
for the administration to address.  Moreover, it demonstrates how a mismatch between 
regional specialist and the growing democracy bureaucracy, proved to be an obstacle in 
coordinating and entrenching the Freedom Agenda paradigm.  Herein, it is safe to 
conclude that despite the President’s grand rhetoric, a more complex reality was 
unfolding within the administration itself, which is certainly an area for further study133.  
The constructivist institutionalist methodology would be well equipped at taking this 
research forward and dealing with this dynamic, by introducing a distinction between 
‘master’ and ‘sectoral’ discourses, which would compare the “official” narrative with that 
produced by specialists in the democracy bureaucracy  (see Schmidt 2000).  This would 
allow a much more detailed assessment of how effectively the “official” narrative and 
policy formulation translated at a policy-practitioner level.   
 
This is not to say that this research has not contributed to the debate in this area.  
Carrying out this research has revealed a more generalisable issue about US democracy 
                                              
133 My intention was to conduct this research as part of this study.  However, due to access issues outlined 
in chapter six this was not undertaken.  Given the change of administrations, it is my intention to attempt to 
carryout this research in the future, and contact individuals that may now be willing to be interviewed.  
Moreover, with the expected publication of memoirs by Carl Rove, Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld 
there will certainly be more information made available over the coming years regarding this issue.   
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promotion.  Namely, that the US struggles to promote democracy, because it is not clear 
how best to do so.  This accounts for the ad hoc programmes the Freedom Agenda 
institutions pursued, and was reflected in J. Scott Carpenter’s assertion that ‘we don't 
know yet how best to promote democracy … there are times when you throw spaghetti 
against the wall and see if it sticks’ (in Finkel 2005: see chapter eleven).  Despite this 
insight, however, it was unambiguously clear that the Bush administration relied on 
ideological convictions, rather than detailed empirical subscriptions, in its assertions that 
the democratisation process could be brought about by subscribing to neoliberal reforms 
and modernisation thesis.  Whilst it is too early to access the consequences of this 
gradualist economics-first approach, it is clear that there are both philosophical and 
practical problems with this strategy.  Moreover, in light of the global ‘Banking Crisis’ 
that took hold in the final throws of the Bush administration’s tenure in office, it would 
be prudent to conduct further studies to see what effects this has had on the region given 
that MEFTA increased the MENA region’s exposure to global markets.  Indeed, whilst 
literature on the adoption of neoliberal logics in Iraq has been sparse, even fewer studies 
have been undertaken into the impact of MEFTA.   
 
Thus, despite the Bush administration’s tenure in office having been completed, the 
importance of further analysis into the Freedom Agenda remains.  Whilst President 
Obama has signalled a more pragmatic approach to dealing with the MENA, and played 
down calls to pursue the Freedom Agenda, his administration has accepted the link 
between democracy promotion and fighting terror (see Hassan 2009).  Moreover, in 
President Obama’s June 4, 2009 speech in Cairo, it was clear that the new administration 
was adopting a similar vernacular to that of his predecessor, emphasising democracy 
promotion as a product of “partnerships” with Middle Eastern regimes (Obama 
2009_06_04).  Evidently, the institutional legacy of the Freedom Agenda has been 
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inherited by the Obama administration, and the findings of this research therefore remain 
pertinent to American foreign policy.  By generating a greater understanding of the 
Freedom Agenda’s construction, this research has not only added value the debate 
concerning Bush’s Freedom Agenda, but will further inform this debate to the extent that 
the Obama administration chooses to continue down the path of the Freedom Agenda’s 
institutional legacy.   
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Tables: 
 
Table 1: MEPI Pillars, Objectives and Focus (Compiled from MEPI 2008) 
 
 
Pillar Objective Focus 
 
Political Pillar 
 
To develop institutions and processes 
that are essential to active citizenries 
and accountable, representative 
governments.  Programmes bring 
NGOs, governments and citizens 
together to push the boundaries of 
change. 
 
 Elections and 
Political Process.  
 Civil Society and 
Reform Advocacy. 
 Media. 
 Rule of Law. 
 
 
Economic 
Pillar 
 
Focusing on region wide economic and 
employment growth driven by private 
sector expansion and entrepreneurship. 
 
 Investment. 
 Entrepreneurship. 
 Trade/Transparency.
 
 
Education 
Pillar 
 
To support education systems that 
enable all people, especially girls, to 
acquire the knowledge and skills 
necessary to compete in today’s 
economy and improve the quality of 
their lives and those of their families. 
 
 
 
 Access. 
 Quality. 
 Skills Development. 
 
Women’s 
Pillar 
 
To support local NGOs and Women 
reformers in the MENA in their effort 
to achieve full participation in society. 
This pillar focuses on addressing 
cultural, legal, regulatory, economic 
and political barriers that women 
encounter in their daily lives. 
 
 
 Women and the 
Law. 
 Women in 
Democracy. 
 Women’s rights. 
 Women’s economic 
empowerment. 
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Table 2: Examples of MEPI Programme Activities in Practice (Compiled from 
MEPI 2005) 
 
Pillar Activities 
 
Political 
• Increased the transparency of Lebanon's elections in 2005 through 
targeted technical and material support to domestic monitoring 
organisations, voter education, journalists, and candidates.  
• Provided support to over 2,000 domestic election monitors for 
Egypt's first multi-candidate election.  
• Supporting the only live satellite broadcasts of Arab parliamentary 
sessions.  
• Supporting national and local political party organisations and their 
members in countries that will have new rounds of municipal and 
parliamentary elections in 2005-2007.  
• Strengthening the role of civil society in the democratic process by 
facilitating dialogue among activists, NGOs, and foreign ministers at 
G8/BMENA meetings and by awarding more than 70 indigenous 
civil society organisations with direct grants.  
 
Economic 
 
• Entrepreneurial training for more than 180 participants from 16 
Middle East and North African countries. Almost half were women. 
Twenty alumni have started or expanded businesses. At least 150 
new jobs have been created.  
• Extended credit and services to small- and medium-sized businesses 
through peer consultation and training for regional banks and 
financial organisations.  
• Established self-sustaining Junior Achievement chapters in 12 
countries throughout the Middle East - over 10,000 students have 
participated. Created public-private partnerships that assisted in the 
sustainability of Junior Achievement chapters.  
• Expanded trade capacity of Arab countries with training and 
technical assistance; a number of Gulf countries are drafting new 
labour laws and updating import/export agricultural standards.  
• Created the first-ever Business Women's Summit for Middle Eastern 
businesswomen. Two hundred women from 16 Middle East and 
North Africa countries and eight American businesswomen 
attended. A new Middle East and North Africa Business Women's 
Network was created by the attendees.  
 
Education 
 
• Providing English language study to over 1,500 underserved youth 
from 13 countries in the Middle East through a micro-scholarship 
programme. As a result of the programme's initial success, the 
programme size is being increased to reach 13,000 people, with an 
added focus on civic responsibility.  
• Translated over 80 children's book titles into Arabic and providing 
more than a million new books to the Middle East through the first-
ever effort to use classroom libraries to develop independent 
reading, critical thinking, and analytical skills in young people.  
• Developing new English as a Foreign Language and on-line civic 
education curricula for grades K-12 through public-private 
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partnership among global and local businesses, governments, and 
NGOs.  
• Empowering young, highly motivated Arab men and women with 
leadership, problem-solving, and entrepreneurial skills through 
intensive five-week institutes. More than 135 students have 
participated, and many started their own projects back at home.  
• Demonstrating creative, innovative solutions to education challenges 
through "Partnership Schools" that offer quality and relevant 
education alternatives for children and serve as models for 
governments as they address additional educational challenges in the 
future.  
 
Women 
 
• Raising the political, advocacy, and communication skills of women 
candidates through innovative Regional Campaign Schools attended 
by over 300 women from the Middle East and North Africa.  
• Providing regional micro-enterprise and business internships for 
women that include a one-month executive MBA programme and a 
three-month internship at Fortune 500 businesses; 42 women from 
16 countries in the region have attended so far.  
• Building a professional network for Arab women legal 
professionals, which offers professional development training 
programmes, policy roundtables, mentoring, and a resource 
directory.  
• Published the first-of-its-kind comprehensive survey and analysis on 
the status of women's freedom in 17 countries and territories in the 
Middle East.  
• Empowering grassroots women's NGOs across the region through 
targeted training on advocacy, negotiation, outreach and 
communication skills to build foundations for democratic reform.  
• Providing training for judges and legal professionals on issues 
ranging from the family code to domestic violence and honour 
killings.  
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Table 3: Requested and Actual MEPI Funding FY2002- FY2009 (See McInerney 
2008) Figures are in US $ Millions 
 
 
Financial Year 
 
 
Requested 
 
Actual 
 
Cumulative 
Actual Total 
FY2002 --- 29 --- 
FY2003 --- 90 119 
FY2004 145 89.5 208.5 
FY2005 150 74.4 282.9 
FY2006 120 114.4 397.3 
FY2007 120 50.8 448.1 
FY2008 75 49.6 497.7 
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Table 4: Status of US-MEFTA Efforts as of January 2009 (Updated from USTR 
2006) 
 
Note: The Palestinian Authority Participates in the US-Israel FTA. 
 
 
 
Country 
 
 
FTA 
 
TIFA 
 
BIT 
 
WTO 
 
GSP 
Israel √ √ √ √ Not Eligible 
Jordan √ √ √ √ √ 
Morocco √ √ √ √ √ 
Bahrain √ √ √ √ Not Eligible 
Egypt Suspended 
Negotiation 
January 2006 
√ √ √ √ 
Lebanon  √  Negotiating 
Accession 
√ 
Algeria  √  Negotiating 
Accession 
√ 
Tunisia  √ √ √ √ 
Saudi Arabia  √  √ Not Eligible 
Oman √ √  √ √ 
Kuwait  √  √ Not Eligible 
 
UAE 
Suspended 
Negotiation 
March 2007 
√  √ Not Eligible 
Yemen  √  Negotiating 
Accession 
√ 
Qatar  √  √ Not Eligible 
Syria     Not Eligible 
Iraq  √  Negotiating 
Accession 
√ 
Libya    Negotiating 
Accession 
Not Eligible 
Iran    Negotiating 
Accession 
Not Eligible 
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Table 5: Sample of Binary Identity Constructions Deployed by the Bush 
Administration 
 
Note: This list of adjectives is by no means exhaustive, but rather provides an attributive 
vernacular that essentialised the identities of the “terrorists” and “America”(see Bush 
2001_09_11b, 2001_09_11c, 2001_09_12a, 2001_09_12b, 2001_09_14, 2001_09_18, 
2001_09_20, 2001_10_07, 2001_11_08). 
 
 
Description of “Terrorists” 
 
Description of “America” 
 
Terrorists Liberators 
Evil Good 
Tyrannical Free 
Unjust Just 
Barbaric/ Uncivilised Progressive/ Civilised 
Violent Peaceful 
Cowardly Daring/ Brave/  Heroic/ Courageous 
Weak Strong 
Intolerant Tolerant 
Cruel Kind 
Brutal Loving 
Indifferent Caring 
Mad Reasonable 
 
 
Table 6: Areas addressed by the Freedom Agenda (From Wittes and Yerkes 
2006a: 6) 
 
Programme Political  
Reform 
Economic 
Reform 
Educational 
Reform 
Women’s 
Empowerment 
Middle East 
Free Trade 
Area 
3 3   
Broader 
Middle East 
and North 
Africa 
Initiative 
3 3 3  
Democracy 
Assistance 
Programmes 
(MEPI, DRL, 
USAID) 
3 3 3 3 
 
3=Core Programme focus. 
3=Conceptual commitment no-programming. 
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Appendices Overview:  
 
Appendix 1: Visa Letter 
Appendix 2: Free Nodes Creation 
Appendix 3: Free Nodes List 
Appendix 4: Tree Node Example 
 
Appendices: 
 
Appendix 1: Visa Letter 
 
Available on request. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 2: Free Nodes Creation 
Note:  This is an example of the software program NVivo 8, in which free nodes can be 
created.  In the left-hand column is a ‘text’, in this case a speech by President G. W. 
Bush, and in the right-hand column is a list of free nodes that correspond to a 
categorisation of the text.  These were created by the author.  This coding process proved 
invaluable in the process-tracing narrative discourse analysis, as it allowed large amounts 
of qualitative data to processed and retrieved.   
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Appendix 3: Free Nodes List 
Note:  The virtue of creating free nodes is that they are listed in the NVivo programme, 
and therefore provide an overview of the qualitative data.  The programme also complies 
information about how many times a free node appears throughout the data sample.  This 
allowed the author to evaluate changes in the discourse over time. 
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Appendix 4: Tree Node Example 
Note:  Once free nodes have been created they can be put into hierarchical tree nodes.  
These are made by the author and represent models of how ideas are connected.  In this 
example the tree node was titled “Representations of American Identity”, and 
accumulated the multiple free nodes that described “America” and “Americans”.  Free 
nodes such as “American Exceptionalism”, “America Innocent”, “Victim-hood” and 
“Liberators” were included within the tree node. 
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